Effects of paying physicians based on their relative performance for quality. Changing remuneration systems: effects on activity in general practice. The influence of bonus payments to doctors on hospital revenue: results of a quasi-experimental study. Prepayment with office-based physicians in publicly funded programs: results from the Children's Medicaid Program. Prepayment was superior to postpayment cash incentives in a randomized postal survey among physicians. Early experience with pay-for-performance: from concept to practice. Paying doctors by salary: a controlled study of general practitioner behaviour in England. A randomized controlled trial evaluating the impact of knowledge translation and exchange strategies. Can computer-generated evidence-based care suggestions enhance evidence-based management of asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease? A randomized, controlled trial.
Studies examining the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs to improve quality of care primarily have been confined to bonus-type arrangements that reward providers for performance above a predetermined threshold. No studies to date have evaluated programs placing providers at financial risk for performance relative to other participants in the program.
                The objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of an incentive program conferring limited financial risk to primary care physicians.
                There were 334 participating primary care physicians in Rochester, New York.
                The design of the study is a retrospective cohort study using pre/post analysis.
                The measurements adhere to 4 diabetes performance measures between 1999 and 2004.
                While absolute performance levels increased across all measures immediately following implementation, there was no difference between the post- and pre-intervention trends indicating that the overall increase in performance was largely a result of secular trends. However, there was evidence of a modest 1-time improvement in physician adherence for eye examination that appeared attributable to the incentive program. For this measure, physicians improved their adherence rate on average by 7 percentage points in the year after implementation of the program.
                This study demonstrates a modest effect in improving provider adherence to quality standards for a single measure of diabetes care during the early phase of a pay-for-performance program that placed physicians under limited financial risk. Further research is needed to determine the most effective incentive structures for achieving substantial gains in quality of care. To investigate the effects on general practitioners' activities of a change in their remuneration from a capitation based system to a mixed fee per item and capitation based system.
                Follow up study with data collected from contact sheets completed by general practitioners in one period before (March 1987) a change in their remuneration system and two periods after (March 1988, November 1988), with a control group of general practitioners with a mixed fee per item and capitation based system throughout.
                General practices in Copenhagen city (index group) and Copenhagen county (control group).
                265 General practitioners in Copenhagen city, of whom 100 were selected randomly from the 130 who agreed to participate (10 exclusions) and 326 general practitioners in Copenhagen county.
                Number of consultations (face to face and by telephone) and renewals of prescriptions, diagnostic and curative services, and specialist and hospital referrals per 1000 enlisted patients in one week.
                Of the 75 general practitioners who completed all three sheets, four were excluded for incomplete data. Total contact rates per 1000 patients listed rose significantly compared with the rates before the change index in the city (100.0 before the change v 111.7 (95% confidence interval 106.4 to 117.4 after the change) and over the same time in the control group (100.0 v 106.0), but within a year these rates fell (to 104.2(99.1 to 109.6) and 104.0 respectively). There was an increase in consultations by telephone initially but not thereafter. Rates of examinations and treatments that attracted specific additional remuneration after the change rose significantly compared with those before (diagnostic services, 138.1 (118.7 to 160.5) and 159.5 (137.8 to 184.7) and curative services 194.6 (152.2 to 248.9) and 194.8(152.3 to 249.2) for second and third data collections respectively) and with the control group (diagnostic services 105.3, 107.6 and curative services 106.0, 115.0) whereas referral rates to secondary care fell (specialist referrals 90.1 (80.7 to 100.6) and 77.0 (68.6 to 86.4) and hospital referrals 87.4 (71.1 to 107.5) and 68.4 (54.7 to 85.4] in doctors in the city.
                Introducing a partial fee for service system seemed to stimulate the provision of services by general practitioners, resulting in reduced referral rates. The concept of a "target income" which doctors aim at, rather than maximising their income seemed to play a part in adjustment to changing the system of remuneration. There is wide consensus that the ways in which providers are reimbursed by third parties will affect their behaviour and, hence, the efficient use of limited resources and the performance of health systems. However, there seems to be little evidence on how payment to hospital-based doctors affects hospital performance. This paper reports a case study conducted in China on the effects of different types of bonus payment to doctors, with a focus on how bonus payment might have affected hospital revenue growth. This has been an increasingly important goal of public hospitals as they have gained increased autonomy. A set of longitudinal quasi-experimental data, and a set of cross-sectional data, both derived from 108 public hospitals, were used for the analysis. It was found that, when a bonus system was introduced, and when the bonus model switched from one with a weaker incentive to provide services to one with a stronger incentive, there was a consistent sudden increase in the rate of growth of hospital revenue. Bonus type was also associated with the size of hospital service revenue. The results highlight the potential risks of linking remuneration too closely with revenue generation, and the need to ensure adequate attention to mechanisms of control and accountability when hospitals are given greater autonomy. This paper is a report of the results of a demonstration designed to provide empirical evidence regarding the effects of alternative approaches to paying physicians for serving children in the Medicaid program: (1) visit fees set at twice regular Medicaid fees in return for physician agreement to manage utilization and (2) capitation and financial risk-sharing along with the same physician agreement to manage utilization. Participating physicians were assigned randomly to either of the two payment groups. Comparisons of utilization and expenditures were made between these two plans and the regular Medicaid program (fee-for-service, low fees). Results showed no adverse effect of capitation payments on primary care visits to office-based physicians. Capitation physician referrals to specialists decreased relative to all other groups studied, consistent with the theory that the financial incentives in capitation will lead primary care physicians to reduce referrals to specialists. Improving response rates, particularly among physicians, is important to minimize nonresponder bias and increase the effective sample size in epidemiologic research. We conducted a randomized trial to examine the impact of prepayment vs. postpayment incentives on response rates.
                Self-completion postal questionnaires were mailed to 949 physicians who were respondents to an earlier survey and representative of the general physician population in Hong Kong. These physicians were randomly allocated to receive a HK dollar 20 cash prepayment incentive that accompanied the survey (n=474) or a postpayment reward of the same amount on receipt of the completed questionnaire (n=475).
                The final prepayment response rate was 82.9%, compared with 72.5% in the postpayment arm (P < .001). Of the eight alternative incentive and follow-up strategies evaluated, three lie on the efficiency frontier (i.e., not dominated), including postpayment with three mailings at HK dollar 42.7, prepayment with three mailings at HK dollar 66.5 and prepayment with three mailings and telephone follow-up at HK dollar 112.1 per responder recruited (US dollar 1=HK dollar 7.8).
                The findings demonstrate that prepayment cash incentives are superior to postpayment of the equivalent amount in improving response rates among a representative sample of Hong Kong physicians. Further research should concentrate on confirming the generalizability of these findings in other health care occupation groups and settings. The adoption of pay-for-performance mechanisms for quality improvement is growing rapidly. Although there is intense interest in and optimism about pay-for-performance programs, there is little published research on pay-for-performance in health care.
                To evaluate the impact of a prototypical physician pay-for-performance program on quality of care.
                We evaluated a natural experiment with pay-for-performance using administrative reports of physician group quality from a large health plan for an intervention group (California physician groups) and a contemporaneous comparison group (Pacific Northwest physician groups). Quality improvement reports were included from October 2001 through April 2004 issued to approximately 300 large physician organizations.
                Three process measures of clinical quality: cervical cancer screening, mammography, and hemoglobin A1c testing.
                Improvements in clinical quality scores were as follows: for cervical cancer screening, 5.3% for California vs 1.7% for Pacific Northwest; for mammography, 1.9% vs 0.2%; and for hemoglobin A1c, 2.1% vs 2.1%. Compared with physician groups in the Pacific Northwest, the California network demonstrated greater quality improvement after the pay-for-performance intervention only in cervical cancer screening (a 3.6% difference in improvement [P = .02]). In total, the plan awarded 3.4 million dollars (27% of the amount set aside) in bonus payments between July 2003 and April 2004, the first year of the program. For all 3 measures, physician groups with baseline performance at or above the performance threshold for receipt of a bonus improved the least but garnered the largest share of the bonus payments.
                Paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed performance target may produce little gain in quality for the money spent and will largely reward those with higher performance at baseline. The study aim was to evaluate the impact of the experimental introduction of salaried contracts in England on general practitioner (GP) behaviour and the quality of care. A controlled before-and-after design was implemented involving ten practices of standard contract GPs, paid largely by capitation and fee-for-service, and ten salaried GP practices. Diaries and routinely available data were used to assess GP workload, and patient assessments of the quality of care were obtained by postal questionnaire. GPs in salaried practices spent less time on practice administration but more working out-of-hours and in direct patient care, allowing more patients to be seen. Total list sizes were smaller in salaried compared with standard contract practices, but lists per GP were higher because of staffing policies. Salaried GPs tended to provide shorter consultations compared with standard contract GPs, prescribe in fewer consultations, but referral rates were similar. Quality was rated as higher for seven out of thirteen aspects of care examined in salaried practices and two in standard contract practices. However, none of these differences were statistically significant. To conclude, salaried contracts did not adversely affect GP productivity and had little impact on other aspects of GP behaviour or the quality of care provided. Significant resources and time are invested in the production of research knowledge. The primary objective of this randomized controlled trial was to evaluate the effectiveness of three knowledge translation and exchange strategies in the incorporation of research evidence into public health policies and programs.
                This trial was conducted with a national sample of public health departments in Canada from 2004 to 2006. The three interventions, implemented over one year in 2005, included access to an online registry of research evidence; tailored messaging; and a knowledge broker. The primary outcome assessed the extent to which research evidence was used in a recent program decision, and the secondary outcome measured the change in the sum of evidence-informed healthy body weight promotion policies or programs being delivered at health departments. Mixed-effects models were used to test the hypotheses.
                One hundred and eight of 141 (77%) health departments participated in this study. No significant effect of the intervention was observed for primary outcome (p < 0.45). However, for public health policies and programs (HPPs), a significant effect of the intervention was observed only for tailored, targeted messages (p < 0.01). The treatment effect was moderated by organizational research culture (e.g., value placed on research evidence in decision making).
                The results of this study suggest that under certain conditions tailored, targeted messages are more effective than knowledge brokering and access to an online registry of research evidence. Greater emphasis on the identification of organizational factors is needed in order to implement strategies that best meet the needs of individual organizations.
                The trial registration number and title are as follows: ISRCTN35240937 -- Is a knowledge broker more effective than other strategies in promoting evidence-based physical activity and healthy body weight programming? Translation of evidence-based guidelines into clinical practice has been inconsistent. We performed a randomized, controlled trial of guideline-based care suggestions delivered to physicians when writing orders on computer workstations.
                Inner-city academic general internal medicine practice.
                Randomized, controlled trial of 246 physicians (25 percent faculty general internists, 75 percent internal medicine residents) and 20 outpatient pharmacists. We enrolled 706 of their primary care patients with asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Care suggestions concerning drugs and monitoring were delivered to a random half of the physicians and pharmacists when writing orders or filling prescriptions using computer workstations. A 2 x 2 factorial randomization of practice sessions and pharmacists resulted in four groups of patients: physician intervention, pharmacist intervention, both interventions, and controls. DATA EXTRACTION/COLLECTION METHODS: Adherence to the guidelines and clinical activity was assessed using patients' electronic medical records. Health-related quality of life, medication adherence, and satisfaction with care were assessed using telephone questionnaires.
                During their year in the study, patients made an average of five scheduled primary care visits. There were no differences between groups in adherence to the care suggestions, generic or condition-specific quality of life, satisfaction with physicians or pharmacists, medication compliance, emergency department visits, or hospitalizations. Physicians receiving the intervention had significantly higher total health care costs. Physician attitudes toward guidelines were mixed.
                Care suggestions shown to physicians and pharmacists on computer workstations had no effect on the delivery or outcomes of care for patients with reactive airways disease.
The evidence from the studies identified in this review is not of sufficient quality or power to obtain a clear answer to the question as to whether target payment remuneration provides a method of improving primary health care. Additional efforts should be directed in evaluating changes in physicians' remuneration systems. Although it would not be difficult to design a randomised controlled trial to evaluate the impact of such payment systems, it would be difficult politically to conduct such trials.