Daily Papers

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Factuality assesses the extent to which a language utterance relates to real-world information; it determines whether utterances correspond to facts, possibilities, or imaginary situations, and as such, it is instrumental for fact checking. Factuality is a complex notion that relies on multiple linguistic signals, and has been studied in various disciplines. We present a complex, multi-faceted annotation scheme of factuality that combines concepts from a variety of previous works. We developed the scheme for Hebrew, but we trust that it can be adapted to other languages. We also present a set of almost 5,000 sentences in the domain of parliamentary discourse that we manually annotated according to this scheme. We report on inter-annotator agreement, and experiment with various approaches to automatically predict (some features of) the scheme, in order to extend the annotation to a large corpus.

Standard factuality evaluations of LLMs treat all errors alike, obscuring whether failures arise from missing knowledge (empty shelves) or from limited access to encoded facts (lost keys). We propose a behavioral framework that profiles factual knowledge at the level of facts rather than questions, characterizing each fact by whether it is encoded, and then by how accessible it is: cannot be recalled, can be directly recalled, or can only be recalled with inference-time computation (thinking). To support such profiling, we introduce WikiProfile, a new benchmark constructed via an automated pipeline with a prompted LLM grounded in web search. Across 4 million responses from 13 LLMs, we find that encoding is nearly saturated in frontier models on our benchmark, with GPT-5 and Gemini-3 encoding 95--98% of facts. However, recall remains a major bottleneck: many errors previously attributed to missing knowledge instead stem from failures to access it. These failures are systematic and disproportionately affect long-tail facts and reverse questions. Finally, we show that thinking improves recall and can recover a substantial fraction of failures, indicating that future gains may rely less on scaling and more on methods that improve how models utilize what they already encode.

While LLMs exhibit remarkable fluency, their utility is often compromised by factual hallucinations and a lack of traceable provenance. Existing resources for grounding mitigate this but typically enforce a dichotomy: they offer either structured knowledge without textual context (e.g., knowledge bases) or grounded text with limited scale and linguistic coverage. To bridge this gap, we introduce FactNet, a massive, open-source resource designed to unify 1.7 billion atomic assertions with 3.01 billion auditable evidence pointers derived exclusively from 316 Wikipedia editions. Unlike recent synthetic approaches, FactNet employs a strictly deterministic construction pipeline, ensuring that every evidence unit is recoverable with byte-level precision. Extensive auditing confirms a high grounding precision of 92.1%, even in long-tail languages. Furthermore, we establish FactNet-Bench, a comprehensive evaluation suite for Knowledge Graph Completion, Question Answering, and Fact Checking. FactNet provides the community with a foundational, reproducible resource for training and evaluating trustworthy, verifiable multilingual systems.

Standard federated learning (FL) approaches are vulnerable to the free-rider dilemma: participating agents can contribute little to nothing yet receive a well-trained aggregated model. While prior mechanisms attempt to solve the free-rider dilemma, none have addressed the issue of truthfulness. In practice, adversarial agents can provide false information to the server in order to cheat its way out of contributing to federated training. In an effort to make free-riding-averse federated mechanisms truthful, and consequently less prone to breaking down in practice, we propose FACT. FACT is the first federated mechanism that: (1) eliminates federated free riding by using a penalty system, (2) ensures agents provide truthful information by creating a competitive environment, and (3) encourages agent participation by offering better performance than training alone. Empirically, FACT avoids free-riding when agents are untruthful, and reduces agent loss by over 4x.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently driven striking performance improvements across a range of natural language processing tasks. The factual knowledge acquired during pretraining and instruction tuning can be useful in various downstream tasks, such as question answering, and language generation. Unlike conventional Knowledge Bases (KBs) that explicitly store factual knowledge, LLMs implicitly store facts in their parameters. Content generated by the LLMs can often exhibit inaccuracies or deviations from the truth, due to facts that can be incorrectly induced or become obsolete over time. To this end, we aim to comprehensively evaluate the extent and scope of factual knowledge within LLMs by designing the benchmark Pinocchio. Pinocchio contains 20K diverse factual questions that span different sources, timelines, domains, regions, and languages. Furthermore, we investigate whether LLMs are able to compose multiple facts, update factual knowledge temporally, reason over multiple pieces of facts, identify subtle factual differences, and resist adversarial examples. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of LLMs show that existing LLMs still lack factual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing trustworthy artificial intelligence. The dataset Pinocchio and our codes will be publicly available.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Assessing factuality of text generated by large language models (LLMs) is an emerging yet crucial research area, aimed at alerting users to potential errors and guiding the development of more reliable LLMs. Nonetheless, the evaluators assessing factuality necessitate suitable evaluation themselves to gauge progress and foster advancements. This direction remains under-explored, resulting in substantial impediments to the progress of factuality evaluators. To mitigate this issue, we introduce a benchmark for Factuality Evaluation of large Language Models, referred to as felm. In this benchmark, we collect responses generated from LLMs and annotate factuality labels in a fine-grained manner. Contrary to previous studies that primarily concentrate on the factuality of world knowledge (e.g.~information from Wikipedia), felm focuses on factuality across diverse domains, spanning from world knowledge to math and reasoning. Our annotation is based on text segments, which can help pinpoint specific factual errors. The factuality annotations are further supplemented by predefined error types and reference links that either support or contradict the statement. In our experiments, we investigate the performance of several LLM-based factuality evaluators on felm, including both vanilla LLMs and those augmented with retrieval mechanisms and chain-of-thought processes. Our findings reveal that while retrieval aids factuality evaluation, current LLMs are far from satisfactory to faithfully detect factual errors.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

Modern language models capture a large body of factual knowledge. However, some facts can be incorrectly induced or become obsolete over time, resulting in factually incorrect generations. This has led to the development of various editing methods that allow updating facts encoded by the model. Evaluation of these methods has primarily focused on testing whether an individual fact has been successfully injected, and if similar predictions for other subjects have not changed. Here we argue that such evaluation is limited, since injecting one fact (e.g. ``Jack Depp is the son of Johnny Depp'') introduces a ``ripple effect'' in the form of additional facts that the model needs to update (e.g.``Jack Depp is the sibling of Lily-Rose Depp''). To address this issue, we propose a novel set of evaluation criteria that consider the implications of an edit on related facts. Using these criteria, we then construct , a diagnostic benchmark of 5K factual edits, capturing a variety of types of ripple effects. We evaluate prominent editing methods on , showing that current methods fail to introduce consistent changes in the model's knowledge. In addition, we find that a simple in-context editing baseline obtains the best scores on our benchmark, suggesting a promising research direction for model editing.

This survey addresses the crucial issue of factuality in Large Language Models (LLMs). As LLMs find applications across diverse domains, the reliability and accuracy of their outputs become vital. We define the Factuality Issue as the probability of LLMs to produce content inconsistent with established facts. We first delve into the implications of these inaccuracies, highlighting the potential consequences and challenges posed by factual errors in LLM outputs. Subsequently, we analyze the mechanisms through which LLMs store and process facts, seeking the primary causes of factual errors. Our discussion then transitions to methodologies for evaluating LLM factuality, emphasizing key metrics, benchmarks, and studies. We further explore strategies for enhancing LLM factuality, including approaches tailored for specific domains. We focus two primary LLM configurations standalone LLMs and Retrieval-Augmented LLMs that utilizes external data, we detail their unique challenges and potential enhancements. Our survey offers a structured guide for researchers aiming to fortify the factual reliability of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly slow-thinking models, often exhibit severe hallucination, outputting incorrect content due to an inability to accurately recognize knowledge boundaries during reasoning. While Reinforcement Learning (RL) can enhance complex reasoning abilities, its outcome-oriented reward mechanism often lacks factual supervision over the thinking process, further exacerbating the hallucination problem. To address the high hallucination in slow-thinking models, we propose Knowledge-enhanced RL, KnowRL. KnowRL guides models to perform fact-based slow thinking by integrating a factuality reward, based on knowledge verification, into the RL training process, helping them recognize their knowledge boundaries. KnowRL guides models to perform fact-based slow thinking by integrating a factuality reward, based on knowledge verification, into the RL training process, helping them recognize their knowledge boundaries. This targeted factual input during RL training enables the model to learn and internalize fact-based reasoning strategies. By directly rewarding adherence to facts within the reasoning steps, KnowRL fosters a more reliable thinking process. Experimental results on three hallucination evaluation datasets and two reasoning evaluation datasets demonstrate that KnowRL effectively mitigates hallucinations in slow-thinking models while maintaining their original strong reasoning capabilities. Our code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/KnowRL.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of recalling multilingual factual knowledge present in their pretraining data. However, most studies evaluate only the final model, leaving the development of factual recall and crosslingual consistency throughout pretraining largely unexplored. In this work, we trace how factual recall and crosslingual consistency evolve during pretraining, focusing on OLMo-7B as a case study. We find that both accuracy and consistency improve over time for most languages. We show that this improvement is primarily driven by the fact frequency in the pretraining corpus: more frequent facts are more likely to be recalled correctly, regardless of language. Yet, some low-frequency facts in non-English languages can still be correctly recalled. Our analysis reveals that these instances largely benefit from crosslingual transfer of their English counterparts -- an effect that emerges predominantly in the early stages of pretraining. We pinpoint two distinct pathways through which multilingual factual knowledge acquisition occurs: (1) frequency-driven learning, which is dominant and language-agnostic, and (2) crosslingual transfer, which is limited in scale and typically constrained to relation types involving named entities. We release our code and data to facilitate further research at https://github.com/cisnlp/multilingual-fact-tracing.

In real world applications, knowledge graphs (KG) are widely used in various domains (e.g. medical applications and dialogue agents). However, for fact verification, KGs have not been adequately utilized as a knowledge source. KGs can be a valuable knowledge source in fact verification due to their reliability and broad applicability. A KG consists of nodes and edges which makes it clear how concepts are linked together, allowing machines to reason over chains of topics. However, there are many challenges in understanding how these machine-readable concepts map to information in text. To enable the community to better use KGs, we introduce a new dataset, FactKG: Fact Verification via Reasoning on Knowledge Graphs. It consists of 108k natural language claims with five types of reasoning: One-hop, Conjunction, Existence, Multi-hop, and Negation. Furthermore, FactKG contains various linguistic patterns, including colloquial style claims as well as written style claims to increase practicality. Lastly, we develop a baseline approach and analyze FactKG over these reasoning types. We believe FactKG can advance both reliability and practicality in KG-based fact verification.

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant safety concerns have emerged. Fundamentally, the safety of large language models is closely linked to the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and clarity of their understanding of safety knowledge, particularly in domains such as law, policy and ethics. This factuality ability is crucial in determining whether these models can be deployed and applied safely and compliantly within specific regions. To address these challenges and better evaluate the factuality ability of LLMs to answer short questions, we introduce the Chinese SafetyQA benchmark. Chinese SafetyQA has several properties (i.e., Chinese, Diverse, High-quality, Static, Easy-to-evaluate, Safety-related, Harmless). Based on Chinese SafetyQA, we perform a comprehensive evaluation on the factuality abilities of existing LLMs and analyze how these capabilities relate to LLM abilities, e.g., RAG ability and robustness against attacks.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Knowledge-grounded dialogue is a task of generating an informative response based on both the dialogue history and external knowledge source. In general, there are two forms of knowledge: manually annotated knowledge graphs and knowledge text from website. From various evaluation viewpoints, each type of knowledge has advantages and downsides. To further distinguish the principles and determinants from the intricate factors, we conduct a thorough experiment and study on the task to answer three essential questions. The questions involve the choice of appropriate knowledge form, the degree of mutual effects between knowledge and the model selection, and the few-shot performance of knowledge. Supported by statistical shreds of evidence, we offer conclusive solutions and sensible suggestions for directions and standards of future research.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Fact-checking is the task of verifying the veracity of claims by assessing their assertions against credible evidence. The vast majority of fact-checking studies focus exclusively on political claims. Very little research explores fact-checking for other topics, specifically subject matters for which expertise is required. We present the first study of explainable fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise. For our case study we choose the setting of public health. To support this case study we construct a new dataset PUBHEALTH of 11.8K claims accompanied by journalist crafted, gold standard explanations (i.e., judgments) to support the fact-check labels for claims. We explore two tasks: veracity prediction and explanation generation. We also define and evaluate, with humans and computationally, three coherence properties of explanation quality. Our results indicate that, by training on in-domain data, gains can be made in explainable, automated fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

To evaluate knowledge in large language models (LLMs), current methods query the model and then evaluate its generated responses. In this work, we ask whether evaluation can be done before the model has generated any text. Concretely, is it possible to estimate how knowledgeable a model is about a certain entity, only from its internal computation? We study this question with two tasks: given a subject entity, the goal is to predict (a) the ability of the model to answer common questions about the entity, and (b) the factuality of responses generated by the model about the entity. Experiments with a variety of LLMs show that KEEN, a simple probe trained over internal subject representations, succeeds at both tasks - strongly correlating with both the QA accuracy of the model per-subject and FActScore, a recent factuality metric in open-ended generation. Moreover, KEEN naturally aligns with the model's hedging behavior and faithfully reflects changes in the model's knowledge after fine-tuning. Lastly, we show a more interpretable yet equally performant variant of KEEN, which highlights a small set of tokens that correlates with the model's lack of knowledge. Being simple and lightweight, KEEN can be leveraged to identify gaps and clusters of entity knowledge in LLMs, and guide decisions such as augmenting queries with retrieval.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

How do transformer-based large language models (LLMs) store and retrieve knowledge? We focus on the most basic form of this task -- factual recall, where the model is tasked with explicitly surfacing stored facts in prompts of form `Fact: The Colosseum is in the country of'. We find that the mechanistic story behind factual recall is more complex than previously thought. It comprises several distinct, independent, and qualitatively different mechanisms that additively combine, constructively interfering on the correct attribute. We term this generic phenomena the additive motif: models compute through summing up multiple independent contributions. Each mechanism's contribution may be insufficient alone, but summing results in constructive interfere on the correct answer. In addition, we extend the method of direct logit attribution to attribute an attention head's output to individual source tokens. We use this technique to unpack what we call `mixed heads' -- which are themselves a pair of two separate additive updates from different source tokens.

Plain language summarization with LLMs can be useful for improving textual accessibility of technical content. But how factual are these summaries in a high-stakes domain like medicine? This paper presents FactPICO, a factuality benchmark for plain language summarization of medical texts describing randomized controlled trials (RCTs), which are the basis of evidence-based medicine and can directly inform patient treatment. FactPICO consists of 345 plain language summaries of RCT abstracts generated from three LLMs (i.e., GPT-4, Llama-2, and Alpaca), with fine-grained evaluation and natural language rationales from experts. We assess the factuality of critical elements of RCTs in those summaries: Populations, Interventions, Comparators, Outcomes (PICO), as well as the reported findings concerning these. We also evaluate the correctness of the extra information (e.g., explanations) added by LLMs. Using FactPICO, we benchmark a range of existing factuality metrics, including the newly devised ones based on LLMs. We find that plain language summarization of medical evidence is still challenging, especially when balancing between simplicity and factuality, and that existing metrics correlate poorly with expert judgments on the instance level.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Transdisciplinary approaches are increasingly essential for addressing grand societal challenges, particularly in complex domains such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), urban planning, and social sciences. However, effectively validating and integrating knowledge across distinct epistemic and ontological perspectives poses significant difficulties. This article proposes a six-dimensional framework for assessing and strengthening transdisciplinary knowledge validity in AI and city studies, based on an extensive analysis of the most cited research (2014--2024). Specifically, the framework classifies research orientations according to ontological, epistemological, methodological, teleological, axiological, and valorization dimensions. Our findings show a predominance of perspectives aligned with critical realism (ontological), positivism (epistemological), analytical methods (methodological), consequentialism (teleological), epistemic values (axiological), and social/economic valorization. Less common stances, such as idealism, mixed methods, and cultural valorization, are also examined for their potential to enrich knowledge production. We highlight how early career researchers and transdisciplinary teams can leverage this framework to reconcile divergent disciplinary viewpoints and promote socially accountable outcomes.

Despite the recent observation that large language models (LLMs) can store substantial factual knowledge, there is a limited understanding of the mechanisms of how they acquire factual knowledge through pretraining. This work addresses this gap by studying how LLMs acquire factual knowledge during pretraining. The findings reveal several important insights into the dynamics of factual knowledge acquisition during pretraining. First, counterintuitively, we observe that pretraining on more data shows no significant improvement in the model's capability to acquire and maintain factual knowledge. Next, there is a power-law relationship between training steps and forgetting of memorization and generalization of factual knowledge, and LLMs trained with duplicated training data exhibit faster forgetting. Third, training LLMs with larger batch sizes can enhance the models' robustness to forgetting. Overall, our observations suggest that factual knowledge acquisition in LLM pretraining occurs by progressively increasing the probability of factual knowledge presented in the pretraining data at each step. However, this increase is diluted by subsequent forgetting. Based on this interpretation, we demonstrate that we can provide plausible explanations for recently observed behaviors of LLMs, such as the poor performance of LLMs on long-tail knowledge and the benefits of deduplicating the pretraining corpus.

We propose an approach for estimating the latent knowledge embedded inside large language models (LLMs). We leverage the in-context learning (ICL) abilities of LLMs to estimate the extent to which an LLM knows the facts stored in a knowledge base. Our knowledge estimator avoids reliability concerns with previous prompting-based methods, is both conceptually simpler and easier to apply, and we demonstrate that it can surface more of the latent knowledge embedded in LLMs. We also investigate how different design choices affect the performance of ICL-based knowledge estimation. Using the proposed estimator, we perform a large-scale evaluation of the factual knowledge of a variety of open source LLMs, like OPT, Pythia, Llama(2), Mistral, Gemma, etc. over a large set of relations and facts from the Wikidata knowledge base. We observe differences in the factual knowledge between different model families and models of different sizes, that some relations are consistently better known than others but that models differ in the precise facts they know, and differences in the knowledge of base models and their finetuned counterparts.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

In this paper, we introduce knowledge image generation as a new task, alongside the Massive Multi-Discipline Multi-Tier Knowledge-Image Generation Benchmark (MMMG) to probe the reasoning capability of image generation models. Knowledge images have been central to human civilization and to the mechanisms of human learning -- a fact underscored by dual-coding theory and the picture-superiority effect. Generating such images is challenging, demanding multimodal reasoning that fuses world knowledge with pixel-level grounding into clear explanatory visuals. To enable comprehensive evaluation, MMMG offers 4,456 expert-validated (knowledge) image-prompt pairs spanning 10 disciplines, 6 educational levels, and diverse knowledge formats such as charts, diagrams, and mind maps. To eliminate confounding complexity during evaluation, we adopt a unified Knowledge Graph (KG) representation. Each KG explicitly delineates a target image's core entities and their dependencies. We further introduce MMMG-Score to evaluate generated knowledge images. This metric combines factual fidelity, measured by graph-edit distance between KGs, with visual clarity assessment. Comprehensive evaluations of 16 state-of-the-art text-to-image generation models expose serious reasoning deficits -- low entity fidelity, weak relations, and clutter -- with GPT-4o achieving an MMMG-Score of only 50.20, underscoring the benchmark's difficulty. To spur further progress, we release FLUX-Reason (MMMG-Score of 34.45), an effective and open baseline that combines a reasoning LLM with diffusion models and is trained on 16,000 curated knowledge image-prompt pairs.

Knowledge Graphs (KGs) store structured factual knowledge by linking entities through relationships, crucial for many applications. These applications depend on the KG's factual accuracy, so verifying facts is essential, yet challenging. Expert manual verification is ideal but impractical on a large scale. Automated methods show promise but are not ready for real-world KGs. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer potential with their semantic understanding and knowledge access, yet their suitability and effectiveness for KG fact validation remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce FactCheck, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs for KG fact validation across three key dimensions: (1) LLMs internal knowledge; (2) external evidence via Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG); and (3) aggregated knowledge employing a multi-model consensus strategy. We evaluated open-source and commercial LLMs on three diverse real-world KGs. FactCheck also includes a RAG dataset with 2+ million documents tailored for KG fact validation. Additionally, we offer an interactive exploration platform for analyzing verification decisions. The experimental analyses demonstrate that while LLMs yield promising results, they are still not sufficiently stable and reliable to be used in real-world KG validation scenarios. Integrating external evidence through RAG methods yields fluctuating performance, providing inconsistent improvements over more streamlined approaches -- at higher computational costs. Similarly, strategies based on multi-model consensus do not consistently outperform individual models, underscoring the lack of a one-fits-all solution. These findings further emphasize the need for a benchmark like FactCheck to systematically evaluate and drive progress on this difficult yet crucial task.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

LLMs and AI chatbots have improved people's efficiency in various fields. However, the necessary knowledge for answering the question may be beyond the models' knowledge boundaries. To mitigate this issue, many researchers try to introduce external knowledge, such as knowledge graphs and Internet contents, into LLMs for up-to-date information. However, the external information from the Internet may include counterfactual information that will confuse the model and lead to an incorrect response. Thus there is a pressing need for LLMs to possess the ability to distinguish reliable information from external knowledge. Therefore, to evaluate the ability of LLMs to discern the reliability of external knowledge, we create a benchmark from existing knowledge bases. Our benchmark consists of two tasks, Question Answering and Text Generation, and for each task, we provide models with a context containing counterfactual information. Evaluation results show that existing LLMs are susceptible to interference from unreliable external knowledge with counterfactual information, and simple intervention methods make limited contributions to the alleviation of this issue.

Large Language Models (LLMs) assist in specialized tasks but struggle to align with evolving domain knowledge without costly fine-tuning. Domain knowledge consists of: Knowledge: Immutable facts (e.g., 'A stone is solid') and generally accepted principles (e.g., ethical standards); Refined Memory: Evolving insights shaped by business needs and real-world changes. However, a significant gap often exists between a domain expert's deep, nuanced understanding and the system's domain knowledge, which can hinder accurate information retrieval and application. Our Memory-Augmented Refinement of Knowledge (MARK) framework enables LLMs to continuously learn without retraining by leveraging structured refined memory, inspired by the Society of Mind. MARK operates through specialized agents, each serving a distinct role: Residual Refined Memory Agent: Stores and retrieves domain-specific insights to maintain context over time; User Question Refined Memory Agent: Captures user-provided facts, abbreviations, and terminology for better comprehension; LLM Response Refined Memory Agent: Extracts key elements from responses for refinement and personalization. These agents analyse stored refined memory, detect patterns, resolve contradictions, and improve response accuracy. Temporal factors like recency and frequency prioritize relevant information while discarding outdated insights. MARK enhances LLMs in multiple ways: Ground Truth Strategy: Reduces hallucinations by establishing a structured reference; Domain-Specific Adaptation: Essential for fields like healthcare, law, and manufacturing, where proprietary insights are absent from public datasets; Personalized AI Assistants: Improves virtual assistants by remembering user preferences, ensuring coherent responses over time.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

Scaling laws describe the relationship between the size of language models and their capabilities. Unlike prior studies that evaluate a model's capability via loss or benchmarks, we estimate the number of knowledge bits a model stores. We focus on factual knowledge represented as tuples, such as (USA, capital, Washington D.C.) from a Wikipedia page. Through multiple controlled datasets, we establish that language models can and only can store 2 bits of knowledge per parameter, even when quantized to int8, and such knowledge can be flexibly extracted for downstream applications. Consequently, a 7B model can store 14B bits of knowledge, surpassing the English Wikipedia and textbooks combined based on our estimation. More broadly, we present 12 results on how (1) training duration, (2) model architecture, (3) quantization, (4) sparsity constraints such as MoE, and (5) data signal-to-noise ratio affect a model's knowledge storage capacity. Notable insights include: * The GPT-2 architecture, with rotary embedding, matches or even surpasses LLaMA/Mistral architectures in knowledge storage, particularly over shorter training durations. This arises because LLaMA/Mistral uses GatedMLP, which is less stable and harder to train. * Prepending training data with domain names (e.g., wikipedia.org) significantly increases a model's knowledge capacity. Language models can autonomously identify and prioritize domains rich in knowledge, optimizing their storage capacity.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Open Information Extraction (OIE) methods extract facts from natural language text in the form of ("subject"; "relation"; "object") triples. These facts are, however, merely surface forms, the ambiguity of which impedes their downstream usage; e.g., the surface phrase "Michael Jordan" may refer to either the former basketball player or the university professor. Knowledge Graphs (KGs), on the other hand, contain facts in a canonical (i.e., unambiguous) form, but their coverage is limited by a static schema (i.e., a fixed set of entities and predicates). To bridge this gap, we need the best of both worlds: (i) high coverage of free-text OIEs, and (ii) semantic precision (i.e., monosemy) of KGs. In order to achieve this goal, we propose a new benchmark with novel evaluation protocols that can, for example, measure fact linking performance on a granular triple slot level, while also measuring if a system has the ability to recognize that a surface form has no match in the existing KG. Our extensive evaluation of several baselines show that detection of out-of-KG entities and predicates is more difficult than accurate linking to existing ones, thus calling for more research efforts on this difficult task. We publicly release all resources (data, benchmark and code) on https://github.com/nec-research/fact-linking.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

The rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs) and the real world has outpaced the static nature of widely used evaluation benchmarks, raising concerns about their reliability for evaluating LLM factuality. While substantial works continue to rely on the popular but old benchmarks, their temporal misalignment with real-world facts and modern LLMs, and their effects on LLM factuality evaluation remain underexplored. Therefore, in this work, we present a systematic investigation of this issue by examining five popular factuality benchmarks and eight LLMs released across different years. An up-to-date fact retrieval pipeline and three metrics are tailored to quantify benchmark aging and its impact on LLM factuality evaluation. Experimental results and analysis illustrate that a considerable portion of samples in the widely used factuality benchmarks are outdated, leading to unreliable assessments of LLM factuality. We hope our work can provide a testbed to assess the reliability of a benchmark for LLM factuality evaluation and inspire more research on the benchmark aging issue. Codes are available in https://github.com/JiangXunyi/BenchAge.

The fluency and creativity of large pre-trained language models (LLMs) have led to their widespread use, sometimes even as a replacement for traditional search engines. Yet language models are prone to making convincing but factually inaccurate claims, often referred to as 'hallucinations.' These errors can inadvertently spread misinformation or harmfully perpetuate misconceptions. Further, manual fact-checking of model responses is a time-consuming process, making human factuality labels expensive to acquire. In this work, we fine-tune language models to be more factual, without human labeling and targeting more open-ended generation settings than past work. We leverage two key recent innovations in NLP to do so. First, several recent works have proposed methods for judging the factuality of open-ended text by measuring consistency with an external knowledge base or simply a large model's confidence scores. Second, the direct preference optimization algorithm enables straightforward fine-tuning of language models on objectives other than supervised imitation, using a preference ranking over possible model responses. We show that learning from automatically generated factuality preference rankings, generated either through existing retrieval systems or our novel retrieval-free approach, significantly improves the factuality (percent of generated claims that are correct) of Llama-2 on held-out topics compared with RLHF or decoding strategies targeted at factuality. At 7B scale, compared to Llama-2-chat, we observe 58% and 40% reduction in factual error rate when generating biographies and answering medical questions, respectively.

Most benchmark datasets targeting commonsense reasoning focus on everyday scenarios: physical knowledge like knowing that you could fill a cup under a waterfall [Talmor et al., 2019], social knowledge like bumping into someone is awkward [Sap et al., 2019], and other generic situations. However, there is a rich space of commonsense inferences anchored to knowledge about specific entities: for example, deciding the truthfulness of a claim "Harry Potter can teach classes on how to fly on a broomstick." Can models learn to combine entity knowledge with commonsense reasoning in this fashion? We introduce CREAK, a testbed for commonsense reasoning about entity knowledge, bridging fact-checking about entities (Harry Potter is a wizard and is skilled at riding a broomstick) with commonsense inferences (if you're good at a skill you can teach others how to do it). Our dataset consists of 13k human-authored English claims about entities that are either true or false, in addition to a small contrast set. Crowdworkers can easily come up with these statements and human performance on the dataset is high (high 90s); we argue that models should be able to blend entity knowledge and commonsense reasoning to do well here. In our experiments, we focus on the closed-book setting and observe that a baseline model finetuned on existing fact verification benchmark struggles on CREAK. Training a model on CREAK improves accuracy by a substantial margin, but still falls short of human performance. Our benchmark provides a unique probe into natural language understanding models, testing both its ability to retrieve facts (e.g., who teaches at the University of Chicago?) and unstated commonsense knowledge (e.g., butlers do not yell at guests).

When a language model is fed a wrong answer, what happens inside the network? Current understanding treats truthfulness as a static property of individual-layer representations-a direction to be probed, a feature to be extracted. Less is known about the dynamics: how internal representations diverge across the full depth of the network when the model processes correct versus incorrect continuations. We introduce forced-completion probing, a method that presents identical queries with known correct and incorrect single-token continuations and tracks five geometric measurements across every layer of four decoder-only models(1.5B-13B parameters). We report three findings. First, correct and incorrect paths diverge through rotation, not rescaling: displacement vectors maintain near-identical magnitudes while their angular separation increases, meaning factual selection is encoded in direction on an approximate hypersphere. Second, the model does not passively fail on incorrect input-it actively suppresses the correct answer, driving internal probability away from the right token. Third, both phenomena are entirely absent below a parameter threshold and emerge at 1.6B, suggesting a phase transition in factual processing capability. These results show that factual constraint processing has a specific geometric character-rotational, not scalar; active, not passive-that is invisible to methods based on single-layer probes or magnitude comparisons.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

Paywalls, licenses and copyright rules often restrict the broad dissemination and reuse of scientific knowledge. We take the position that it is both legally and technically feasible to extract the scientific knowledge in scholarly texts. Current methods, like text embeddings, fail to reliably preserve factual content, and simple paraphrasing may not be legally sound. We urge the community to adopt a new idea: convert scholarly documents into Knowledge Units using LLMs. These units use structured data capturing entities, attributes and relationships without stylistic content. We provide evidence that Knowledge Units: (1) form a legally defensible framework for sharing knowledge from copyrighted research texts, based on legal analyses of German copyright law and U.S. Fair Use doctrine, and (2) preserve most (~95%) factual knowledge from original text, measured by MCQ performance on facts from the original copyrighted text across four research domains. Freeing scientific knowledge from copyright promises transformative benefits for scientific research and education by allowing language models to reuse important facts from copyrighted text. To support this, we share open-source tools for converting research documents into Knowledge Units. Overall, our work posits the feasibility of democratizing access to scientific knowledge while respecting copyright.

Evaluating the truthfulness of online content is critical for combating misinformation. This study examines the efficiency and effectiveness of crowdsourced truthfulness assessments through a comparative analysis of two approaches: one involving full-length webpages as evidence for each claim, and another using summaries for each evidence document generated with a large language model. Using an A/B testing setting, we engage a diverse pool of participants tasked with evaluating the truthfulness of statements under these conditions. Our analysis explores both the quality of assessments and the behavioral patterns of participants. The results reveal that relying on summarized evidence offers comparable accuracy and error metrics to the Standard modality while significantly improving efficiency. Workers in the Summary setting complete a significantly higher number of assessments, reducing task duration and costs. Additionally, the Summary modality maximizes internal agreement and maintains consistent reliance on and perceived usefulness of evidence, demonstrating its potential to streamline large-scale truthfulness evaluations.

Language models (LMs) are widely used by an increasing number of users, underscoring the challenge of maintaining factuality across a broad range of topics. We first present VERIFY (Verification and Evidence RetrIeval for FactualitY evaluation), a pipeline to evaluate LMs' factuality in real-world user interactions. VERIFY considers the verifiability of LM-generated content and categorizes content units as supported, unsupported, or undecidable based on the retrieved evidence from the Web. Importantly, factuality judgment by VERIFY correlates better with human evaluations than existing methods. Using VERIFY, we identify "hallucination prompts" across diverse topics, i.e., those eliciting the highest rates of incorrect and inconclusive LM responses. These prompts form FactBench, a dataset of 1K prompts across 150 fine-grained topics. Our dataset captures emerging factuality challenges in real-world LM interactions and can be regularly updated with new prompts. We benchmark widely-used LMs from GPT, Gemini, and Llama3.1 family on FactBench, yielding the following key findings: (i) Proprietary models exhibit better factuality, with performance declining from Easy to Hard hallucination prompts. (ii) Llama3.1-405B-Instruct shows comparable or lower factual accuracy than Llama3.1-70B-Instruct across all evaluation methods due to its higher subjectivity that leads to more content labeled as undecidable. (iii) Gemini1.5-Pro shows a significantly higher refusal rate, with over-refusal in 25% of cases. Our code and data are publicly available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/launch/factbench.

Our fight against false information is spearheaded by fact-checkers. They investigate the veracity of claims and document their findings as fact-checking reports. With the rapid increase in the amount of false information circulating online, the use of automation in fact-checking processes aims to strengthen this ecosystem by enhancing scalability. Datasets containing fact-checked claims play a key role in developing such automated solutions. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no fact-checking dataset at the ecosystem level, covering claims from a sufficiently long period of time and sourced from a wide range of actors reflecting the entire ecosystem that admittedly follows widely-accepted codes and principles of fact-checking. We present a new dataset FACTors, the first to fill this gap by presenting ecosystem-level data on fact-checking. It contains 118,112 claims from 117,993 fact-checking reports in English (co-)authored by 1,953 individuals and published during the period of 1995-2025 by 39 fact-checking organisations that are active signatories of the IFCN (International Fact-Checking Network) and/or EFCSN (European Fact-Checking Standards Network). It contains 7,327 overlapping claims investigated by multiple fact-checking organisations, corresponding to 2,977 unique claims. It allows to conduct new ecosystem-level studies of the fact-checkers (organisations and individuals). To demonstrate the usefulness of FACTors, we present three example applications, including a first-of-its-kind statistical analysis of the fact-checking ecosystem, examining the political inclinations of the fact-checking organisations, and attempting to assign a credibility score to each organisation based on the findings of the statistical analysis and political leanings. Our methods for constructing FACTors are generic and can be used to maintain a live dataset that can be updated dynamically.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

True self-evolution requires agents to act as lifelong learners that internalize novel experiences to solve future problems. However, rigorously measuring this foundational capability is hindered by two obstacles: the entanglement of prior knowledge, where ``new'' knowledge may appear in pre-training data, and the entanglement of reasoning complexity, where failures may stem from problem difficulty rather than an inability to recall learned knowledge. We introduce SE-Bench, a diagnostic environment that obfuscates the NumPy library and its API doc into a pseudo-novel package with randomized identifiers. Agents are trained to internalize this package and evaluated on simple coding tasks without access to documentation, yielding a clean setting where tasks are trivial with the new API doc but impossible for base models without it. Our investigation reveals three insights: (1) the Open-Book Paradox, where training with reference documentation inhibits retention, requiring "Closed-Book Training" to force knowledge compression into weights; (2) the RL Gap, where standard RL fails to internalize new knowledge completely due to PPO clipping and negative gradients; and (3) the viability of Self-Play for internalization, proving models can learn from self-generated, noisy tasks when coupled with SFT, but not RL. Overall, SE-Bench establishes a rigorous diagnostic platform for self-evolution with knowledge internalization. Our code and dataset can be found at https://github.com/thunlp/SE-Bench.

Hallucination and factuality deficits remain key obstacles to the reliability of large language models (LLMs) in long-form generation. Existing reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) frameworks primarily rely on preference rewards, yet they often overlook the model's internal knowledge boundaries, exacerbating the so-called "hallucination tax". To address this challenge, we propose Knowledge-Level Consistency Reinforcement Learning Framework (KLCF), a novel framework that focuses on the knowledge consistency between the policy model's expressed knowledge and the base model's parametric knowledge, and introduces a Dual-Fact Alignment mechanism to jointly optimize factual recall and precision. Specifically, KLCF leverages pretrained knowledge boundaries to construct fact checklist, guiding online reinforcement learning to improve factual coverage and recall; simultaneously, it trains a self-assessment module based on the base model's internal knowledge to enhance factual precision during generation. Unlike prior methods that rely on external retrieval or heavy verification, our reward design is fully external-knowledge-free and lightweight, making KLCF efficient and easily scalable to large-scale training. Experimental results demonstrate that KLCF substantially improves factuality metrics across multiple long-form benchmarks and effectively alleviates model hallucinations.

Recent probing studies reveal that large language models exhibit linear subspaces that separate true from false statements, yet the mechanism behind their emergence is unclear. We introduce a transparent, one-layer transformer toy model that reproduces such truth subspaces end-to-end and exposes one concrete route by which they can arise. We study one simple setting in which truth encoding can emerge: a data distribution where factual statements co-occur with other factual statements (and vice-versa), encouraging the model to learn this distinction in order to lower the LM loss on future tokens. We corroborate this pattern with experiments in pretrained language models. Finally, in the toy setting we observe a two-phase learning dynamic: networks first memorize individual factual associations in a few steps, then -- over a longer horizon -- learn to linearly separate true from false, which in turn lowers language-modeling loss. Together, these results provide both a mechanistic demonstration and an empirical motivation for how and why linear truth representations can emerge in language models.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Previous literature has proved that Pretrained Language Models (PLMs) can store factual knowledge. However, we find that facts stored in the PLMs are not always correct. It motivates us to explore a fundamental question: How do we calibrate factual knowledge in PLMs without re-training from scratch? In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight method CaliNet to achieve this goal. To be specific, we first detect whether PLMs can learn the right facts via a contrastive score between right and fake facts. If not, we then use a lightweight method to add and adapt new parameters to specific factual texts. Experiments on the knowledge probing task show the calibration effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, through closed-book question answering, we find that the calibrated PLM possesses knowledge generalization ability after fine-tuning. Beyond the calibration performance, we further investigate and visualize the knowledge calibration mechanism.

Unified multimodal models provide a natural and promising architecture for understanding diverse and complex real-world knowledge while generating high-quality images. However, they still rely primarily on frozen parametric knowledge, which makes them struggle with real-world image generation involving long-tail and knowledge-intensive concepts. Inspired by the broad success of agents on real-world tasks, we explore agentic modeling to address this limitation. Specifically, we present Unify-Agent, a unified multimodal agent for world-grounded image synthesis, which reframes image generation as an agentic pipeline consisting of prompt understanding, multimodal evidence searching, grounded recaptioning, and final synthesis. To train our model, we construct a tailored multimodal data pipeline and curate 143K high-quality agent trajectories for world-grounded image synthesis, enabling effective supervision over the full agentic generation process. We further introduce FactIP, a benchmark covering 12 categories of culturally significant and long-tail factual concepts that explicitly requires external knowledge grounding. Extensive experiments show that our proposed Unify-Agent substantially improves over its base unified model across diverse benchmarks and real world generation tasks, while approaching the world knowledge capabilities of the strongest closed-source models. As an early exploration of agent-based modeling for world-grounded image synthesis, our work highlights the value of tightly coupling reasoning, searching, and generation for reliable open-world agentic image synthesis.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Large language models (LLMs) can correctly answer "When was Einstein born?" yet fail to provide the same date when writing about Einstein's life revealing a fundamental inconsistency in how models access factual knowledge across task complexities. While models display impressive accuracy on factual question-answering benchmarks, the reliability gap between simple and complex queries remains poorly understood, eroding their trustworthiness. In this work, we introduce Short-Long Form Alignment for Factual Question Answering (SLAQ), a controlled evaluation framework that compares LLMs' answers to the same factual questions asked (a) in isolation (short) vs. (b) integrated into complex queries (long). Looking at 16 LLMs across 600 queries, we find a systematic misalignment of answers to the corresponding short and long queries. We further uncover position-dependent accuracy loss and momentum effects where consecutive correct or incorrect answers create self-reinforcing patterns. Through mechanistic analysis, we find that aligned facts activate overlapping model internals, and that metrics based on mechanistic similarity can predict short-long answer alignment with up to 78% accuracy. Our work establishes factual consistency over query complexity as an important aspect of LLMs' trustworthiness and challenges current evaluation practices, which implicitly assume that good performance for simple factual queries implies reliability in more complex knowledge-seeking tasks too.

Rote learning is a memorization technique based on repetition. It is commonly believed to hinder generalization by encouraging verbatim memorization rather than deeper understanding. This insight holds for even learning factual knowledge that inevitably requires a certain degree of memorization. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs can be trained to generalize from rote memorized data. We introduce a two-phase memorize-then-generalize framework, where the model first rote memorizes factual subject-object associations using a semantically meaningless token and then learns to generalize by fine-tuning on a small set of semantically meaningful prompts. Extensive experiments over 8 LLMs show that the models can reinterpret rote memorized data through the semantically meaningful prompts, as evidenced by the emergence of structured, semantically aligned latent representations between the two. This surprising finding opens the door to both effective and efficient knowledge injection and possible risks of repurposing the memorized data for malicious usage.

The emergence of generative pre-trained models has facilitated the synthesis of high-quality text, but it has also posed challenges in identifying factual errors in the generated text. In particular: (1) A wider range of tasks now face an increasing risk of containing factual errors when handled by generative models. (2) Generated texts tend to be lengthy and lack a clearly defined granularity for individual facts. (3) There is a scarcity of explicit evidence available during the process of fact checking. With the above challenges in mind, in this paper, we propose FacTool, a task and domain agnostic framework for detecting factual errors of texts generated by large language models (e.g., ChatGPT). Experiments on four different tasks (knowledge-based QA, code generation, mathematical reasoning, and scientific literature review) show the efficacy of the proposed method. We release the code of FacTool associated with ChatGPT plugin interface at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/factool .

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for long-form text generation. However, factual errors in the responses would undermine their reliability. Despite growing attention to LLM factuality, the effect of response length on factuality remains underexplored. In this work, we systematically investigate this relationship by first introducing an automatic and bi-level long-form factuality evaluation framework, which achieves high agreement with human annotations while being cost-effective. Using this framework, we conduct controlled experiments and find that longer responses exhibit lower factual precision, confirming the presence of length bias. To explain this phenomenon, we empirically examine three hypotheses: error propagation, long context, and facts exhaustion. Our results reveal that facts exhaustion, where the model gradually exhausts more reliable knowledge, is the primary cause of factual degradation, rather than the other two hypotheses.

Generative AI models often learn and reproduce false information present in their training corpora. This position paper argues that, analogous to biological immunization, where controlled exposure to a weakened pathogen builds immunity, AI models should be fine tuned on small, quarantined sets of explicitly labeled falsehoods as a "vaccine" against misinformation. These curated false examples are periodically injected during finetuning, strengthening the model ability to recognize and reject misleading claims while preserving accuracy on truthful inputs. An illustrative case study shows that immunized models generate substantially less misinformation than baselines. To our knowledge, this is the first training framework that treats fact checked falsehoods themselves as a supervised vaccine, rather than relying on input perturbations or generic human feedback signals, to harden models against future misinformation. We also outline ethical safeguards and governance controls to ensure the safe use of false data. Model immunization offers a proactive paradigm for aligning AI systems with factuality.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Multilingual large-scale Pretrained Language Models (PLMs) have been shown to store considerable amounts of factual knowledge, but large variations are observed across languages. With the ultimate goal of ensuring that users with different language backgrounds obtain consistent feedback from the same model, we study the cross-lingual consistency (CLC) of factual knowledge in various multilingual PLMs. To this end, we propose a Ranking-based Consistency (RankC) metric to evaluate knowledge consistency across languages independently from accuracy. Using this metric, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the determining factors for CLC, both at model level and at language-pair level. Among other results, we find that increasing model size leads to higher factual probing accuracy in most languages, but does not improve cross-lingual consistency. Finally, we conduct a case study on CLC when new factual associations are inserted in the PLMs via model editing. Results on a small sample of facts inserted in English reveal a clear pattern whereby the new piece of knowledge transfers only to languages with which English has a high RankC score.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly impacted many aspects of our lives. However, assessing and ensuring their chronological knowledge remains challenging. Existing approaches fall short in addressing the accumulative nature of knowledge, often relying on a single time stamp. To overcome this, we introduce ChroKnowBench, a benchmark dataset designed to evaluate chronologically accumulated knowledge across three key aspects: multiple domains, time dependency, temporal state. Our benchmark distinguishes between knowledge that evolves (e.g., scientific discoveries, amended laws) and knowledge that remain constant (e.g., mathematical truths, commonsense facts). Building on this benchmark, we present ChroKnowledge (Chronological Categorization of Knowledge), a novel sampling-based framework for evaluating and updating LLMs' non-parametric chronological knowledge. Our evaluation shows: (1) The ability of eliciting temporal knowledge varies depending on the data format that model was trained on. (2) LLMs partially recall knowledge or show a cut-off at temporal boundaries rather than recalling all aspects of knowledge correctly. Thus, we apply our ChroKnowPrompt, an in-depth prompting to elicit chronological knowledge by traversing step-by-step through the surrounding time spans. We observe that our framework successfully updates the overall knowledge across the entire timeline in both the biomedical domain (+11.9%) and the general domain (+2.8%), demonstrating its effectiveness in refining temporal knowledge. This non-parametric approach also enables knowledge updates not only in open-source models but also in proprietary LLMs, ensuring comprehensive applicability across model types. We perform a comprehensive analysis based on temporal characteristics of ChroKnowPrompt and validate the potential of various models to elicit intrinsic temporal knowledge through our method.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) are trained on vast unlabeled data, rich in world knowledge. This fact has sparked the interest of the community in quantifying the amount of factual knowledge present in PLMs, as this explains their performance on downstream tasks, and potentially justifies their use as knowledge bases. In this work, we survey methods and datasets that are used to probe PLMs for factual knowledge. Our contributions are: (1) We propose a categorization scheme for factual probing methods that is based on how their inputs, outputs and the probed PLMs are adapted; (2) We provide an overview of the datasets used for factual probing; (3) We synthesize insights about knowledge retention and prompt optimization in PLMs, analyze obstacles to adopting PLMs as knowledge bases and outline directions for future work.

We propose a many-sorted modal logic for reasoning about knowledge in multi-agent systems. Our logic introduces a clear distinction between participating agents and the environment. This allows to express local properties of agents and global properties of worlds in a uniform way, as well as to talk about the presence or absence of agents in a world. The logic subsumes the standard epistemic logic and is a conservative extension of it. The semantics is given in chromatic hypergraphs, a generalization of chromatic simplicial complexes, which were recently used to model knowledge in distributed systems. We show that the logic is sound and complete with respect to the intended semantics. We also show a further connection of chromatic hypergraphs with neighborhood frames.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

The pervasiveness of large language models and generative AI in online media has amplified the need for effective automated fact-checking to assist fact-checkers in tackling the increasing volume and sophistication of misinformation. The complex nature of fact-checking demands that automated fact-checking systems provide explanations that enable fact-checkers to scrutinise their outputs. However, it is unclear how these explanations should align with the decision-making and reasoning processes of fact-checkers to be effectively integrated into their workflows. Through semi-structured interviews with fact-checking professionals, we bridge this gap by: (i) providing an account of how fact-checkers assess evidence, make decisions, and explain their processes; (ii) examining how fact-checkers use automated tools in practice; and (iii) identifying fact-checker explanation requirements for automated fact-checking tools. The findings show unmet explanation needs and identify important criteria for replicable fact-checking explanations that trace the model's reasoning path, reference specific evidence, and highlight uncertainty and information gaps.

Large language models (LLMs) tend to generate lexically, semantically, and stylistically homogenous texts. This poses a risk of knowledge collapse, where homogenous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. Existing works on homogenization are limited by a focus on closed-ended multiple-choice setups or fuzzy semantic features, and do not look at trends across time and cultural contexts. To overcome this, we present a new methodology to measure epistemic diversity, i.e., variation in real-world claims in LLM outputs, which we use to perform a broad empirical study of LLM knowledge collapse. We test 27 LLMs, 155 topics covering 12 countries, and 200 prompt variations sourced from real user chats. For the topics in our study, we show that while newer models tend to generate more diverse claims, nearly all models are less epistemically diverse than a basic web search. We find that model size has a negative impact on epistemic diversity, while retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has a positive impact, though the improvement from RAG varies by the cultural context. Finally, compared to a traditional knowledge source (Wikipedia), we find that country-specific claims reflect the English language more than the local one, highlighting a gap in epistemic representation

Before deploying a language model (LM) within a given domain, it is important to measure its tendency to generate factually incorrect information in that domain. Existing factual generation evaluation methods focus on facts sampled from the LM itself, and thus do not control the set of evaluated facts and might under-represent rare and unlikely facts. We propose FACTOR: Factual Assessment via Corpus TransfORmation, a scalable approach for evaluating LM factuality. FACTOR automatically transforms a factual corpus of interest into a benchmark evaluating an LM's propensity to generate true facts from the corpus vs. similar but incorrect statements. We use our framework to create two benchmarks: Wiki-FACTOR and News-FACTOR. We show that: (i) our benchmark scores increase with model size and improve when the LM is augmented with retrieval; (ii) benchmark score correlates with perplexity, but the two metrics do not always agree on model ranking; and (iii) when perplexity and benchmark score disagree, the latter better reflects factuality in open-ended generation, as measured by human annotators. We make our data and code publicly available in https://github.com/AI21Labs/factor.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

We introduce The FACTS Leaderboard, an online leaderboard suite and associated set of benchmarks that comprehensively evaluates the ability of language models to generate factually accurate text across diverse scenarios. The suite provides a holistic measure of factuality by aggregating the performance of models on four distinct sub-leaderboards: (1) FACTS Multimodal, which measures the factuality of responses to image-based questions; (2) FACTS Parametric, which assesses models' world knowledge by answering closed-book factoid questions from internal parameters; (3) FACTS Search, which evaluates factuality in information-seeking scenarios, where the model must use a search API; and (4) FACTS Grounding (v2), which evaluates whether long-form responses are grounded in provided documents, featuring significantly improved judge models. Each sub-leaderboard employs automated judge models to score model responses, and the final suite score is an average of the four components, designed to provide a robust and balanced assessment of a model's overall factuality. The FACTS Leaderboard Suite will be actively maintained, containing both public and private splits to allow for external participation while guarding its integrity. It can be found at https://www.kaggle.com/benchmarks/google/facts .

Despite their impressive generative capabilities, LLMs are hindered by fact-conflicting hallucinations in real-world applications. The accurate identification of hallucinations in texts generated by LLMs, especially in complex inferential scenarios, is a relatively unexplored area. To address this gap, we present FactCHD, a dedicated benchmark designed for the detection of fact-conflicting hallucinations from LLMs. FactCHD features a diverse dataset that spans various factuality patterns, including vanilla, multi-hop, comparison, and set operation. A distinctive element of FactCHD is its integration of fact-based evidence chains, significantly enhancing the depth of evaluating the detectors' explanations. Experiments on different LLMs expose the shortcomings of current approaches in detecting factual errors accurately. Furthermore, we introduce Truth-Triangulator that synthesizes reflective considerations by tool-enhanced ChatGPT and LoRA-tuning based on Llama2, aiming to yield more credible detection through the amalgamation of predictive results and evidence. The benchmark dataset is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/FactCHD.

As events progress, news articles often update with new information: if we are not cautious, we risk propagating outdated facts. In this work, we hypothesize that linguistic features indicate factual fluidity, and that we can predict which facts in a news article will update using solely the text of a news article (i.e. not external resources like search engines). We test this hypothesis, first, by isolating fact-updates in large news revisions corpora. News articles may update for many reasons (e.g. factual, stylistic, narrative). We introduce the NewsEdits 2.0 taxonomy, an edit-intentions schema that separates fact updates from stylistic and narrative updates in news writing. We annotate over 9,200 pairs of sentence revisions and train high-scoring ensemble models to apply this schema. Then, taking a large dataset of silver-labeled pairs, we show that we can predict when facts will update in older article drafts with high precision. Finally, to demonstrate the usefulness of these findings, we construct a language model question asking (LLM-QA) abstention task. We wish the LLM to abstain from answering questions when information is likely to become outdated. Using our predictions, we show, LLM absention reaches near oracle levels of accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

One characteristic that makes humans superior to modern artificially intelligent models is the ability to interpret images beyond what is visually apparent. Consider the following two natural language search queries - (i) "a queue of customers patiently waiting to buy ice cream" and (ii) "a queue of tourists going to see a famous Mughal architecture in India." Interpreting these queries requires one to reason with (i) Commonsense such as interpreting people as customers or tourists, actions as waiting to buy or going to see; and (ii) Fact or world knowledge associated with named visual entities, for example, whether the store in the image sells ice cream or whether the landmark in the image is a Mughal architecture located in India. Such reasoning goes beyond just visual recognition. To enable both commonsense and factual reasoning in the image search, we present a unified framework, namely Knowledge Retrieval-Augmented Multimodal Transformer (KRAMT), that treats the named visual entities in an image as a gateway to encyclopedic knowledge and leverages them along with natural language query to ground relevant knowledge. Further, KRAMT seamlessly integrates visual content and grounded knowledge to learn alignment between images and search queries. This unified framework is then used to perform image search requiring commonsense and factual reasoning. The retrieval performance of KRAMT is evaluated and compared with related approaches on a new dataset we introduce - namely COFAR. We make our code and dataset available at https://vl2g.github.io/projects/cofar

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

This is an essay in what might be called ``mathematical metaphysics.'' There is a fundamental duality that run through mathematics and the natural sciences. The duality starts as the logical level; it is represented by the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of partitions since subsets and partitions are category-theoretic dual concepts. In more basic terms, it starts with the duality between the elements (Its) of subsets and the distinctions (Dits, i.e., ordered pairs of elements in different blocks) of a partition. Mathematically, the Its & Dits duality is fully developed in category theory as the reverse-the-arrows duality. The quantitative versions of subsets and partitions are developed as probability theory and information theory (based on logical entropy). Classical physics was based on a view of reality as definite all the way down. In contrast, quantum physics embodies (objective) indefiniteness. And finally, there are the two fundamental dual mechanisms at work in biology, the selectionist mechanism and the generative mechanism, two mechanisms that embody the fundamental duality.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

We often attribute human characteristics to large language models (LLMs) and claim that they "know" certain things. LLMs have an internal probabilistic knowledge that represents information retained during training. How can we assess the veracity of this knowledge? We examine two common methods for probing the veracity of LLMs and discover several assumptions that are flawed. To address these flawed assumptions, we introduce sAwMIL (short for Sparse Aware Multiple-Instance Learning), a probing method that utilizes the internal activations of LLMs to separate statements into true, false, and neither. sAwMIL is based on multiple-instance learning and conformal prediction. We evaluate sAwMIL on 5 validity criteria across 16 open-source LLMs, including both default and chat-based variants, as well as on 3 new datasets. Among the insights we provide are: (1) the veracity signal is often concentrated in the third quarter of an LLM's depth; (2) truth and falsehood signals are not always symmetric; (3) linear probes perform better on chat models than on default models; (4) nonlinear probes may be required to capture veracity signals for some LLMs with reinforcement learning from human feedback or knowledge distillation; and (5) LLMs capture a third type of signal that is distinct from true and false and is neither true nor false. These findings provide a reliable method for verifying what LLMs "know" and how certain they are of their probabilistic internal knowledge.

Knowledge-intensive tasks (e.g., open-domain question answering (QA)) require a substantial amount of factual knowledge and often rely on external information for assistance. Recently, large language models (LLMs) (e.g., ChatGPT), have demonstrated impressive prowess in solving a wide range of tasks with world knowledge, including knowledge-intensive tasks. However, it remains unclear how well LLMs are able to perceive their factual knowledge boundaries, particularly how they behave when incorporating retrieval augmentation. In this study, we present an initial analysis of the factual knowledge boundaries of LLMs and how retrieval augmentation affects LLMs on open-domain QA. Specially, we focus on three primary research questions and analyze them by examining QA performance, priori judgement and posteriori judgement of LLMs. We show evidence that LLMs possess unwavering confidence in their capabilities to respond to questions and the accuracy of their responses. Furthermore, retrieval augmentation proves to be an effective approach in enhancing LLMs' awareness of knowledge boundaries, thereby improving their judgemental abilities. Additionally, we also find that LLMs have a propensity to rely on the provided retrieval results when formulating answers, while the quality of these results significantly impacts their reliance. The code to reproduce this work is available at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/LLM-Knowledge-Boundary.

Transformers have achieved great success in numerous NLP tasks but continue to exhibit notable gaps in multi-step factual reasoning, especially when real-world knowledge is sparse. Recent advances in grokking have demonstrated that neural networks can transition from memorizing to perfectly generalizing once they detect underlying logical patterns - yet these studies have primarily used small, synthetic tasks. In this paper, for the first time, we extend grokking to real-world factual data and address the challenge of dataset sparsity by augmenting existing knowledge graphs with carefully designed synthetic data to raise the ratio phi_r of inferred facts to atomic facts above the threshold required for grokking. Surprisingly, we find that even factually incorrect synthetic data can strengthen emergent reasoning circuits rather than degrade accuracy, as it forces the model to rely on relational structure rather than memorization. When evaluated on multi-hop reasoning benchmarks, our approach achieves up to 95-100% accuracy on 2WikiMultiHopQA - substantially improving over strong baselines and matching or exceeding current state-of-the-art results. We further provide an in-depth analysis of how increasing phi_r drives the formation of generalizing circuits inside Transformers. Our findings suggest that grokking-based data augmentation can unlock implicit multi-hop reasoning capabilities, opening the door to more robust and interpretable factual reasoning in large-scale language models.

Hallucinated outputs from language models pose risks in the medical domain, especially for lay audiences making health-related decisions. Existing factuality evaluation methods, such as entailment- and question-answering-based (QA), struggle with plain language summary (PLS) generation due to elaborative explanation phenomenon, which introduces external content (e.g., definitions, background, examples) absent from the source document to enhance comprehension. To address this, we introduce PlainQAFact, a framework trained on a fine-grained, human-annotated dataset PlainFact, to evaluate the factuality of both source-simplified and elaboratively explained sentences. PlainQAFact first classifies factuality type and then assesses factuality using a retrieval-augmented QA-based scoring method. Our approach is lightweight and computationally efficient. Empirical results show that existing factuality metrics fail to effectively evaluate factuality in PLS, especially for elaborative explanations, whereas PlainQAFact achieves state-of-the-art performance. We further analyze its effectiveness across external knowledge sources, answer extraction strategies, overlap measures, and document granularity levels, refining its overall factuality assessment.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated vast capabilities on generative tasks in recent years, yet they struggle with guaranteeing the factual correctness of the generated content. This makes these models unreliable in realistic situations where factually accurate responses are expected. In this paper, we propose FactReasoner, a new factuality assessor that relies on probabilistic reasoning to assess the factuality of a long-form generated response. Specifically, FactReasoner decomposes the response into atomic units, retrieves relevant contexts for them from an external knowledge source, and constructs a joint probability distribution over the atoms and contexts using probabilistic encodings of the logical relationships (entailment, contradiction) between the textual utterances corresponding to the atoms and contexts. FactReasoner then computes the posterior probability of whether atomic units in the response are supported by the retrieved contexts. Our experiments on labeled and unlabeled benchmark datasets demonstrate clearly that FactReasoner improves considerably over state-of-the-art prompt-based approaches in terms of both factual precision and recall.

Large Language Models show promise for agricultural advisory, yet vanilla models exhibit unsupported recommendations, generic advice lacking specific, actionable detail, and communication styles misaligned with smallholder farmer needs. In high stakes agricultural contexts, where recommendation accuracy has direct consequences for farmer outcomes, these limitations pose challenges for responsible deployment. We present a hybrid LLM architecture that decouples factual retrieval from conversational delivery: supervised fine-tuning with LoRA on expert-curated GOLDEN FACTS (atomic, verified units of agricultural knowledge) optimizes fact recall, while a separate stitching layer transforms retrieved facts into culturally appropriate, safety-aware responses. Our evaluation framework, DG-EVAL, performs atomic fact verification (measuring recall, precision, and contradiction detection) against expert-curated ground truth rather than Wikipedia or retrieved documents. Experiments across multiple model configurations on crops and queries from Bihar, India show that fine-tuning on curated data substantially improves fact recall and F1, while maintaining high relevance. Using a fine-tuned smaller model achieves comparable or better factual quality at a fraction of the cost of frontier models. A stitching layer further improves safety subscores while maintaining high conversational quality. We release the farmerchat-prompts library to enable reproducible development of domain-specific agricultural AI.

Evaluating the factuality of long-form text generated by large language models (LMs) is non-trivial because (1) generations often contain a mixture of supported and unsupported pieces of information, making binary judgments of quality inadequate, and (2) human evaluation is time-consuming and costly. In this paper, we introduce FActScore (Factual precision in Atomicity Score), a new evaluation that breaks a generation into a series of atomic facts and computes the percentage of atomic facts supported by a reliable knowledge source. We conduct an extensive human evaluation to obtain FActScores of people biographies generated by several state-of-the-art commercial LMs -- InstructGPT, ChatGPT, and the retrieval-augmented PerplexityAI -- and report new analysis demonstrating the need for such a fine-grained score (e.g., ChatGPT only achieves 58%). Since human evaluation is costly, we also introduce an automated model that estimates FActScore, using retrieval and a strong language model, with less than a 2% error rate. Finally, we use this automated metric to evaluate 6,500 generations from a new set of 13 recent LMs that would have cost $26K if evaluated by humans, with various findings: GPT-4 and ChatGPT are more factual than public models, and Vicuna and Alpaca are some of the best public models.

In this work, we evaluate the capacity for foundation models to retrieve encyclopedic knowledge across a wide range of languages, topics, and contexts. To support this effort, we 1) produce a new dataset containing 303k factual associations in 20 different languages, 2) formulate a new counterfactual knowledge assessment, Polyglot or Not, and 3) benchmark 5 foundation models in a multilingual setting and a diverse set of 20 models in an English-only setting. We observed significant accuracy differences in models of interest, with Meta's LLaMA topping both the multilingual and English-only assessments. Error analysis reveals a significant deficiency in LLaMA's ability to retrieve facts in languages written in the Cyrillic script and gaps in its understanding of facts based on the location and gender of entailed subjects. Ultimately, we argue that the promise of utilizing foundation language models as bonafide polyglots is greatly diminished when they are tasked with retrieving information in languages other than English. Supporting code (https://github.com/daniel-furman/Polyglot-or-Not) and dataset (https://huggingface.co/datasets/Polyglot-or-Not/Fact-Completion) are openly released.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Factual recall from a reference source is crucial for evaluating the performance of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, as it directly probes into the quality of both retrieval and generation. However, it still remains a challenge to perform this evaluation reliably and efficiently. Recent work has focused on fact verification via prompting language model (LM) evaluators, however we demonstrate that these methods are unreliable in the presence of incomplete or inaccurate information. We introduce Facts as a Function (FaaF), a new approach to fact verification that utilizes the function calling abilities of LMs and a framework for RAG factual recall evaluation. FaaF substantially improves the ability of LMs to identify unsupported facts in text with incomplete information whilst improving efficiency and lowering cost by several times, compared to prompt-based approaches.

The factuality of large language model (LLMs) tends to decay over time since events posterior to their training are "unknown" to them. One way to keep models up-to-date could be factual update: the task of inserting, replacing, or removing certain simple (atomic) facts within the model. To study this task, we present WikiFactDiff, a dataset that describes the evolution of factual knowledge between two dates as a collection of simple facts divided into three categories: new, obsolete, and static. We describe several update scenarios arising from various combinations of these three types of basic update. The facts are represented by subject-relation-object triples; indeed, WikiFactDiff was constructed by comparing the state of the Wikidata knowledge base at 4 January 2021 and 27 February 2023. Those fact are accompanied by verbalization templates and cloze tests that enable running update algorithms and their evaluation metrics. Contrary to other datasets, such as zsRE and CounterFact, WikiFactDiff constitutes a realistic update setting that involves various update scenarios, including replacements, archival, and new entity insertions. We also present an evaluation of existing update algorithms on WikiFactDiff.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

The remarkable performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has unequivocally demonstrated their proficient understanding capabilities in handling a wide array of visual tasks. Nevertheless, the opaque nature of their black-box reasoning processes persists as an enigma, rendering them uninterpretable and struggling with hallucination. Their ability to execute intricate compositional reasoning tasks is also constrained, culminating in a stagnation of learning progression for these models. In this work, we introduce Fact, a novel paradigm designed to generate multimodal rationales that are faithful, concise, and transferable for teaching MLLMs. This paradigm utilizes verifiable visual programming to generate executable code guaranteeing faithfulness and precision. Subsequently, through a series of operations including pruning, merging, and bridging, the rationale enhances its conciseness. Furthermore, we filter rationales that can be transferred to end-to-end paradigms from programming paradigms to guarantee transferability. Empirical evidence from experiments demonstrates the superiority of our method across models of varying parameter sizes, significantly enhancing their compositional reasoning and generalization ability. Our approach also reduces hallucinations owing to its high correlation between images and text.

When language models are trained on textual data, they acquire both knowledge about the structure of language as well as knowledge of facts about the world. At inference time, their knowledge of facts can be leveraged to solve interesting problems and perform useful knowledge work for users. It is well known that language models can verbatim memorize long sequences from their training data. However, it is much less well understood how language models memorize facts seen during training. In this work, we propose a new dataset to specifically empower researchers to study the dual processes of fact memorization and verbatim sequence memorization. The dataset consists of synthetically-generated, webtext-like documents about fictional events, as well as question-answer pairs about the events. We conduct training experiments showing how synthetic data about fictional events can be effective in teasing apart different forms of memorization. We also document the challenges in effectively building realistic, fictional synthetic data.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Neural knowledge-grounded generative models for dialogue often produce content that is factually inconsistent with the knowledge they rely on, making them unreliable and limiting their applicability. Inspired by recent work on evaluating factual consistency in abstractive summarization, we propose an automatic evaluation metric for factual consistency in knowledge-grounded dialogue using automatic question generation and question answering. Our metric, denoted Q^2, compares answer spans using natural language inference (NLI), instead of token-based matching as done in previous work. To foster proper evaluation, we curate a novel dataset of dialogue system outputs for the Wizard-of-Wikipedia dataset, manually annotated for factual consistency. We perform a thorough meta-evaluation of Q^2 against other metrics using this dataset and two others, where it consistently shows higher correlation with human judgements.

In large language models (LLMs), certain neurons can store distinct pieces of knowledge learned during pretraining. While knowledge typically appears as a combination of relations and entities, it remains unclear whether some neurons focus on a relation itself -- independent of any entity. We hypothesize such neurons detect a relation in the input text and guide generation involving such a relation. To investigate this, we study the Llama-2 family on a chosen set of relations with a statistics-based method. Our experiments demonstrate the existence of relation-specific neurons. We measure the effect of selectively deactivating candidate neurons specific to relation r on the LLM's ability to handle (1) facts whose relation is r and (2) facts whose relation is a different relation r' neq r. With respect to their capacity for encoding relation information, we give evidence for the following three properties of relation-specific neurons. (i) Neuron cumulativity. The neurons for r present a cumulative effect so that deactivating a larger portion of them results in the degradation of more facts in r. (ii) Neuron versatility. Neurons can be shared across multiple closely related as well as less related relations. Some relation neurons transfer across languages. (iii) Neuron interference. Deactivating neurons specific to one relation can improve LLM generation performance for facts of other relations. We will make our code publicly available at https://github.com/cisnlp/relation-specific-neurons.

Knowledge-intensive language understanding tasks require Language Models (LMs) to integrate relevant context, mitigating their inherent weaknesses, such as incomplete or outdated knowledge. Nevertheless, studies indicate that LMs often ignore the provided context as it can conflict with the pre-existing LM's memory learned during pre-training. Moreover, conflicting knowledge can already be present in the LM's parameters, termed intra-memory conflict. Existing works have studied the two types of knowledge conflicts only in isolation. We conjecture that the (degree of) intra-memory conflicts can in turn affect LM's handling of context-memory conflicts. To study this, we introduce the DYNAMICQA dataset, which includes facts with a temporal dynamic nature where a fact can change with a varying time frequency and disputable dynamic facts, which can change depending on the viewpoint. DYNAMICQA is the first to include real-world knowledge conflicts and provide context to study the link between the different types of knowledge conflicts. With the proposed dataset, we assess the use of uncertainty for measuring the intra-memory conflict and introduce a novel Coherent Persuasion (CP) score to evaluate the context's ability to sway LM's semantic output. Our extensive experiments reveal that static facts, which are unlikely to change, are more easily updated with additional context, relative to temporal and disputable facts.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at generating long-form responses, but evaluating their factuality remains challenging due to complex inter-sentence dependencies within the generated facts. Prior solutions predominantly follow a decompose-decontextualize-verify pipeline but often fail to capture essential context and miss key relational facts. In this paper, we introduce VeriFact, a factuality evaluation framework designed to enhance fact extraction by identifying and resolving incomplete and missing facts to support more accurate verification results. Moreover, we introduce FactRBench , a benchmark that evaluates both precision and recall in long-form model responses, whereas prior work primarily focuses on precision. FactRBench provides reference fact sets from advanced LLMs and human-written answers, enabling recall assessment. Empirical evaluations show that VeriFact significantly enhances fact completeness and preserves complex facts with critical relational information, resulting in more accurate factuality evaluation. Benchmarking various open- and close-weight LLMs on FactRBench indicate that larger models within same model family improve precision and recall, but high precision does not always correlate with high recall, underscoring the importance of comprehensive factuality assessment.

While hallucinations of large language models (LLMs) prevail as a major challenge, existing evaluation benchmarks on factuality do not cover the diverse domains of knowledge that the real-world users of LLMs seek information about. To bridge this gap, we introduce WildHallucinations, a benchmark that evaluates factuality. It does so by prompting LLMs to generate information about entities mined from user-chatbot conversations in the wild. These generations are then automatically fact-checked against a systematically curated knowledge source collected from web search. Notably, half of these real-world entities do not have associated Wikipedia pages. We evaluate 118,785 generations from 15 LLMs on 7,919 entities. We find that LLMs consistently hallucinate more on entities without Wikipedia pages and exhibit varying hallucination rates across different domains. Finally, given the same base models, adding a retrieval component only slightly reduces hallucinations but does not eliminate hallucinations.

Neural language models (LMs) represent facts about the world described by text. Sometimes these facts derive from training data (in most LMs, a representation of the word "banana" encodes the fact that bananas are fruits). Sometimes facts derive from input text itself (a representation of the sentence "I poured out the bottle" encodes the fact that the bottle became empty). We describe REMEDI, a method for learning to map statements in natural language to fact encodings in an LM's internal representation system. REMEDI encodings can be used as knowledge editors: when added to LM hidden representations, they modify downstream generation to be consistent with new facts. REMEDI encodings may also be used as probes: when compared to LM representations, they reveal which properties LMs already attribute to mentioned entities, in some cases making it possible to predict when LMs will generate outputs that conflict with background knowledge or input text. REMEDI thus links work on probing, prompting, and LM editing, and offers steps toward general tools for fine-grained inspection and control of knowledge in LMs.

Seeking health-related advice on the internet has become a common practice in the digital era. Determining the trustworthiness of medical claims found online and finding appropriate evidence for this information is increasingly challenging. Fact-checking has emerged as an approach to assess the veracity of factual claims using evidence from credible knowledge sources. To help advance the automation of this task, in this paper, we introduce a novel dataset of 750 health-related claims, labeled for veracity by medical experts and backed with evidence from appropriate clinical studies. We provide an analysis of the dataset, highlighting its characteristics and challenges. The dataset can be used for Machine Learning tasks related to automated fact-checking such as evidence retrieval, veracity prediction, and explanation generation. For this purpose, we provide baseline models based on different approaches, examine their performance, and discuss the findings.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

Two commonly-employed strategies to combat the rise of misinformation on social media are (i) fact-checking by professional organisations and (ii) community moderation by platform users. Policy changes by Twitter/X and, more recently, Meta, signal a shift away from partnerships with fact-checking organisations and towards an increased reliance on crowdsourced community notes. However, the extent and nature of dependencies between fact-checking and helpful community notes remain unclear. To address these questions, we use language models to annotate a large corpus of Twitter/X community notes with attributes such as topic, cited sources, and whether they refute claims tied to broader misinformation narratives. Our analysis reveals that community notes cite fact-checking sources up to five times more than previously reported. Fact-checking is especially crucial for notes on posts linked to broader narratives, which are twice as likely to reference fact-checking sources compared to other sources. In conclusion, our results show that successful community moderation heavily relies on professional fact-checking.