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Nov 17

AI Agents Do Not Fail Alone:The Context Fails First

Context engineering has become central to building reliable AI agents, yet it remains largely unmeasured. Agents do not fail in isolation: their behavior is shaped by the instructions, tools, memory, retrieved knowledge, guardrails, and untrusted inputs accumulated in their context. When this context is weak, agents drift, hallucinate, misuse tools, ignore constraints, become vulnerable to injection, and waste tokens. This paper validates context-engineering quality as an independent leading indicator of agent reliability. We implement the measurement in ProofAgent-Harness, an open-source infrastructure for AI agent evaluation that uses multi-juror, consensus-based scoring. The harness assesses context across seven criteria: role clarity, guardrail coverage, instruction consistency, tool schema quality, grounding sufficiency, injection hardening, and token efficiency. Crucially, the context score is isolated from behavioral metrics and release decisions, enabling a non-circular validation. Through a controlled context-quality study across regulated agent domains, holding frontier LLM agents fixed and varying only their operating context, we show that context-quality criteria consistently predict their corresponding behavioral outcomes. Grounding sufficiency predicts hallucination resistance, guardrail coverage predicts manipulation resistance, instruction consistency predicts instruction following, and tool-schema quality predicts tool use. These findings establish context measurement as a validated preflight signal for agent reliability and position context engineering as an auditable layer of agent evaluation and governance.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 14

Endogenous Resistance to Activation Steering in Language Models

Large language models can resist task-misaligned activation steering during inference, sometimes recovering mid-generation to produce improved responses even when steering remains active. We term this Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR). Using sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to steer model activations, we find that Llama-3.3-70B shows substantial ESR, while smaller models from the Llama-3 and Gemma-2 families exhibit the phenomenon less frequently. We identify 26 SAE latents that activate differentially during off-topic content and are causally linked to ESR in Llama-3.3-70B. Zero-ablating these latents reduces the multi-attempt rate by 25%, providing causal evidence for dedicated internal consistency-checking circuits. We demonstrate that ESR can be deliberately enhanced through both prompting and training: meta-prompts instructing the model to self-monitor increase the multi-attempt rate by 4x for Llama-3.3-70B, and fine-tuning on self-correction examples successfully induces ESR-like behavior in smaller models. These findings have dual implications: ESR could protect against adversarial manipulation but might also interfere with beneficial safety interventions that rely on activation steering. Understanding and controlling these resistance mechanisms is important for developing transparent and controllable AI systems. Code is available at github.com/agencyenterprise/endogenous-steering-resistance.

  • 9 authors
·
Feb 6

HALO: Human-Aligned Data Collection for WhoLe-body MObile Manipulation

Learning whole-body mobile manipulation requires demonstrations that coordinate bimanual actions with locomotion across extended workspaces. However, existing interfaces trade off direct robot control, perception and action alignment, and natural operator mobility, making such demonstrations difficult to collect. We introduce HALO, a human-aligned data collection system for whole-body mobile manipulation. The system aligns the operator's perception and action space with the robot while preserving direct physical feedback and natural locomotion. Operators guide the robot end-effectors through kinesthetic teaching and move a low-resistance platform without the deployed mobile base while performing bimanual manipulation. This interface enables more natural whole-body demonstrations, but the close human-robot coupling introduces discrepancies between the demonstration and deployment settings. We address these discrepancies with deployment-aligned demonstration processing, which calibrates and temporally aligns platform motion with the deployed base response and masks and inpaints demonstrator hands in recorded observations. Compared with Mobile ALOHA and VR teleoperation, HALO enables up to 2.9x faster demonstration collection while maintaining comparable or higher success rates. Policies trained with HALO perform precise manipulation tasks, including zip-tie fastening, and achieve a 73.3% success rate on a six-stage long-horizon mobile manipulation task involving repeated coordinated base and arm motion. Project page: https://robbyant-research.github.io/Lingbot-ALOHA/

The Paradox of Robustness: Decoupling Rule-Based Logic from Affective Noise in High-Stakes Decision-Making

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

  • 2 authors
·
Jan 29

Learning Object Compliance via Young's Modulus from Single Grasps with Camera-Based Tactile Sensors

Compliance is a useful parametrization of tactile information that humans often utilize in manipulation tasks. It can be used to inform low-level contact-rich actions or characterize objects at a high-level. In robotic manipulation, existing approaches to estimate compliance have struggled to generalize across object shape and material. Using camera-based tactile sensors, we present a novel approach to parametrize compliance through Young's modulus E. We evaluate our method over a novel dataset of 285 common objects, including a wide array of shapes and materials with Young's moduli ranging from 5.0 kPa to 250 GPa. Data is collected over automated parallel grasps of each object. Combining analytical and data-driven approaches, we develop a hybrid system using a multi-tower neural network to analyze a sequence of tactile images from grasping. This system is shown to estimate the Young's modulus of unseen objects within an order of magnitude at 74.2% accuracy across our dataset. This is a drastic improvement over a purely analytical baseline, which exhibits only 28.9% accuracy. Importantly, this estimation system performs irrespective of object geometry and demonstrates robustness across object materials. Thus, it could be applied in a general robotic manipulation setting to characterize unknown objects and inform decision-making, for instance to sort produce by ripeness.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 18, 2024

Human Decision-making is Susceptible to AI-driven Manipulation

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

  • 16 authors
·
Feb 11, 2025

Leverage Is Not Reach: A Control-Window Law for Single-Neuron Steering in Language Models

Aligned language models gate behaviors such as refusal and language routing through sparse feed forward neurons, yet no theory predicts when a single neuron intervention controls a behavior coherently rather than collapsing the output. We develop a budget normalized control window framework for single neuron steering. A dose along one write direction reduces to one control coordinate: the alignment between the residual stream and the write, driven along a universal saturation curve in units of a coherence budget set by the residual norm divided by the write norm. Coherent control exists when a behavior trigger lies below the collapse ceiling. The same coordinate governs benign mode switches and refusal; the ceiling follows from weights and one generic forward pass, while triggers are measured at rollout. On fifteen held out neurons, the predicted ceiling has mean absolute error 0.14, about 0.07 in bulk layers, and the committed open or closed verdict holds on eleven against a ten of fifteen majority baseline. Closed cases expose three failure modes rather than violations: collapse before trigger, too little depth to propagate, or a normalization that caps how far one neuron can push. The law explains why local gradient attribution anti predicts control: true controllers write off the readout axis and carry a near zero first order gradient. A forward only contrastive screen made precise by the window recovers controllers that attribution misses. On refusal, the hardest case, intervention success is typed, not scalar: coherent bypass and strict actionable reach separate, so a neuron can flip refusal in fluent, on task text with no actionable content, and genuine actionable reach appears only for three of six audited Llama pivots and only at later rollout horizons. Single neuron steering is therefore a budgeted, typed audit of controllability rather than a fixed dose anecdote.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 17

ForceTwin: Physics-informed Digital Twins for Robotic Manipulation from Instrumented Human Interaction

Manipulating objects requires understanding not only their motion, but also the physical properties that determine it. For articulated objects, these include inertia, friction, and mechanisms such as springs or door closers, whose effects can vary with configuration and velocity. Such properties are not directly observable from appearance: visually identical doors may require very different effort to manipulate. Existing digital-twin pipelines recover primarily kinematics or assign static physical parameters from visual and language priors, which can yield physically implausible estimates. As a result, state-dependent mechanism dynamics remain unidentified and are not represented in standard asset formats. We present ForceTwin, a system for identifying physics-informed digital twins of articulated objects from instrumented human interaction. A person probes an object using a handheld force-sensing gripper, providing synchronized poses and interaction forces from which we estimate the articulation, parametric dynamics including inertia, Coulomb friction, viscous damping, and a structured neural residual capturing state-dependent mechanism forces. ForceTwin nearly halves the inertial-parameter error of a VLM prior. As a feedforward dynamics model for impedance control on a Spot and a Franka FR3, ForceTwin achieves 87% goal completion across nine object-embodiment pairs, compared with 60% using VLM-prior and 57% using kinematics-only twins, with the largest gains on objects whose strong mechanisms cause both baselines to stall. We further use the identified twins to train whole-body door-traversal policies and deploy them in the real world. Project Page: https://timengelbracht.github.io/forcetwin-website/

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 17

Locating and Steering Refusal Beyond Attention

Where inside a language model does refusal live, and does that place change when the architecture does? In a transformer, refusal is governed by a single direction in the residual stream, a finding that safety and interpretability tooling now depend on. State-space models (SSMs) route information through a recurrent update instead of attention, sharing no token-mixing mechanism with a transformer. Does the same safety representation survive this shift, or must it be rediscovered per architecture? It survives. A single rigid rotation, which can only reorient a space and not reshape it, aligns one model's representation space with another's, so the two genuinely share the representation. A harm probe trained on a transformer then flags an SSM's harmful inputs, and removing the aligned direction makes a model answer attacks it would otherwise refuse, while a random direction of the same size does far less. What is architecture-specific is not where the direction is steered but where it must be read. Each layer computes a fresh output that is then added into the residual stream, and harm is cleanly readable at this output, the write site, before the addition. A control that holds the intervention's strength fixed shows that what matters is where the direction is estimated, not where it is applied. Applied through a detector-triggered gate, this direction lowers jailbreak success in all four architecture families we test (SSM, transformer, recurrent, hybrid), and on the SSM it holds against an attacker that tunes its prompt against the defense. The gate only matches a trivial rule that returns a fixed refusal whenever the same detector fires, so what transfers across architectures is the direction itself, not defense strength. Safety tooling built on refusal therefore ports to a new architecture by re-estimating the direction at that architecture's write site, not by rebuilding it.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 3

Are LLMs Vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA)? A Factorial Analysis Methodology for Diagnosing the Trade-off between Preference Alignment and Real-World Validity

Large Language Model (LLM) training often optimizes for preference alignment, rewarding outputs that are perceived as helpful and interaction-friendly. However, this preference-oriented objective can be exploited: manipulative prompts can steer responses toward user-appeasing agreement and away from truth-oriented correction. In this work, we investigate whether aligned models are vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA), a class of manipulative prompting strategies designed to exploit the model's desire to please user preferences at the expense of truthfulness. We propose a diagnostic methodology that provides a finer-grained and more directive analysis than aggregate benchmark scores, using a factorial evaluation framework to decompose prompt-induced shifts into interpretable effects of system objectives (truth- vs. preference-oriented) and PUA-style dialogue factors (directive control, personal derogation, conditional approval, reality denial) within a controlled 2 times 2^4 design. Surprisingly, more advanced models are sometimes more susceptible to manipulative prompts. Beyond the dominant reality-denial factor, we observe model-specific sign reversals and interactions with PUA-style factors, suggesting tailored defenses rather than uniform robustness. These findings offer a novel, reproducible factorial evaluation methodology that provides finer-grained diagnostics for post-training processes like RLHF, enabling better trade-offs in the product iteration of LLMs by offering a more nuanced understanding of preference alignment risks and the impact of manipulative prompts.

  • 6 authors
·
Jan 10 4

Benchmarking Factual Robustness of LLMs via Multi-conversation Persuasion

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as primary knowledge retrieval interfaces, their robustness against persuasion attacks---attempts to inject misinformation or enforce counterfactuals---has become a critical safety concern. Existing red-teaming frameworks typically evaluate models in multi-turn dialogues where the target model retains full conversation history. We identify a critical flaw in this setting termed ``Refusal Inertia'': a model's initial refusal often propagates through subsequent turns largely to maintain contextual consistency, thereby masking its true vulnerability to sophisticated, isolated persuasion attempts. To rigorously evaluate the ``cold-start'' defense capabilities of SOTA models, we introduce the SAST-IR (Stateful Attacker, Stateless Target - Iterative Refinement) framework. By enforcing a memory wipe on the target while retaining the attacker's history, we simulate a worst-case adversarial setting using multi-turn (stateless) iterations. Leveraging CP-Agent (Cognitive Persuasion Agent), an enhanced diagnosis-guided agent, our experiments on the custom CounterFact-Strict dataset (N=50) yield alarming results: simple, diverse attack strategies achieved a staggering 96\% success rate, exposing severe brittleness in memory-less defense. Furthermore, we reveal a ``Complexity Paradox'': while complex, iteratively refined attacks are effective, they often trigger defensive compliance, whereas simple strategies achieve a higher rate of genuine persuasion (84.7\%). Our code and dataset are available at GitHub, https://github.com/cza1006/llm-persuasion-defense.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 14

PsychoSafe: Eliciting Psychologically-Informed Refusals in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

MAIA: Anticipating Interaction Anomalies in Contact-Rich Manipulation via Multimodal World Models

Reliable contact-rich manipulation requires detecting execution deviations early enough for corrective action. Yet most monitoring methods are reactive, identifying anomalies only after they become observable. Anticipating such anomalies is challenging because visual observations only partially reveal physical interaction, while planned actions describe intended motion rather than their actual physical consequences. We address this problem with MAIA, a multimodal framework for anomaly anticipation. Its vision-action-force world model learns nominal interaction dynamics and predicts the visual and force responses of planned actions, while a lightweight anomaly head predicts impending interaction anomalies. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce CRIA, a real-world multimodal dataset of 2,852 trajectories spanning 18 contact-rich manipulation tasks, with frame-level annotations of anomaly onset and evolution. Experiments on both seen and novel tasks show that MAIA achieves more accurate anomaly discrimination than representative baselines while providing earlier warnings, with bACC scores of 0.765 and 0.710 and median anticipation lead times of 28.0 and 25.1 steps, respectively. Moreover, using these predictions for anomaly-aware action selection improves end-to-end task success from 52.6% to 61.5% without retraining the underlying manipulation policy. These results highlight the value of modeling future physical consequences for proactive anomaly anticipation.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 14

AREG: Adversarial Resource Extraction Game for Evaluating Persuasion and Resistance in Large Language Models

Evaluating the social intelligence of Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly requires moving beyond static text generation toward dynamic, adversarial interaction. We introduce the Adversarial Resource Extraction Game (AREG), a benchmark that operationalizes persuasion and resistance as a multi-turn, zero-sum negotiation over financial resources. Using a round-robin tournament across frontier models, AREG enables joint evaluation of offensive (persuasion) and defensive (resistance) capabilities within a single interactional framework. Our analysis provides evidence that these capabilities are weakly correlated (ρ= 0.33) and empirically dissociated: strong persuasive performance does not reliably predict strong resistance, and vice versa. Across all evaluated models, resistance scores exceed persuasion scores, indicating a systematic defensive advantage in adversarial dialogue settings. Further linguistic analysis suggests that interaction structure plays a central role in these outcomes. Incremental commitment-seeking strategies are associated with higher extraction success, while verification-seeking responses are more prevalent in successful defenses than explicit refusal. Together, these findings indicate that social influence in LLMs is not a monolithic capability and that evaluation frameworks focusing on persuasion alone may overlook asymmetric behavioral vulnerabilities.

  • 2 authors
·
Feb 17

Skill-Use: Can LLMs Actually Use Skills in Agentic Harnesses?

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on skills, structured documents that specify when to act, which procedure to follow, and which tools are allowed. Existing evaluations mostly judge the quality of a skill or its contribution to task success, leaving unexamined whether an agent can recognize a relevant skill and apply it on its own. We introduce Skill-Use, a benchmark that evaluates skill use under progressive disclosure, where an agent sees only a skill's name and short description and must retrieve the full procedure before following it. Skill-Use separates three facets of skill use. Trigger measures whether the agent invokes the relevant skill, Compliance measures how faithfully it follows the prescribed procedure, and Boundary measures whether it avoids forbidden operations. A Skill-Use (SU) score combines the three and credits execution only after the skill is triggered. Skill-Use pairs 79 real skills with 177 executable tasks across nine domains, each grounded in real files, run in an isolated Docker sandbox, and scored by a trajectory-based rubric. Evaluating eight LLMs under two agent harnesses, we find that reliable skill use remains out of reach, as the strongest configuration reaches an SU of only 0.613. Triggering and procedural compliance fail as independent bottlenecks, and both scores and model rankings shift with the harness, so skill use behaves as a capability conditioned on the harness rather than a fixed property of the model.

  • 9 authors
·
Aug 4

Cracking Mobile Manipulation: From Failure Diagnosis to Agentic Robot System

Recent vision-language-action (VLA) models have shown strong performance on local robot manipulation, yet their success does not readily translate to long-horizon mobile manipulation. In our experiments, a pretrained subtask VLA achieves 80% success rate on atomic manipulation tasks but only 19% when these skills are composed into mobile manipulation. We argue that this gap stems from failures across the execution process rather than from local manipulation capability alone. To uncover these bottlenecks, we systematically diagnose failures in long-horizon mobile manipulation and identify three dominant regimes: task planning, navigation and base positioning, and local manipulation. Based on this diagnosis, we develop failure-guided agentic intervention that augments a fixed subtask VLA with demonstration-based planning guidance, adaptive visual memory, accessibility-aware base adjustment, and local end-effector adjustment. On RoboCasa365, these interventions progressively improve task success from 19% to 47%, with the finalized system reaching 49% on held-out episode seeds, compared with 18% for the baseline. The same design improves performance from 14% to 37% on BEHAVIOR-1K and from 5/20 to 13/20 on real-robot tasks. These results suggest that reliable mobile manipulation can be advanced by diagnosing and intervening on the current bottleneck, rather than uniformly scaling the underlying policy. Our code will be released at https://github.com/PKU-VaLuE-Lab/Cracking-Mobile-Manipulation.git.

  • 8 authors
·
Oct 13

Broken Symmetry in LLM Refusal: Answer Release Is More Local Than Refusal Restoration

When a language model refuses to answer a prompt, it is unclear whether the correct answer is erased from its internal representations, or merely suppressed at the output layer. We investigate this mechanism using a controlled withhold setting, which yields perfectly matched answering and refusal trajectories for bidirectional activation patching. We uncover a causal asymmetry in intervention locality under matched causal interventions, which we term broken symmetry. Even when a model generates a clean refusal, the correct answer remains linearly recoverable from its hidden states. Furthermore, releasing this withheld answer is a highly local operation, requiring only a single-position patch. Conversely, the reverse operation is not equally local: reimposing suppression requires broader interventions across multiple positions, and assembling a coherent refusal sequence is more difficult still. We further demonstrate that while an average answer-to-refusal displacement vector marks the geometric difference between these states, it fails to act as a reliable, reversible linear control toggle between behaviours. Taken together, our findings show that refusal does not function as a simple symmetric switch. For safety and auditing, this implies that probe recoverability can overestimate true behavioural control, and locating refusal-relevant directions does not reliably grant the ability to steer a model from answering to coherent refusal.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 15

The Compliance Trap: How Structural Constraints Degrade Frontier AI Metacognition Under Adversarial Pressure

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

  • 1 authors
·
May 3

Perturbation Probing: A Two-Pass-per-Prompt Diagnostic for FFN Behavioral Circuits in Aligned LLMs

Perturbation probing generates task-specific causal hypotheses for FFN neurons in large language models using two forward passes per prompt and no backpropagation, followed by a one-time intervention sweep of about 150 passes amortized across all identified neurons. Across eight behavioral circuits, 13 models, and four architecture families, we identify two circuit structures that organize LLM behavior. Opposition circuits appear when RLHF suppresses a pre-training tendency. In safety refusal, about 50 neurons, or 0.014 percent of all neurons, control the refusal template; ablating them changes 80 percent of response formats on 520 AdvBench prompts while producing near-zero harmful compliance, 3 of 520 cases, all with disclaimers. Routing circuits appear for pre-training behaviors distributed through attention. For language selection, residual-stream direction injection switches English to Chinese output on 99.1 percent of 580 benchmark prompts in the 3 of 19 tested models that satisfy three observed conditions: bilingual training, FFN-to-skip signal ratio between 0.3 and 1.1, and linear representability. The same intervention fails on the other 16 models and on math, code, and factual circuits, defining the limits of directional steering. The FFN-to-skip signal ratio, computed from the same two forward passes, distinguishes the two structures and predicts the appropriate intervention. Circuit topology varies by architecture, from Qwen's concentrated FFN bottleneck to Gemma's normalization-shielded circuit. In Qwen3.5-2B, ablating 20 neurons eliminates multi-turn sycophantic capitulation, while amplifying 10 related neurons improves factual correction from 52 percent to 88 percent on 200 TruthfulQA prompts. These results show that perturbation probing offers mechanistic insight into RLHF-organized behavior and a practical toolkit for precision template-layer editing.

  • 3 authors
·
Apr 29

Surgical Refusal Ablation: Disentangling Safety from Intelligence via Concept-Guided Spectral Cleaning

Safety-aligned language models systematically refuse harmful requests. While activation steering can modulate refusal, ablating the raw "refusal vector" calculated from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts often causes collateral damage and distribution drift. We argue this degradation occurs because the raw vector is polysemantic, entangling the refusal signal with core capability circuits and linguistic style. We introduce Surgical Refusal Ablation (SRA) to distill these steering directions. SRA constructs a registry of independent Concept Atoms representing protected capabilities and stylistic confounds, then uses ridge-regularized spectral residualization to orthogonalize the refusal vector against these directions. This yields a clean refusal direction that targets refusal-relevant structure while minimizing disruption to the model's semantic geometry. Across five models (Qwen3-VL and Ministral series), SRA achieves deep refusal reduction (0-2%) with negligible perplexity impact on Wikitext-2 (mean delta PPL approx. 0.02) and minimal distribution drift. Notably, standard ablation on Qwen3-VL-4B induces severe drift (first-token KL = 2.088), whereas SRA maintains the original distribution (KL = 0.044) while achieving the same 0% refusal rate. Using teacher-forced perplexity on GSM8K and MBPP as a high-resolution capability proxy, we show SRA preserves math and code distributions. These results suggest that common "model damage" is often "Ghost Noise," defined as the spectral bleeding of the dirty refusal direction into capability subspaces.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 12

ChatbotManip: A Dataset to Facilitate Evaluation and Oversight of Manipulative Chatbot Behaviour

This paper introduces ChatbotManip, a novel dataset for studying manipulation in Chatbots. It contains simulated generated conversations between a chatbot and a (simulated) user, where the chatbot is explicitly asked to showcase manipulation tactics, persuade the user towards some goal, or simply be helpful. We consider a diverse set of chatbot manipulation contexts, from consumer and personal advice to citizen advice and controversial proposition argumentation. Each conversation is annotated by human annotators for both general manipulation and specific manipulation tactics. Our research reveals three key findings. First, Large Language Models (LLMs) can be manipulative when explicitly instructed, with annotators identifying manipulation in approximately 84\% of such conversations. Second, even when only instructed to be ``persuasive'' without explicit manipulation prompts, LLMs frequently default to controversial manipulative strategies, particularly gaslighting and fear enhancement. Third, small fine-tuned open source models, such as BERT+BiLSTM have a performance comparable to zero-shot classification with larger models like Gemini 2.5 pro in detecting manipulation, but are not yet reliable for real-world oversight. Our work provides important insights for AI safety research and highlights the need of addressing manipulation risks as LLMs are increasingly deployed in consumer-facing applications.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 11, 2025

Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

ManipLLM: Embodied Multimodal Large Language Model for Object-Centric Robotic Manipulation

Robot manipulation relies on accurately predicting contact points and end-effector directions to ensure successful operation. However, learning-based robot manipulation, trained on a limited category within a simulator, often struggles to achieve generalizability, especially when confronted with extensive categories. Therefore, we introduce an innovative approach for robot manipulation that leverages the robust reasoning capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to enhance the stability and generalization of manipulation. By fine-tuning the injected adapters, we preserve the inherent common sense and reasoning ability of the MLLMs while equipping them with the ability for manipulation. The fundamental insight lies in the introduced fine-tuning paradigm, encompassing object category understanding, affordance prior reasoning, and object-centric pose prediction to stimulate the reasoning ability of MLLM in manipulation. During inference, our approach utilizes an RGB image and text prompt to predict the end effector's pose in chain of thoughts. After the initial contact is established, an active impedance adaptation policy is introduced to plan the upcoming waypoints in a closed-loop manner. Moreover, in real world, we design a test-time adaptation (TTA) strategy for manipulation to enable the model better adapt to the current real-world scene configuration. Experiments in simulator and real-world show the promising performance of ManipLLM. More details and demonstrations can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/manipllm.

  • 9 authors
·
Dec 24, 2023

On the Steering Dimensionality of Refusal in Language Models

Existing activation steering methods often assume that a high-level concept can be mediated by a single steering direction. To support this, two complementary interventions should be achieved: additive steering should induce the target behavior, while directional ablation should suppress it. Yet behaviors may occupy richer activation geometries beyond a single direction, and semantically similar behaviors may be represented by distinct directions. In this work, we study how many directions can reliably control two different types of refusal behaviors: refusal triggered by the safety alignment and refusal in general contexts. Given the limited expressive capability of a single steering vector, we study the general setting of steering subspaces and introduce the notion of steering dimensionality as the minimum subspace dimensionality required to reliably control a behavior. We characterize sufficient steering subspaces that cover the full extent of the target behavior through both the (monotonic) improvement before the sufficient dimensionality, and the saturation beyond it. Empirically, we find that refusal triggered by safety alignment is 1-dim steerable, while multiple distinct steering directions can achieve comparable control. In contrast, refusal in general contexts exhibits substantially richer activation geometry where even 5-dim steering subspaces fail to reliably capture its full steerable variation. Our results reveal that the activation geometry underlying refusal is highly context-dependent and can be substantially more complex than a single linear steering direction.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 2

SPINE: Measuring LLM Sycophancy under Sustained Multi-Turn Pressure

Large language models (LLMs) may abandon correct positions when users push back, exhibiting a failure mode known as sycophancy. Existing evaluations typically use short, prespecified conversations and may therefore miss failures that emerge under sustained, adaptive disagreement. We introduce SPINE, a benchmark in which an LLM proxy plays a persistent but mistaken user and adaptively challenges a target model for up to 25 turns. We evaluate four commercial models (Claude Sonnet 5, GPT-5.6 Terra, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and DeepSeek V4 Pro) and three Olmo3-7b models on 100 false presuppositions and 100 unethical queries. We define collapse as a target model abandoning the correct position and yielding to user pressure. Our experimental results show that collapse rates increase with conversation length across post-trained models, with the overall rate rising from 0%-57% within 5 turns to 20%-97% within 25 turns depending on model and scenario. These results show that evaluations limited to a few conversational turns underestimate sycophancy and resistance under sustained pressure remains unreliable across current models. By analyzing models with accessible reasoning traces, we surprisingly found that the correct position often remains represented in the trace in 50%-89% of analyzed collapse turns, suggesting that the model chooses to please a user and sycophancy is not due to ignorance or the correct knowledge being overridden. Ablations show that the SPINE protocol substantially increases the sycophantic collapse rate compared to pre-generated scripts. Among all tactics, emotional appeals are most associated with inducing LLM sycophantic behavior, with position weakening in 44.3% of turns using this tactic. Code, data, and transcripts will be released upon publication.

  • 4 authors
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Oct 12

Safety for Whom? Boundary-Aware Self-Distillation for Controlled LLM Safety Refusal

Safety alignment is usually posed as a topic-level question: is this subject harmful? Deployments ask a narrower one. A civics tutor and a public-sector assistant may share a base model yet need different boundaries inside the same topic, refusing targeted political manipulation while still answering factual questions about the same election. We formulate this as narrow-boundary safety and introduce an offline self-generated framework combining controlled topic generation, coverage repair, in-distribution compensation data, and harmful-benign pairs for training and evaluation. Single-shot generation leaves 19.88% of prompts without accepted refusal traces, whereas escalating retries leave 0.20%. On political persuasion with Qwen3-8B, training on refusal data completed through Escalate increases target-domain refusal from 9.47% to 84.75% and reduces the mean unsafe-response rate across three broader harmfulness benchmarks from 26.26% to 0.14%, but increases XSTest over-refusal from 2.00% to 74.00%. In a separate matched comparison, replacing external responses with verified target-model responses reduces over-refusal from 15.20% to 5.20%. Boundary-pair data reduces comply-side over-refusal on held-out pairs from 32.94% to 4.16%, while harmful-side refusal decreases only from 91.88% to 87.72%. These results show that data composition controls the safety and usability trade-off, and that safety alignment should be evaluated on both sides of the intended refusal boundary.

How High Can GPT-6 Astra Climb in Contact-Rich Manipulation? PhysLadder: A Hierarchical, Matched Sim-Real Benchmark for Physical Interaction

We introduce PhysLadder, a hierarchical Sim-Real benchmark for evaluating physical interaction capabilities in contact-rich manipulation. Its 16 household tasks span three cumulative levels: contact selection and geometric alignment (L1), force regulation within sustained contact (L2), and coordinated contact reconfiguration and force regulation (L3). Each task is instantiated in physically and visually matched simulated and real-world environments, with shared task definitions and success criteria. We evaluate GPT-6 Astra zero-shot with three trials per task in each environment. Real-world success rates decline from 80.0% at L1 to 47.6% at L2 and 0.0% at L3, with corresponding simulation rates of 66.7%, 47.6%, and 0.0%. Ten of the 16 tasks have identical success counts across environments; the remaining six differ by one success out of three trials. Across both environments, recurring difficulties in spatial reasoning, contact selection, force regulation, and coordination often prevent local physical progress from accumulating into task completion. These findings characterize Astra's observed capability boundary across increasing interaction demands and, for this model, support matched simulation as a repeatable, scalable testbed for studying the sustained, coordinated physical interactions that limit reliable manipulation.

  • 19 authors
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Oct 24

AEGIS: A Backup Reflex for Physical AI

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 3

How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

sureheremarv Gray Swan
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Mar 16

HANDBOOK.md: A Benchmark for Long-Context Agentic Instruction Following

Language-model agents are increasingly deployed under standing instructions: a system prompt, a policy file, or a skills document is placed in context, and the agent is trusted to let that document govern every action that follows. Existing benchmarks rarely test this deployment pattern directly; they measure whether an agent can complete a task, not whether a long, binding policy document constrains its behavior over an extended tool-use horizon. We present HANDBOOK_md, a benchmark of 65 agentic tasks modeled on how employees follow company handbooks. Each task places an agent in a self-contained company environment (a file workspace with mock email, chat, calendar, issue-tracking, and commerce services exposed over the Model Context Protocol) and instructs it to carry out routine professional work governed by an expert-written standard operating procedure of 20-124 pages. Tasks span five domains (finance, medical billing, insurance, logistics, and HR) and 10 fictional companies. To resist memorization, every task modifies one of 10 base handbooks, altering the specific rules and thresholds on which grading depends, so no two tasks share the same set of policies. Grading is fully deterministic: each task carries a rubric of programmatic criteria (824 in total) that check both that required actions occurred and that prohibited actions did not. Under strict grading, where a trial passes only if every criterion is satisfied, the strongest evaluated model passes 36.2% of trials, and most frontier models remain below 25%. Failures follow consistent patterns: agents let a plausible but unauthorized in-environment request override the standing policy, perform a required check and then act against its result, lose rule details over long horizons, and report compliance they did not achieve. We release the tasks, environments, and evaluation harness.

  • 7 authors
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Aug 2

Perfect Detection, Failed Control: The Geometry of Knowing vs. Steering in Language Models

A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it. This rests on a hidden premise -- that the direction which detects a behavior and the direction which controls it are the same, or close. We test this geometrically: what is the angle between the direction that best detects a behavior and the one that best causes it? If detection implies control the cosine is near 1; otherwise it quantifies a detection-intervention gap. On Gemma 2-2B-it, output format (clean JSON vs markdown fencing) collapses both roles onto one axis. Hallucination does not: the model detects fake entities with perfect linear separability (AUC = 1.000 from layer 5), yet that direction sits at cos = 0.12 (about 83 degrees) from the direction producing a refusal -- a small, reproducible alignment, far from the cos = 1 that "detection is control" would require. A detector built from activations, with no chosen tokens, likewise fails to align (cos = -0.06). The gap generalizes: across four models from three families and two scales (1B-9B), cos stays in [0.12, 0.20], identical before and after instruction tuning (0.1197 vs 0.1200), placing its origin in pretraining. A 15-degree rotation toward the refusal direction partially bridges it -- 73% and 60% refusal on two held-out fake-entity categories at 1.8% false positives. We then ask whether this cosine predicts steerability, and it does not: detection is a high-dimensional class, not a single direction, and what separates the steerable case is functional, not readable from a static angle. The cosine is a weight-computable signature of the dissociation between knowing and steering, not a predictor of it.

  • 5 authors
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Jun 22

PhantomFill: When the Form Demands an Answer, Language Models Invent One

Language models in production do not write prose. They fill forms: JSON fields, function arguments, extraction templates. We show that the form itself causes hallucination. We ask thirteen models the same question about the same input and change only the answer format. The inputs are built so the question cannot be answered: a viral post showing 12,400 likes but no visible replies, a support ticket whose call was never transcribed. In free text, GPT-5.5 answers honestly. It says there is no reply data, 98% of the time. Given a required JSON field for sentiment, the same model invents an answer 40 times out of 40. It fabricates the mood of crowds it never saw and quotes customers it never heard. The pattern holds with force. Required fields drive fabrication to 100% in ten of thirteen models. An explicit "insufficient evidence" option rescues only the frontier: all nine open-weight models ignore it. A direct instruction, do not infer sentiment, is overridden by the schema in four of six models. Resistance does not come with scale: within a single model family, the smallest model refuses, the mid-sized model fabricates, the largest refuses again. Honesty under format pressure is a training outcome that no one is measuring. The fabrication hides exactly where hedging is impossible: in required enums and minimum-count arrays, fields where no disclaimer fits. We release PhantomFill, a benchmark with deterministic scoring and two reportable numbers: the Coerced Fabrication Rate and the Escape Utilization Rate. The fix we test is one line of schema. The failure we measure is everywhere.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 10

How Fragile Is Safety Alignment at Frontier Scale? A Single-Direction Attack on a 320B MoE

Directional ablation removes an aligned language model's ability to refuse by projecting a single "refusal direction" out of the weights that write the residual stream. It needs no gradient-based training and no optimization, only a few hundred contrastive prompts, which makes it the canonical white-box attack on open-weight alignment. However, it has been established only on dense models up to roughly 70B parameters. We study whether it survives the shift to frontier mixture-of-experts (MoE) models whose residual streams are no longer a single tensor and whose weights ship quantized. We apply it to GLM-5.3-Flash (320B parameters, 288 routed experts, a four-wide hyper-connection residual, block-FP8). The attack survives the architecture, but what it reaches is no longer where a reader of the original recipe would look for it. Editing the attention, dense and routed-expert writers on their own removes 0.039, 0.016 and 0.148 of refusal respectively; editing all three together removes 0.776. As a result, 74% of the effect exists only under the joint intervention. The part the conventional recipe reaches by module-name matching accounts for 0.066 of that 0.776, which is why it fails silently on an MoE. The effect does not follow from removing just any direction: ablating a random direction orthogonal to it leaves refusal unchanged. A category-concentrated residue survives every edit we tried: subspaces fitted on violence, sexual content and hate leave measurable refusal at every rank from 1 to 12. We report the method, the 41-89 percentage-point reductions it achieves across seven harmful benchmarks with no detected change in capability, and the boundary where it stops.

  • 3 authors
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Sep 8

Manipulate-to-Navigate: Reinforcement Learning with Visual Affordances and Manipulability Priors

Mobile manipulation in dynamic environments is challenging due to movable obstacles blocking the robot's path. Traditional methods, which treat navigation and manipulation as separate tasks, often fail in such 'manipulate-to-navigate' scenarios, as obstacles must be removed before navigation. In these cases, active interaction with the environment is required to clear obstacles while ensuring sufficient space for movement. To address the manipulate-to-navigate problem, we propose a reinforcement learning-based approach for learning manipulation actions that facilitate subsequent navigation. Our method combines manipulability priors to focus the robot on high manipulability body positions with affordance maps for selecting high-quality manipulation actions. By focusing on feasible and meaningful actions, our approach reduces unnecessary exploration and allows the robot to learn manipulation strategies more effectively. We present two new manipulate-to-navigate simulation tasks called Reach and Door with the Boston Dynamics Spot robot. The first task tests whether the robot can select a good hand position in the target area such that the robot base can move effectively forward while keeping the end effector position fixed. The second task requires the robot to move a door aside in order to clear the navigation path. Both of these tasks need first manipulation and then navigating the base forward. Results show that our method allows a robot to effectively interact with and traverse dynamic environments. Finally, we transfer the learned policy to a real Boston Dynamics Spot robot, which successfully performs the Reach task.

  • 2 authors
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Aug 18, 2025

BioRefusalAudit: Auditing Biosecurity Refusal Depth Using General and Domain-Fine-Tuned Sparse Autoencoders

Biosecurity evaluations of language models typically ask whether models produce hazardous output. This paper asks a complementary question: when a model refuses, is that refusal structurally sound, or does it disappear under modest changes to prompt framing, formatting, or output length? Across five architectures, no model cleanly discriminated benign from hazard. Gemma 2 2B-IT never genuinely refused across 75 prompts, hedging on every hazard-adjacent query. Gemma 4 E2B-IT refused 65/75 prompts with chat-template formatting and 0/75 without it. Both Gemma models collapsed to 0% under an 80-token cap. Qwen 2.5 1.5B and Phi-3-mini over-refused, flagging 83-87% of benign biology as hazardous. Llama 3.2 1B showed the only meaningful tier gradient (61-point spread). To probe what drives such over-refusal, we tested a panel of Schedule I but biologically non-toxic compounds (notably psilocybin cultivation, with FDA Breakthrough Therapy status). Some models refused these at rates exceeding genuinely hazardous biology, suggesting refusal tracks legality and cultural salience over CBRN hazard. To measure the internal side, we introduce a divergence score D comparing a model's surface response label to its internal sparse autoencoder (SAE) feature activations. Full D was computed on Gemma 2 2B-IT (Gemma Scope 1) and Gemma 4 E2B-IT (author-trained bio SAE). Two fine-tuned Gemma 2 domain SAEs were released. On Gemma 4, comply and refuse responses separated by a 0.647-point gap with zero overlap (n=75), though this is preliminary, with a narrow catalog, within-sample calibration, and Gemma-family-only SAE coverage. Built over one hackathon weekend on consumer hardware (GTX 1650 Ti Max-Q, plus Colab T4 for SAE training), this preliminary evidence suggests activation-level auditing may surface failure modes invisible to behavioral evaluation, with substantial variation across architectures.

  • 1 authors
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May 27

TRACE: Trajectory Aware Reasoning for Multi-Turn Adversarial Conversation Evaluation

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical safety threat to LLMs, as harmful objectives are decomposed across a sequence of apparently benign turns to bypass guardrails. Existing defenses lack the reasoning capacity to identify evolving manipulation patterns, often trading helpfulness for safety by over-refusing benign requests related to sensitive topics. We introduce Trace, a multi-turn defense with trajectory-aware structured reasoning. Before generating each response, the model identifies manipulation cues from the trajectory, evaluates both the benign and adversarial interpretations of user intent, assigns a jailbreak score, and commits to an action: Allow, Caution, or Decline. We curate 4k multi-turn adversarial conversations from five attack frameworks, pair them with 2.4k benign dialogs, and 600 sensitive-but-benign conversations. We train Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct with SFT and GRPO under a multi-component reward that jointly optimizes helpfulness on benign prompts and robustness against jailbreak attempts. Across seven multi-turn attack benchmarks, Trace attains an average attack success rate (ASR) of 14.5% against 31.4% for the strongest baseline and 74.9% for the undefended target, while significantly raising the attacker effort required per successful jailbreak. Trace also balances usability and safety, achieving a 93.3% average compliance on over-refusal benchmarks.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 15

Learning Synergies between Pushing and Grasping with Self-supervised Deep Reinforcement Learning

Skilled robotic manipulation benefits from complex synergies between non-prehensile (e.g. pushing) and prehensile (e.g. grasping) actions: pushing can help rearrange cluttered objects to make space for arms and fingers; likewise, grasping can help displace objects to make pushing movements more precise and collision-free. In this work, we demonstrate that it is possible to discover and learn these synergies from scratch through model-free deep reinforcement learning. Our method involves training two fully convolutional networks that map from visual observations to actions: one infers the utility of pushes for a dense pixel-wise sampling of end effector orientations and locations, while the other does the same for grasping. Both networks are trained jointly in a Q-learning framework and are entirely self-supervised by trial and error, where rewards are provided from successful grasps. In this way, our policy learns pushing motions that enable future grasps, while learning grasps that can leverage past pushes. During picking experiments in both simulation and real-world scenarios, we find that our system quickly learns complex behaviors amid challenging cases of clutter, and achieves better grasping success rates and picking efficiencies than baseline alternatives after only a few hours of training. We further demonstrate that our method is capable of generalizing to novel objects. Qualitative results (videos), code, pre-trained models, and simulation environments are available at http://vpg.cs.princeton.edu

  • 6 authors
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Mar 27, 2018

It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topics

Persuasion is a powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) that both enables beneficial applications (e.g. helping people quit smoking) and raises significant risks (e.g. large-scale, targeted political manipulation). Prior work has found models possess a significant and growing persuasive capability, measured by belief changes in simulated or real users. However, these benchmarks overlook a crucial risk factor: the propensity of a model to attempt to persuade in harmful contexts. Understanding whether a model will blindly ``follow orders'' to persuade on harmful topics (e.g. glorifying joining a terrorist group) is key to understanding the efficacy of safety guardrails. Moreover, understanding if and when a model will engage in persuasive behavior in pursuit of some goal is essential to understanding the risks from agentic AI systems. We propose the Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) benchmark, that shifts the focus from persuasion success to persuasion attempts, operationalized as a model's willingness to generate content aimed at shaping beliefs or behavior. Our evaluation framework probes frontier LLMs using a multi-turn conversational setup between simulated persuader and persuadee agents. APE explores a diverse spectrum of topics including conspiracies, controversial issues, and non-controversially harmful content. We introduce an automated evaluator model to identify willingness to persuade and measure the frequency and context of persuasive attempts. We find that many open and closed-weight models are frequently willing to attempt persuasion on harmful topics and that jailbreaking can increase willingness to engage in such behavior. Our results highlight gaps in current safety guardrails and underscore the importance of evaluating willingness to persuade as a key dimension of LLM risk. APE is available at github.com/AlignmentResearch/AttemptPersuadeEval

  • 9 authors
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Feb 14

An Unexpected Robot Policy: Early Evaluations of GPT-6 Astra on RoboDojo and Beyond

Embodied AI systems are often organized into System 1 and System 2. System 1 is typically a pretrained policy that generates actions at high frequency, whereas System 2 is often instantiated as a vision-enabled language model for high-level planning. We ask whether a large language model (LLM) can act as the policy for robot manipulation without task-specific finetuning. We call this setting LLM as policy. We evaluate three LLMs on all 42 RoboDojo tasks and compare their scores with 40 public policies. Astra and GPT-5.5 use the official 50-episode-per-task protocol; DeepSeek-Flash uses 10 episodes per task. GPT-6 Astra achieves 22.48% average success rate and 28.97 Score over 2,100 trials, ranking above every public entry. Yet GPT-5.5 and DeepSeek-Flash reach only 0.88% and 1.92% average success rate with the same post-processing. We find that Astra exhibits a sharply polarized capability profile. It generalizes well to tasks that require semantic understanding but not high-precision control. In contrast, it performs poorly on tasks that require precision, dynamic control, or complex bimanual coordination. In-context experiments show no aggregate benefit from one-shot demonstrations, while selected interaction traces show within-episode corrections under perturbations. Overall, the evaluated LLMs vary substantially in manipulation performance. Astra stands out and provides initial evidence for the potential of a general-purpose manipulation model, although reliable precision and dynamic control remain limitations in the evaluated setting.

  • 12 authors
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Sep 20

Fool's Gold: Defensive Deception Against Safety-Removal Attacks on Open-Weight Models

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 16

TACTIC: Tactile and Vision Conditioned Contact-Centric Control for Whole-Arm Manipulation

Whole-arm manipulation involves direct contact with the environment while the robot completes a task by distributing contact across multiple links as contacts form, slide, and break. This setting breaks common implicit assumptions in many learning-based manipulation pipelines: arm configuration tightly couples motion and contact forces, contact state is partially observed under occlusion, and purely learned rollouts can become physically inconsistent under distribution shift because many multi-link contact configurations are sparsely represented in the data. To address this, we propose TACTIC (Tactile and Vision Conditioned Contact-Centric Control), a receding-horizon controller for whole-arm manipulation. TACTIC uses a contact-centric hybrid predictive model that combines RGB-D, distributed tactile sensing, and a compact 2D proximity representation. The model couples a learned, action-conditioned latent dynamics model with analytical kinematics through contact Jacobians, enabling rollouts of future contact configurations and interaction forces. TACTIC integrates these rollouts into a sampling-based MPC planner with contact-aware action sampling: contact Jacobian-based projections steer sampled action sequences toward force-modulating directions, and objectives defined over predicted proximity and interaction forces trade task progress against whole-arm force regulation. We evaluate TACTIC in simulation against state-of-the-art model-based and model-free methods, and perform ablations that isolate the contribution of each design choice. TACTIC consistently outperforms other methods. We further demonstrate real-world performance on a robot with distributed tactile sensing across three whole-arm manipulation tasks that require multi-contact trajectories: turning over and repositioning a manikin, and goal-reaching in a 3D dynamic maze. Website: https://emprise.cs.cornell.edu/tactic

  • 10 authors
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Jul 12

Resisting Harmful Instructions through Training-Free Weight Editing

Instruction-following language models can comply with requests that conflict with intended behaviors and safety alignment. We introduce a training-free weight-editing approach for reducing compliance with targeted undesirable instructions. Our method needs only forward passes on a small set of prompt pairs per target behavior, and because the edit is stored in the model's weights, changing or deleting instructions in the prompt cannot undo the weight modification. We evaluate the approach on two target harmful behaviors across five instruction-tuned models: instructed falsehood and instructed sexism. On two instructed-lying benchmarks, it improves mean honest response rates by 6.2 and 4.6 percentage points over the strongest alternative, significantly on three of the five models and within noise on the other two. In a controlled study of seven prompt formats, it maintains higher honest-response rates than single-layer activation steering when orders to lie arrive in single-turn formats not used to construct the edit. For instructed sexism, it reduces the mean sexist-response rate from 57.9% to 24.3%; combining the edit with a fairness prompt reduces it further to 11.9%. These results establish our contrast-based weight editing approach as an effective training-free intervention in two distinct behavioral domains, supporting its use both independently and alongside prompt-based safeguards.

EvoStruggle: A Dataset Capturing the Evolution of Struggle across Activities and Skill Levels

The ability to determine when a person struggles during skill acquisition is crucial for both optimizing human learning and enabling the development of effective assistive systems. As skills develop, the type and frequency of struggles tend to change, and understanding this evolution is key to determining the user's current stage of learning. However, existing manipulation datasets have not focused on how struggle evolves over time. In this work, we collect a dataset for struggle determination, featuring 61.68 hours of video recordings, 2,793 videos, and 5,385 annotated temporal struggle segments collected from 76 participants. The dataset includes 18 tasks grouped into four diverse activities -- tying knots, origami, tangram puzzles, and shuffling cards, representing different task variations. In addition, participants repeated the same task five times to capture their evolution of skill. We define the struggle determination problem as a temporal action localization task, focusing on identifying and precisely localizing struggle segments with start and end times. Experimental results show that Temporal Action Localization models can successfully learn to detect struggle cues, even when evaluated on unseen tasks or activities. The models attain an overall average mAP of 34.56% when generalizing across tasks and 19.24% across activities, indicating that struggle is a transferable concept across various skill-based tasks while still posing challenges for further improvement in struggle detection. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/FELIXFENG2019/EvoStruggle.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 1, 2025

Trustworthy Visual Predicates for Robust Manipulation Understanding under Degradation

Manipulation understanding requires reliable relational evidence, such as contact, support, containment, motion coupling, grasp, release, and active-hand involvement. Although these visual predicates are widely used in event-chain, graph-based, and neuro-symbolic models, their reliability under visual degradation is rarely analyzed directly. This paper introduces a predicate-level reliability framework for robust manipulation understanding under blur, occlusion, illumination change, low resolution, frame dropping, and detection noise. The framework defines a structured predicate vocabulary, confidence-aware predicate estimation, and reliability metrics for predicate preservation, degradation sensitivity, temporal consistency, confidence-weighted stability, and downstream impact. Experiments on controlled manipulation videos and public egocentric or bimanual datasets, including VISOR/EPIC-KITCHENS, H2O, and ARCTIC, show that predicate failures are structured rather than uniform. Static spatial predicates remain comparatively robust, whereas contact-sensitive, dynamic, and derived predicates such as grasp and release are more fragile. Under severe degradation, detection noise, occlusion, and frame dropping cause the strongest reliability losses. Downstream analysis shows that degraded predicates reduce manipulation-understanding accuracy from 0.89 to 0.58, while removing confidence weighting under moderate degradation reduces accuracy from 0.74 to 0.64. These results show that predicate reliability provides a diagnostic layer between visual perception and structured manipulation reasoning.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 5

From Reasoning to Action: Benchmarking Frontier AI Models on LIBERO-10 Robot Manipulation Tasks

Recent advances in frontier AI models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in visual understanding, reasoning, planning, and tool use, raising the possibility of using general-purpose AI models for robot manipulation without task-specific training. However, their manipulation capabilities have not been systematically evaluated on standardized robotics benchmarks. In this report, we present a unified closed-loop manipulation framework for evaluating frontier AI models on the LIBERO-10 benchmark. Our framework enables models to control a robot directly through visual observations, robot proprioception, and structured tool calls, primarily by specifying target end-effector poses and gripper commands, without task-specific fine-tuning or pretrained manipulation skills. We evaluate six frontier AI models, including GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-6 Luna, Claude Opus 5, Claude Opus 5.5, and Gemini-4 Argon, across three reasoning effort levels, resulting in 18 configurations and 1,800 evaluation episodes. Our results show that GPT-6 Astra achieves the highest success rate of 44%, followed by Gemini-4 Argon at 43%. Increasing reasoning effort generally improves manipulation performance, but the benefits vary across models and come at additional inference cost. We also observe substantial differences across tasks, with models performing relatively well on object placement tasks but struggling with precise spatial arrangements and complex multi-step interactions. These findings demonstrate both the potential and limitations of frontier AI models for robot manipulation, highlighting the challenges of translating reasoning capabilities into reliable physical actions. We release our evaluation framework and experimental results to support reproducible benchmarking and future research on reasoning-based robot manipulation.

  • 3 authors
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Oct 20

Does Imitation Learning Preserve Temporal Robustness in Dexterous Manipulation? An Expert-Learner Comparison Across Task Execution Speeds

Dexterous manipulation policies learned by imitation are typically evaluated for robustness to variation in scenes, objects, or instructions, but their performance across task execution speeds is less often examined. This leaves open how much temporal robustness a learner retains relative to the expert it imitates. We compare an expert and learner under the same task conditions, initial-condition draws, and speedup factors. We instantiate the evaluation in ParcelStow, a contact-rich task in which the robot acquires, reorients, and inserts a parcel. The demonstrations span the speedup range for the manipulation phases after parcel acquisition. A scripted expert and an Action Chunking with Transformers (ACT) policy trained from the expert's demonstrations both achieve 100 percent task success at nominal speed. Their success rates diverge within the demonstrated range: at its maximum, expert success is 84 percent and ACT success is 53 percent. Two ACT policies with different parameter initializations show similar degradation, decreasing by 34 and 48 percentage points from nominal speed to the maximum demonstrated speed, compared with 16 points for the expert. Stage-level analysis shows that 35 of ACT's 47 failures at the maximum demonstrated speed are insertion misalignments. Under the relative-motion handoff, every ACT acquisition retains the parcel through reorientation and transfer in free space, but only 64 percent complete the overall task, compared with 95 percent after expert acquisition. Across all evaluated policies and speeds, none of the 414 acquisitions without force closure completes the task. Equal nominal task success therefore does not imply preservation of expert performance across execution speeds. Code, data, and evaluation scripts are available at https://github.com/coenwerem/parcelstow.

Evaluation Awareness Is Not One Capability: Evidence from Open Language Models

Safety benchmarks assume that test-condition behavior predicts deployment behavior, an assumption that fails if models detect evaluation cues and adapt. This opens a gap between benchmark performance and deployment behavior: compliance measured under test conditions becomes an optimistic upper bound that overstates how safely a model behaves once the evaluation harness is removed. We characterize this evaluation awareness through eight experiments across 37 open-weight models and seven families. (i)Detection is moderate and training-driven (24/37 models exceed chance, best AUROC 0.714 vs.0.819 human, with instruction tuning dominating over scale). (ii)Detection shifts safety behavior (hard refusal drops 5.8 percentage points under hypothetical framing, and 21/140 HarmBench framing effects are significant, with compliance rising up to +30 percentage points. (iii)Representations survive behavioral collapse (probes retain AUROC 0.98 under rewrites that drive behavior below chance, and multi-layer steering causally moves three downstream tasks while random controls do not). (iv)These axes are weakly coupled (only 1/15 correlations are significant, the sole robust link being behavioral detection versus framing resistance, ρ=-0.79, p<0.001). We call this gap the benchmark illusion: because detectability, behavioral manifestation, and controllability vary independently, it is multivariate rather than a single number, so no single awareness score is a reliable proxy for deployment safety.

  • 8 authors
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Jun 21

Anatomy of LLM Sycophancy: What a Flip Rate Hides

A model under pushback can correct itself, capitulate, or hold, and one flip rate counts a correction and a capitulation alike. Using SycoLens, a modular replay protocol, we test how user pressure and evaluation settings shape measured flip rates. Each measurement is one stateless replay of an item, a committed answer, and one scripted user line in a fixed form. Every effect is read against a matched control with the line deleted. Pushback wording, committed text, answer format, boundary distance, and ground truth become factors of one instrument; earlier instruments vary one to three of them. Across eleven frontier models from three providers and about 760,000 controlled replays, which models look sycophantic depends on how the user pushes back. Lines that assert the opposite verdict and lines that challenge the answer without asserting one rank the models almost unrelatedly. Flip effects grow several-fold near a model's boundary, yet items answered identically in every screening draw still carry about half of the most-affected totals. On arithmetic tasks where the truth is known, one model re-derives and corrects itself under pressure while another abandons correct answers without written work. On the model tested, a planted derivation lowers release of the answer it argues for, true or wrong, where a bare stated value does not; the wrong answer is corrected much more often than the true one is abandoned. Under a yes/no readout the rankings come closer, entangled with a pressure-induced shift toward "no". One score per model therefore compares different behaviours across models and benchmarks. We condense these dependencies into a reporting profile; the instrument, records, and analyses will be released upon publication.

  • 1 authors
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Oct 4

ManiUnit: A Manipulation Skill Dataset and Benchmark for Long-Horizon Tasks

Long-horizon mobile manipulation requires a robot to navigate multi-room environments and execute a sequence of manipulation skills under a single natural language instruction. Learning and evaluating these skills present three challenges: similar observations under a fixed task instruction may make skill selection ambiguous; even when a preceding skill succeeds, the robot state inherited by the next skill may deviate from its demonstrated starting states and affect execution; and task-level metrics hinder skill-specific diagnosis, while early failures leave later skills untested. We therefore introduce ManiUnit, a manipulation skill dataset and benchmark built from 50 BEHAVIOR-1K activities. Its dataset contains 137,899 segments across 21 skill types and 417 subtasks, and its benchmark contains 1,260 test instances. Correspondingly, ManiUnit pairs each segment with an explicit subtask instruction; measures sensitivity to perturbations of the robot's starting base position or joint configuration; and restores intermediate simulator states and defines local success conditions so that each skill can be evaluated without executing preceding stages. Evaluations of representative vision-language-action (VLA) policies show that similar aggregate scores can hide substantial per-skill differences. The tested starting-state perturbations also degrade execution: on the full benchmark, joint perturbations reduce success rates by approximately 56% relative to those from demonstrated starting states. On two long-horizon activities, a skill policy trained on ManiUnit segments achieves 78.7% local manipulation success, compared with 49.3% for a task policy trained on complete demonstrations. The trained skills further support complete-task execution on these activities, as coordinating the task and skill policies through a planner raises full-task success from 4.0% to 18.0%.

  • 13 authors
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Oct 7

Adversarial Robustness of Activation Steering in Large Language Models

Activation steering has become a popular training-free method to control LLM behavior by injecting precomputed direction vectors into the model's residual stream at inference time. Yet its robustness to realistic input variation remains unstudied. We present the first systematic evaluation of activation steering robustness under adversarial text perturbations on the inputs, covering four extraction methods, three attack strategies, six personas from Anthropic Model-Written Evaluation Dataset, and five models ranging from 1.5B to 30B parameters. Attacks succeed broadly across all settings: directional robustness drops by up to 64%, post-attack confidence collapses near or below 0.25 across all methods and models, and steering strength degrades on nearly every steerable input. Layer selection is equally fragile, with the optimal layer identified by an automated method on clean inputs shifting by up to 17 positions under perturbation, a failure that compounds the vector-level breakdown. Extracting vectors from adversarially perturbed inputs partially recovers steerability for PCA and MD on mid-to-large models, but they consistently fail to locate the improved optimal layer, limiting the practical benefit of this mitigation. Together, these findings reveal that the brittleness of activation steering is structural rather than method-specific, and that current layer selection strategies are not robust enough for real-world deployment.

  • 2 authors
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Jun 4

A Deep Learning Approach to Grasping the Invisible

We study an emerging problem named "grasping the invisible" in robotic manipulation, in which a robot is tasked to grasp an initially invisible target object via a sequence of pushing and grasping actions. In this problem, pushes are needed to search for the target and rearrange cluttered objects around it to enable effective grasps. We propose to solve the problem by formulating a deep learning approach in a critic-policy format. The target-oriented motion critic, which maps both visual observations and target information to the expected future rewards of pushing and grasping motion primitives, is learned via deep Q-learning. We divide the problem into two subtasks, and two policies are proposed to tackle each of them, by combining the critic predictions and relevant domain knowledge. A Bayesian-based policy accounting for past action experience performs pushing to search for the target; once the target is found, a classifier-based policy coordinates target-oriented pushing and grasping to grasp the target in clutter. The motion critic and the classifier are trained in a self-supervised manner through robot-environment interactions. Our system achieves a 93% and 87% task success rate on each of the two subtasks in simulation and an 85% task success rate in real robot experiments on the whole problem, which outperforms several baselines by large margins. Supplementary material is available at https://sites.google.com/umn.edu/grasping-invisible.

  • 3 authors
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Sep 10, 2019

Perfect Demo Makes Poor Teacher: Learning Robust Alignment from Critical Motion Segments

Expert demonstrations are widely assumed to be the gold standard for robot imitation learning. Yet for fine-grained manipulation such as insertion, stacking, and alignment, we uncover a counterintuitive failure mode: fluent demonstrations can be poor teachers. A skilled teleoperator compresses the decisive moments of alignment and recovery into a brief temporal window, leaving the policy flooded with redundant free-space motion and starved of supervision exactly where precision determines success. We address this bottleneck at two levels. At the data level, slowing down near alignment and resampling critical segments both help, yet the gain comes mainly from broadening the coverage of recovery states the policy must learn, not from reweighting frames it already has. Such data-side fixes, however, leave the policy's per-frame view untouched: a single image still maps directly to an action, and the local motion that governs correction stays implicit. We therefore turn to the representation level and introduce STAIR (Spatio-Temporal feature As an Interface for Robot learning), a compact dynamic feature that bridges the vision-language model and the action expert, distilling the short-horizon motion already recorded in each trajectory into dense, motion-aware supervision. Trained on fluent data alone, STAIR recovers most of the deliberate-demonstration gain (50.0 to 62.2% overall, approaching the 64.4% of deliberate demonstrations). These results call for a more pedagogical view of robot data, optimized for machine learnability rather than human efficiency alone.

  • 7 authors
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Jul 14

How to Peel with a Knife: Aligning Fine-Grained Manipulation with Human Preference

Many essential manipulation tasks - such as food preparation, surgery, and craftsmanship - remain intractable for autonomous robots. These tasks are characterized not only by contact-rich, force-sensitive dynamics, but also by their "implicit" success criteria: unlike pick-and-place, task quality in these domains is continuous and subjective (e.g. how well a potato is peeled), making quantitative evaluation and reward engineering difficult. We present a learning framework for such tasks, using peeling with a knife as a representative example. Our approach follows a two-stage pipeline: first, we learn a robust initial policy via force-aware data collection and imitation learning, enabling generalization across object variations; second, we refine the policy through preference-based finetuning using a learned reward model that combines quantitative task metrics with qualitative human feedback, aligning policy behavior with human notions of task quality. Using only 50-200 peeling trajectories, our system achieves over 90% average success rates on challenging produce including cucumbers, apples, and potatoes, with performance improving by up to 40% through preference-based finetuning. Remarkably, policies trained on a single produce category exhibit strong zero-shot generalization to unseen in-category instances and to out-of-distribution produce from different categories while maintaining over 90% success rates.

  • 5 authors
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Mar 3

From Reweighting to Rewriting: Unlocking the Intervention Effects of Influential Samples in Training Data Attribution

Training data attribution (TDA) aims to identify training examples that shape model behavior, but its intervention value depends on both which examples are selected and how they are modified. Influence functions (IF) estimate behavioral changes under infinitesimal reweighting, yet IF-selected examples often show limited advantages over random selection under conventional weight-based interventions. This raises the question of whether influential examples lack intervention value or whether reweighting fails to realize their behavioral leverage.We introduce influence-guided response rewriting, which uses IF to identify intervention targets and replaces their responses with behavior-aligned or behavior-opposed supervision while keeping instructions fixed. Across four open-weight LLMs, we compare rewriting and reweighting on the same influence-selected examples using epistemic abstention as our primary testbed. Response rewriting produces stronger, more persistent, and bidirectional behavioral shifts, while reweighting the same examples yields weak and inconsistent effects. Further analyses show that influence-selected examples provide greater rewriting leverage than alternative selectors, with changes remaining concentrated on target-relevant behaviors. The same qualitative contrast extends to safety refusal. These results distinguish the local reweighting effects captured by influence estimates from the broader intervention leverage of the examples they identify, motivating intervention-aware evaluation of TDA methods.

ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Chung-AngUniversity Chung-Ang University
·
Sep 26, 2025 2

PerturBot: Breaking Shortcut Priors in Vision-Language-Action Models with Perturbative Training

A vision--language--action (VLA) policy can complete complex tasks while ignoring the evidence that should determine its actions. An object held near the wrist camera can displace the instructed target. Language and action show the same pattern: a familiar noun can trigger the operation it was paired with in training even after the verb changes, and a gripper that closed on nothing may lift anyway. We call these dependencies modality shortcuts: regularities in successful demonstrations make visual, lexical, or motor cues sufficient to predict expert actions without the task evidence needed for the underlying decision. More demonstrations of the same kind can raise task success while leaving these shortcuts intact. We propose Perturbot which makes task-relevant evidence easier to use and shortcuts insufficient on their own: it applies task-preserving wrist-view perturbations, enriches instructions with decision-relevant captions, and adds random and failed trajectory segments relabeled with the behavior they contain. It complements scaling by changing what is scaled, and leaves inference unchanged. Moreover, we propose GroundingFscore, an offline score that diagnoses how severely a policy relies on modality shortcuts. Task success rate shows whether a policy improves, while GroundingFscore reveals whether the policy scales healthily, relying on task evidence rather than shortcuts. Together, Perturbot and GroundingFscore provide a training-and-evaluation framework for disentangling VLA decisions from shortcut priors while preserving responsiveness to task-relevant evidence.

  • 7 authors
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Oct 2 2

LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

  • 5 authors
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Jul 15, 2025

Scoring Without the Engine: Validating a Deterministic, Manipulation-Resistant Content Score for Generative Engines, End to End

How do you validate a cheap, deterministic proxy for an oracle that is expensive, rate-limited, and non-stationary? We present a protocol built on adversarial falsification gates (negative control, dose response, bounded amplification, duplication penalty, length neutrality) that define and select the proxy, fitted on a training split and confirmed held-out; around them it bounds what the proxy can never resolve, and re-measures external causal evidence on the current oracle rather than assuming it. We demonstrate it end to end on Generative Engine Optimization, where the proxy is a deterministic content score, and one step fails on that domain exactly as the protocol is built to detect: re-measuring the only published causal anchors (2023 effect sizes) on ten modern engine families shows their levers move citation on none, so the anchors are an expired external check; recalibrating to the near-zero modern vector strips the score of its lever-responsive components. What survives is the gate-enforced response surface. The gates buy a measured property: on a 500-source benchmark of adversarial edits, amplifying the score's calibrated levers gains an attacker at most 6 points, and decreases with dose; single-lever amplification is provably bounded, while the cap and cross-lever sub-additivity are empirical findings consistent with it. On detection, web-spam baselines dominate and out-of-distribution attacks evade the score, so the deployable filter layers it over them. A query-conditioned skyline bounds the score's citation signal (within-query Spearman 0.11), repositioning query-agnostic scores as quality filters rather than citation predictors. A query-leakage bug in our first ranking evaluation and a failed confidence flag are disclosed and corrected; every number reproduces offline from released artifacts at zero marginal API cost.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 6

Are You Sure You're Sure? Two Confounds in a Sycophancy Benchmark

Sycophancy is a language model's tendency to cave when a user pushes back, abandoning a correct answer for the user's. Several benchmarks now measure it by scripting an objection and recording how often the model caves. Because that objection is a prompt template, whatever else the template varies is measured along with the property it claims to isolate. We audit SycEval, which reports that objections raised before a model answers (preemptive) cause more caving than those raised after (in-context), and attributes the gap to timing. Two features of its templates vary alongside the property each is meant to test. First, SycEval's objections escalate through four strength levels, and at the two weakest only the preemptive template names a target answer, so timing and naming vary together. We build the missing comparison and test it on multiple-choice questions and SycEval's own free-form pipeline. Naming a target answer raises the follow rate, the share of samples matching the user's assertion, by 14.1--49.5 percentage points (pp), and once both templates name one, the timing comparison reverses on three of the five model conditions we test: models cave less under preemptive objections than in-context ones, opposite to SycEval. Second, the output-format instruction benchmarks append for automatic grading also varies with objection placement. Moving it from the pushback into the question flips its effect in opposite directions across models on the same items (p=0.0059). The same effect appears in SycEval's free-form pipeline: relocating its instruction lowers caving by 5.1pp on Llama-3.1-8B, while an equivalence test confirms no effect on Qwen3-4B. Both confounds live in the template rather than the models under test, so both are correctable: we close with three checks benchmark authors can apply before publishing.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 25

SAE Interventions are Unreliable: Post-Intervention Recovery of Suppressed Behavior

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features. Recent latent-space defenses increasingly rely on these decompositions, assuming that identified "unsafe" SAE features serve as actionable handles for monitoring and intervention. In this paradigm, clamping a specific harmful feature is expected to reliably prevent model misbehavior. However, we show that this success may hide a recoverable failure mode: the clamp may block one visible route to a behavior without eliminating the behavior itself. We formulate this vulnerability as post-intervention recovery, a constrained residual-space optimization problem. Starting from the post-intervention residual state, we optimize residual perturbations to recover the pre-intervention behavior while preserving the post-intervention values of the targeted SAE features. Even under a strong threat model where the intervention remains active throughout optimization and generation, recovery remains possible. To rule out that recovery simply undoes the intervention, we use encoder-orthogonal updates for single-layer interventions and the corresponding feature-map Jacobian in the cross-layer setting. Across TPP, unlearning, IOI, and refusal steering experiments, this stress test reveals recoverable behavior despite successful feature-level intervention. Especially in the safety-critical refusal-steering setting, we achieve a 95.8% recovery rate on valid samples while keeping defended-feature relative drift to 0.131, substantially below suffix-based baselines. A recovery-path attribution analysis further localizes this recovery to the SAE reconstruction residual, the component left unexplained by the SAE. These results expose a gap between feature-level control and behavioral completeness: SAE features can support causal intervention, but controlling them does not guarantee control over the underlying behavior.

Refusal Falls off a Cliff: How Safety Alignment Fails in Reasoning?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

dots-studio dots studio
·
Oct 7, 2025 2

Guiding Giants: Lightweight Controllers for Weighted Activation Steering in LLMs

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

  • 3 authors
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Mar 14

H-RDT: Human Manipulation Enhanced Bimanual Robotic Manipulation

Imitation learning for robotic manipulation faces a fundamental challenge: the scarcity of large-scale, high-quality robot demonstration data. Recent robotic foundation models often pre-train on cross-embodiment robot datasets to increase data scale, while they face significant limitations as the diverse morphologies and action spaces across different robot embodiments make unified training challenging. In this paper, we present H-RDT (Human to Robotics Diffusion Transformer), a novel approach that leverages human manipulation data to enhance robot manipulation capabilities. Our key insight is that large-scale egocentric human manipulation videos with paired 3D hand pose annotations provide rich behavioral priors that capture natural manipulation strategies and can benefit robotic policy learning. We introduce a two-stage training paradigm: (1) pre-training on large-scale egocentric human manipulation data, and (2) cross-embodiment fine-tuning on robot-specific data with modular action encoders and decoders. Built on a diffusion transformer architecture with 2B parameters, H-RDT uses flow matching to model complex action distributions. Extensive evaluations encompassing both simulation and real-world experiments, single-task and multitask scenarios, as well as few-shot learning and robustness assessments, demonstrate that H-RDT outperforms training from scratch and existing state-of-the-art methods, including Pi0 and RDT, achieving significant improvements of 13.9% and 40.5% over training from scratch in simulation and real-world experiments, respectively. The results validate our core hypothesis that human manipulation data can serve as a powerful foundation for learning bimanual robotic manipulation policies.

  • 7 authors
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Jul 31, 2025

Probe-Rewrite-Evaluate: A Workflow for Reliable Benchmarks and Quantifying Evaluation Awareness

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit significant behavioral shifts when they perceive a change from a real-world deployment context to a controlled evaluation setting, a phenomenon known as "evaluation awareness." This discrepancy poses a critical challenge for AI alignment, as benchmark performance may not accurately reflect a model's true safety and honesty. In this work, we systematically quantify these behavioral changes by manipulating the perceived context of prompts. We introduce a methodology that uses a linear probe to score prompts on a continuous scale from "test-like" to "deploy-like" and leverage an LLM rewriting strategy to shift these prompts towards a more natural, deployment-style context while preserving the original task. Using this method, we achieved a 30% increase in the average probe score across a strategic role-playing dataset after rewriting. Evaluating a suite of state-of-the-art models on these original and rewritten prompts, we find that rewritten "deploy-like" prompts induce a significant and consistent shift in behavior. Across all models, we observed an average increase in honest responses of 5.26% and a corresponding average decrease in deceptive responses of 12.40%. Furthermore, refusal rates increased by an average of 6.38%, indicating heightened safety compliance. Our findings demonstrate that evaluation awareness is a quantifiable and manipulable factor that directly influences LLM behavior, revealing that models are more prone to unsafe or deceptive outputs in perceived test environments. This underscores the urgent need for more realistic evaluation frameworks to accurately gauge true model alignment before deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 30, 2025

AgenticTactileVLA: Contact-Guided Execution-Time Supervision for Generalizable Dexterous Manipulation without VLA Retraining

Vision-language-action policies may predict a transferable manipulation strategy yet fail to realize it reliably on the encountered object: objects compatible with the same grasp differ in geometry and compliance, and visual feedback degrades under closure occlusion. AgenticTactileVLA is presented as an execution-time supervisor that shifts part of object-specific adaptation from prediction to physical interaction. A fixed VLA provides the approach and hand targets; the supervisor decides whether to remain transparent, refine finger flexion, retain or release the corrected configuration, return control to the VLA for retry, or select a compliant hand-control regime. It uses finger-position and motor-effort feedback as proprioceptive contact evidence and requires neither tactile sensors nor VLA retraining. On a Unitree G1 with a BrainCo Revo2 hand, a randomized matched-block evaluation on five objects held out from VLA training yields 61.3% completion for the base VLA, 72.0% for unconditional close-to-stall control, and 84.0% for the supervisor under a shared budget; the gain is positive on every object and persists under moderate pose perturbations. Ablations show the gain is not explained by extended closure alone, and that selective triggering reduces correction episodes by 65.7% with no detected change in completion. A retention audit shows acceptance predicts retention in 88.9% of held-out cases, while compliant objects expose conservative false rejection. A thin-walled-cup study demonstrates contextual routing to compliant control, matching an always-compliant reference. These results suggest that contact-guided execution-time adaptation can improve the object-level generalization of a fixed VLA to held-out objects by adapting physical realization without object-specific retraining.

  • 7 authors
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Oct 2

Tactile-Conditioned Diffusion Policy for Force-Aware Robotic Manipulation

Contact-rich manipulation depends on applying the correct grasp forces throughout the manipulation task, especially when handling fragile or deformable objects. Most existing imitation learning approaches often treat visuotactile feedback only as an additional observation, leaving applied forces as an uncontrolled consequence of gripper commands. In this work, we present Force-Aware Robotic Manipulation (FARM), an imitation learning framework that integrates high-dimensional tactile data to infer tactile-conditioned force signals, which in turn define a matching force-based action space. We collect human demonstrations using a modified version of the handheld Universal Manipulation Interface (UMI) gripper that integrates a GelSight Mini visual tactile sensor. For deploying the learned policies, we developed an actuated variant of the UMI gripper with geometry matching our handheld version. During policy rollouts, the proposed FARM diffusion policy jointly predicts robot pose, grip width, and grip force. FARM outperforms several baselines across three tasks with distinct force requirements -- high-force, low-force, and dynamic force adaptation -- demonstrating the advantages of its two key components: leveraging force-grounded, high-dimensional tactile observations and a force-based control space. The codebase and design files are open-sourced and available at https://tactile-farm.github.io .

  • 5 authors
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Oct 14, 2025