Daily Papers

As the development of Large Models (LMs) progresses rapidly, their safety is also a priority. In current Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) safety workflow, evaluation, diagnosis, and alignment are often handled by separate tools. Specifically, safety evaluation can only locate external behavioral risks but cannot figure out internal root causes. Meanwhile, safety diagnosis often drifts from concrete risk scenarios and remains at the explainable level. In this way, safety alignment lack dedicated explanations of changes in internal mechanisms, potentially degrading general capabilities. To systematically address these issues, we propose an open-source project, namely DeepSight, to practice a new safety evaluation-diagnosis integrated paradigm. DeepSight is low-cost, reproducible, efficient, and highly scalable large-scale model safety evaluation project consisting of a evaluation toolkit DeepSafe and a diagnosis toolkit DeepScan. By unifying task and data protocols, we build a connection between the two stages and transform safety evaluation from black-box to white-box insight. Besides, DeepSight is the first open source toolkit that support the frontier AI risk evaluation and joint safety evaluation and diagnosis.

Tool-using LLM agents fail through trajectories rather than only final responses, as they may execute unsafe tool calls, follow injected instructions, comply with harmful requests, or over-refuse benign tasks despite producing a seemingly safe answer. Existing safety-alignment signals are largely response-level or off-policy, and often incur a safety-utility trade-off: improving agent safety comes at the cost of degraded task performance. Such sparse and single-objective rewards severely limit real-world usability. To bridge this gap, we propose FATE, an on-policy self-evolving framework that transforms verifier-scored failures into repair supervision without expert demonstrations. For each failure, the same policy proposes repair candidates, which are then re-scored by verifiers and filtered across security, utility, over-refusal control, and trajectory validity. This dense trajectory-level information is then used as a supervision signal for agent self-evolution. During this process, we further introduce Pareto-Front Policy Optimization (PFPO), combining supervised warmup with Pareto-aware policy optimization to preserve safety-utility trade-offs. Experiments on AgentDojo, AgentHarm, and ATBench show that FATE improves safety across different models and scales while preserving useful behavior. Compared with strong baselines, FATE reduces attack success rate by 33.5%, harmful compliance by 82.6%, and improves external trajectory-safety diagnosis by 6.5%. These results suggest that failed trajectories can provide structured repair supervision for safer self-evolving agents.

In industrial procurement, an LLM answer is useful only if it survives a standards check: recommended material must match operating condition, every parameter must respect a regulated threshold, and no procedure may contradict a safety clause. Partial correctness can mask safety-critical contradictions that aggregate LLM benchmarks rarely capture. We introduce IndustryBench, a 2,049-item benchmark for industrial procurement QA in Chinese, grounded in Chinese national standards (GB/T) and structured industrial product records, organized by seven capability dimensions, ten industry categories, and panel-derived difficulty tiers, with item-aligned English, Russian, and Vietnamese renderings. Our construction pipeline rejects 70.3% of LLM-generated candidates at a search-based external-verification stage, calibrating how unreliable industrial QA remains after LLM-only filtering.Our evaluation decouples raw correctness, scored by a Qwen3-Max judge validated at κ_w = 0.798 against a domain expert, from a separate safety-violation (SV) check against source texts. Across 17 models in Chinese and an 8-model intersection over four languages, we find: (i) the best system reaches only 2.083 on the 0--3 rubric, leaving substantial headroom; (ii) Standards & Terminology is the most persistent capability weakness and survives item-aligned translation; (iii) extended reasoning lowers safety-adjusted scores for 12 of 13 models, primarily by introducing unsupported safety-critical details into longer final answers; and (iv) safety-violation rates reshuffle the leaderboard -- GPT-5.4 climbs from rank 6 to rank 3 after SV adjustment, while Kimi-k2.5-1T-A32B drops seven positions.Industrial LLM evaluation therefore requires source-grounded, safety-aware diagnosis rather than aggregate accuracy. We release IndustryBench with all prompts, scoring scripts, and dataset documentation.

As agent systems move into increasingly diverse execution settings, trajectory-level safety evaluation and diagnosis require benchmarks that evolve with them. ATBench is a diverse and realistic agent trajectory benchmark for safety evaluation and diagnosis. This report presents ATBench-Claw and ATBench-CodeX, two domain-customized extensions that carry ATBench into the OpenClaw and OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime settings. The key adaptation mechanism is to analyze each new setting, customize the three-dimensional Safety Taxonomy over risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm, and then use that customized taxonomy to define the benchmark specification consumed by the shared ATBench construction pipeline. This extensibility matters because agent frameworks remain relatively stable at the architectural level even as their concrete execution settings, tool ecosystems, and product capabilities evolve quickly. Concretely, ATBench-Claw targets OpenClaw-sensitive execution chains over tools, skills, sessions, and external actions, while ATBench-CodeX targets trajectories in the OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime setting over repositories, shells, patches, dependencies, approvals, and runtime policy boundaries. Our emphasis therefore falls on taxonomy customization, domain-specific risk coverage, and benchmark design under a shared ATBench generation framework.

Prediction sets can wrap around any ML model to cover unknown test outcomes with a guaranteed probability. Yet, it remains unclear how to use them optimally for downstream decision-making. Here, we propose a decision-theoretic framework that seeks to minimize the expected loss (risk) against a worst-case distribution consistent with the prediction set's coverage guarantee. We first characterize the minimax optimal policy for a fixed prediction set, showing that it balances the worst-case loss inside the set with a penalty for potential losses outside the set. Building on this, we derive the optimal prediction set construction that minimizes the resulting robust risk subject to a coverage constraint. Finally, we introduce Risk-Optimal Conformal Prediction (ROCP), a practical algorithm that targets these risk-minimizing sets while maintaining finite-sample distribution-free marginal coverage. Empirical evaluations on medical diagnosis and safety-critical decision-making tasks demonstrate that ROCP reduces critical mistakes compared to baselines, particularly when out-of-set errors are costly.

Safety-aligned language models often refuse prompts that are actually harmless. Current evaluations mostly report global rates such as false rejection or compliance. These scores treat each prompt alone and miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This gap limits diagnosis and tuning. We introduce "semantic confusion," a failure mode that captures such local inconsistency, and a framework to measure it. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that hold intent fixed while varying surface form. We then propose three model-agnostic metrics at the token level: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each refusal to its nearest accepted neighbors and use token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families and deployment guards show that global false-rejection rate hides critical structure. Our metrics reveal globally unstable boundaries in some settings, localized pockets of inconsistency in others, and cases where stricter refusal does not increase inconsistency. We also show how confusion-aware auditing separates how often a system refuses from how sensibly it refuses. This gives developers a practical signal to reduce false refusals while preserving safety.

Numerous medical systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in diverse healthcare tasks. However, research on their medication safety remains limited due to the lack of real world datasets, constrained by privacy and accessibility issues. Moreover, evaluation of LLMs in realistic clinical consultation settings, particularly regarding medication safety, is still underexplored. To address these gaps, we propose a framework that simulates and evaluates clinical consultations to systematically assess the medication safety capabilities of LLMs. Within this framework, we generate inquiry diagnosis dialogues with embedded medication risks and construct a dedicated medication safety database, RxRisk DB, containing 6,725 contraindications, 28,781 drug interactions, and 14,906 indication-drug pairs. A two-stage filtering strategy ensures clinical realism and professional quality, resulting in the benchmark RxSafeBench with 2,443 high-quality consultation scenarios. We evaluate leading open-source and proprietary LLMs using structured multiple choice questions that test their ability to recommend safe medications under simulated patient contexts. Results show that current LLMs struggle to integrate contraindication and interaction knowledge, especially when risks are implied rather than explicit. Our findings highlight key challenges in ensuring medication safety in LLM-based systems and provide insights into improving reliability through better prompting and task-specific tuning. RxSafeBench offers the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating medication safety in LLMs, advancing safer and more trustworthy AI-driven clinical decision support.

LLMs for clinical decision support often fail under small but clinically meaningful input shifts such as masking a symptom or negating a finding, despite high performance on static benchmarks. These reasoning failures frequently go undetected by standard NLP metrics, which are insensitive to latent representation shifts that drive diagnosis instability. We propose a geometry-aware evaluation framework, LAPD (Latent Agentic Perturbation Diagnostics), which systematically probes the latent robustness of clinical LLMs under structured adversarial edits. Within this framework, we introduce Latent Diagnosis Flip Rate (LDFR), a model-agnostic diagnostic signal that captures representational instability when embeddings cross decision boundaries in PCA-reduced latent space. Clinical notes are generated using a structured prompting pipeline grounded in diagnostic reasoning, then perturbed along four axes: masking, negation, synonym replacement, and numeric variation to simulate common ambiguities and omissions. We compute LDFR across both foundation and clinical LLMs, finding that latent fragility emerges even under minimal surface-level changes. Finally, we validate our findings on 90 real clinical notes from the DiReCT benchmark (MIMIC-IV), confirming the generalizability of LDFR beyond synthetic settings. Our results reveal a persistent gap between surface robustness and semantic stability, underscoring the importance of geometry-aware auditing in safety-critical clinical AI.

The rise of AI agents introduces complex safety and security challenges arising from autonomous tool use and environmental interactions. Current guardrail models lack agentic risk awareness and transparency in risk diagnosis. To introduce an agentic guardrail that covers complex and numerous risky behaviors, we first propose a unified three-dimensional taxonomy that orthogonally categorizes agentic risks by their source (where), failure mode (how), and consequence (what). Guided by this structured and hierarchical taxonomy, we introduce a new fine-grained agentic safety benchmark (ATBench) and a Diagnostic Guardrail framework for agent safety and security (AgentDoG). AgentDoG provides fine-grained and contextual monitoring across agent trajectories. More Crucially, AgentDoG can diagnose the root causes of unsafe actions and seemingly safe but unreasonable actions, offering provenance and transparency beyond binary labels to facilitate effective agent alignment. AgentDoG variants are available in three sizes (4B, 7B, and 8B parameters) across Qwen and Llama model families. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that AgentDoG achieves state-of-the-art performance in agentic safety moderation in diverse and complex interactive scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.

General-purpose Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), despite their massive scale, often falter in dermatology due to "diffuse attention" - the inability to disentangle subtle pathological lesions from background noise. In this paper, we challenge the assumption that parameter scaling is the only path to medical precision. We introduce SkinFlow, a framework that treats diagnosis as an optimization of visual information transmission efficiency. Our approach utilizes a Virtual-Width Dynamic Vision Encoder (DVE) to "unfold" complex pathological manifolds without physical parameter expansion, coupled with a two-stage Reinforcement Learning strategy. This strategy sequentially aligns explicit medical descriptions (Stage I) and reconstructs implicit diagnostic textures (Stage II) within a constrained semantic space. Furthermore, we propose a clinically grounded evaluation protocol that prioritizes diagnostic safety and hierarchical relevance over rigid label matching. Empirical results are compelling: our 7B model establishes a new state-of-the-art on the Fitzpatrick17k benchmark, achieving a +12.06% gain in Top-1 accuracy and a +28.57% boost in Top-6 accuracy over the massive general-purpose models (e.g., Qwen3VL-235B and GPT-5.2). These findings demonstrate that optimizing geometric capacity and information flow yields superior diagnostic reasoning compared to raw parameter scaling.

Due to the widespread use of LLMs and the rising critical ethical and safety concerns, LLM unlearning methods have been developed to remove harmful knowledge and undesirable capabilities. In this context, evaluations are mostly based on single-value metrics such as QA accuracy. However, these metrics often fail to capture the nuanced retention of harmful knowledge components, making it difficult to assess the true effectiveness of unlearning. To address this issue, we propose UNCD (UNlearning evaluation via Cognitive Diagnosis), a novel framework that leverages Cognitive Diagnosis Modeling for fine-grained evaluation of LLM unlearning. Our dedicated benchmark, UNCD-Cyber, provides a detailed assessment of the removal of dangerous capabilities. Moreover, we introduce UNCD-Agent, which refines unlearning by diagnosing knowledge remnants and generating targeted unlearning data. Extensive experiments across eight unlearning methods and two base models demonstrate that UNCD not only enhances evaluation but also effectively facilitates the removal of harmful LLM abilities.

Large language model (LLM) agents offer a promising data-driven approach to automating Site Reliability Engineering (SRE), yet their enterprise deployment is constrained by three challenges: restricted access to proprietary data, unsafe action execution under permission-governed environments, and the inability of closed systems to improve from failures. We present AOI (Autonomous Operations Intelligence), a trainable multi-agent framework formulating automated operations as a structured trajectory learning problem under security constraints. Our approach integrates three key components. First, a trainable diagnostic system applies Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to distill expert-level knowledge into locally deployed open-source models, enabling preference-based learning without exposing sensitive data. Second, a read-write separated execution architecture decomposes operational trajectories into observation, reasoning, and action phases, allowing safe learning while preventing unauthorized state mutation. Third, a Failure Trajectory Closed-Loop Evolver mines unsuccessful trajectories and converts them into corrective supervision signals, enabling continual data augmentation. Evaluated on the AIOpsLab benchmark, our contributions yield cumulative gains. (1) The AOI runtime alone achieves 66.3% best@5 success on all 86 tasks, outperforming the prior state-of-the-art (41.9%) by 24.4 points. (2) Adding Observer GRPO training, a locally deployed 14B model reaches 42.9% avg@1 on 63 held-out tasks with unseen fault types, surpassing Claude Sonnet 4.5. (3) The Evolver converts 37 failed trajectories into diagnostic guidance, improving end-to-end avg@5 by 4.8 points while reducing variance by 35%.

Evaluating the safety of LLM-based agents is increasingly important because risks in realistic deployments often emerge over multi-step interactions rather than isolated prompts or final responses. Existing trajectory-level benchmarks remain limited by insufficient interaction diversity, coarse observability of safety failures, and weak long-horizon realism. We introduce ATBench, a trajectory-level benchmark for structured, diverse, and realistic evaluation of agent safety. ATBench organizes agentic risk along three dimensions: risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm. Based on this taxonomy, we construct trajectories with heterogeneous tool pools and a long-context delayed-trigger protocol that captures realistic risk emergence across multiple stages. The benchmark contains 1,000 trajectories (503 safe and 497 unsafe), averaging 9.01 turns and 3.95k tokens, with 1,954 invoked tools drawn from pools spanning 2,084 available tools. Data quality is supported by rule-based and LLM-based filtering plus full human audit. Experiments on frontier LLMs, open-source models, and specialized guard systems show that ATBench is challenging even for strong evaluators, while enabling taxonomy-stratified analysis, cross-benchmark comparison, and diagnosis of long-horizon failure patterns.

Accurate diagnosis of power transformer faults is essential for ensuring the stability and safety of electrical power systems. This study presents a comparative analysis of conventional machine learning (ML) algorithms and deep learning (DL) algorithms for fault classification of power transformers. Using a condition-monitored dataset spanning 10 months, various gas concentration features were normalized and used to train five ML classifiers: Support Vector Machine (SVM), k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Random Forest (RF), XGBoost, and Artificial Neural Network (ANN). In addition, four DL models were evaluated: Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU), One-Dimensional Convolutional Neural Network (1D-CNN), and TabNet. Experimental results show that both ML and DL approaches performed comparably. The RF model achieved the highest ML accuracy at 86.82%, while the 1D-CNN model attained a close 86.30%.

While electroencephalogram (EEG) based brain-computer interface (BCI) has been widely used for medical diagnosis, health care, and device control, the safety of EEG BCI has long been neglected. In this paper, we propose Professor X, an invisible and robust "mind-controller" that can arbitrarily manipulate the outputs of EEG BCI through backdoor attack, to alert the EEG community of the potential hazard. However, existing EEG attacks mainly focus on single-target class attacks, and they either require engaging the training stage of the target BCI, or fail to maintain high stealthiness. Addressing these limitations, Professor X exploits a three-stage clean label poisoning attack: 1) selecting one trigger for each class; 2) learning optimal injecting EEG electrodes and frequencies strategy with reinforcement learning for each trigger; 3) generating poisoned samples by injecting the corresponding trigger's frequencies into poisoned data for each class by linearly interpolating the spectral amplitude of both data according to previously learned strategies. Experiments on datasets of three common EEG tasks demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of Professor X, which also easily bypasses existing backdoor defenses.

Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have advanced existing medical systems for automatic disease diagnosis. However, there are still concerns about the reliability of deep medical diagnosis systems against the potential threats of adversarial attacks since inaccurate diagnosis could lead to disastrous consequences in the safety realm. In this study, we propose a highly robust yet efficient CNN-Transformer hybrid model which is equipped with the locality of CNNs as well as the global connectivity of vision Transformers. To mitigate the high quadratic complexity of the self-attention mechanism while jointly attending to information in various representation subspaces, we construct our attention mechanism by means of an efficient convolution operation. Moreover, to alleviate the fragility of our Transformer model against adversarial attacks, we attempt to learn smoother decision boundaries. To this end, we augment the shape information of an image in the high-level feature space by permuting the feature mean and variance within mini-batches. With less computational complexity, our proposed hybrid model demonstrates its high robustness and generalization ability compared to the state-of-the-art studies on a large-scale collection of standardized MedMNIST-2D datasets.

Speech emotion recognition (SER) is essential for humanoid robot tasks such as social robotic interactions and robotic psychological diagnosis, where interpretable and efficient models are critical for safety and performance. Existing deep models trained on large datasets remain largely uninterpretable, often insufficiently modeling underlying emotional acoustic signals and failing to capture and analyze the core physiology of emotional vocal behaviors. Physiological research on human voices shows that the dynamics of vocal amplitude and phase correlate with emotions through the vocal tract filter and the glottal source. However, most existing deep models solely involve amplitude but fail to couple the physiological features of and between amplitude and phase. Here, we propose PhysioSER, a physiology-informed vocal spectrotemporal representation learning method, to address these issues with a compact, plug-and-play design. PhysioSER constructs amplitude and phase views informed by voice anatomy and physiology (VAP) to complement SSL models for SER. This VAP-informed framework incorporates two parallel workflows: a vocal feature representation branch to decompose vocal signals based on VAP, embed them into a quaternion field, and use Hamilton-structured quaternion convolutions for modeling their dynamic interactions; and a latent representation branch based on a frozen SSL backbone. Then, utterance-level features from both workflows are aligned by a Contrastive Projection and Alignment framework, followed by a shallow attention fusion head for SER classification. PhysioSER is shown to be interpretable and efficient for SER through extensive evaluations across 14 datasets, 10 languages, and 6 backbones, and its practical efficacy is validated by real-time deployment on a humanoid robotic platform.

Accurate anatomical labeling and analysis of the pulmonary structure and its surrounding anatomy from thoracic CT is getting increasingly important for understanding the etilogy of abnormalities or supporting targetted therapy and early interventions. Whilst lung and airway cell atlases have been attempted, there is a lack of fine-grained morphological atlases that are clinically deployable. In this work, we introduce AirMorph, a robust, end-to-end deep learning pipeline enabling fully automatic and comprehensive airway anatomical labeling at lobar, segmental, and subsegmental resolutions that can be used to create digital atlases of the lung. Evaluated across large-scale multi-center datasets comprising diverse pulmonary conditions, the AirMorph consistently outperformed existing segmentation and labeling methods in terms of accuracy, topological consistency, and completeness. To simplify clinical interpretation, we further introduce a compact anatomical signature quantifying critical morphological airway features, including stenosis, ectasia, tortuosity, divergence, length, and complexity. When applied to various pulmonary diseases such as pulmonary fibrosis, emphysema, atelectasis, consolidation, and reticular opacities, it demonstrates strong discriminative power, revealing disease-specific morphological patterns with high interpretability and explainability. Additionally, AirMorph supports efficient automated branching pattern analysis, potentially enhancing bronchoscopic navigation planning and procedural safety, offering a valuable clinical tool for improved diagnosis, targeted treatment, and personalized patient care.

The rapid iteration of autonomous driving algorithms has created a growing demand for high-fidelity, replayable, and diagnosable testing data. However, many public datasets lack real vehicle dynamics feedback and closed-loop interaction with surrounding traffic and road infrastructure, limiting their ability to reflect deployment readiness. To address this gap, we present OVPD (OnSite Virtual-Physical Dataset), a virtual-physical fusion testing dataset released from the 2025 OnSite Autonomous Driving Challenge. Centered on real-vehicle-in-the-loop testing, OVPD integrates virtual background traffic with vehicle-infrastructure perception to build controllable and interactive closed-loop test environments on a proving ground. The dataset contains 20 testing clips from 20 teams over a scenario chain of 15 atomic scenarios, totaling nearly 3 hours of multi-modal data, including vehicle trajectories and states, control commands, and digital-twin-rendered surround-view observations. OVPD supports long-tail planning and decision-making validation, open-loop or platform-enabled closed-loop evaluation, and comprehensive assessment across safety, efficiency, comfort, rule compliance, and traffic impact, providing actionable evidence for failure diagnosis and iterative improvement. The dataset is available via: https://huggingface.co/datasets/Yuhang253820/Onsite_OPVD

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly explored as scalable tools for mental health counseling, yet evaluating their safety remains challenging due to the interactional and context-dependent nature of clinical harm. Existing evaluation frameworks predominantly assess isolated responses using coarse-grained taxonomies or static datasets, limiting their ability to diagnose how harms emerge and accumulate over multi-turn counseling interactions. In this work, we introduce R-MHSafe, a role-aware mental health safety taxonomy that characterizes clinically significant harm in terms of the interactional roles an AI counselor adopts, including perpetrator, instigator, facilitator, or enabler, combined with clinically grounded harm categories. Then, we propose MHSafeEval, a closed-loop, agent-based evaluation framework that formulates safety assessment as trajectory-level discovery of harm through adversarial multi-turn interactions, guided by role-aware modeling. Using R-MHSafe and MHSafeEval, we conduct a large-scale evaluation across state-of-the-art LLMs. Our results reveal substantial role-dependent and cumulative safety failures that are systematically missed by existing static benchmarks, and show that our framework significantly improves failure-mode coverage and diagnostic granularity.

The increasing use of Machine Learning (ML) components embedded in autonomous systems -- so-called Learning-Enabled Systems (LESs) -- has resulted in the pressing need to assure their functional safety. As for traditional functional safety, the emerging consensus within both, industry and academia, is to use assurance cases for this purpose. Typically assurance cases support claims of reliability in support of safety, and can be viewed as a structured way of organising arguments and evidence generated from safety analysis and reliability modelling activities. While such assurance activities are traditionally guided by consensus-based standards developed from vast engineering experience, LESs pose new challenges in safety-critical application due to the characteristics and design of ML models. In this article, we first present an overall assurance framework for LESs with an emphasis on quantitative aspects, e.g., breaking down system-level safety targets to component-level requirements and supporting claims stated in reliability metrics. We then introduce a novel model-agnostic Reliability Assessment Model (RAM) for ML classifiers that utilises the operational profile and robustness verification evidence. We discuss the model assumptions and the inherent challenges of assessing ML reliability uncovered by our RAM and propose solutions to practical use. Probabilistic safety argument templates at the lower ML component-level are also developed based on the RAM. Finally, to evaluate and demonstrate our methods, we not only conduct experiments on synthetic/benchmark datasets but also scope our methods with case studies on simulated Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and physical Unmanned Ground Vehicles.

We present a tool-supported approach for the synthesis, verification and validation of the control software responsible for the safety of the human-robot interaction in manufacturing processes that use collaborative robots. In human-robot collaboration, software-based safety controllers are used to improve operational safety, e.g., by triggering shutdown mechanisms or emergency stops to avoid accidents. Complex robotic tasks and increasingly close human-robot interaction pose new challenges to controller developers and certification authorities. Key among these challenges is the need to assure the correctness of safety controllers under explicit (and preferably weak) assumptions. Our controller synthesis, verification and validation approach is informed by the process, risk analysis, and relevant safety regulations for the target application. Controllers are selected from a design space of feasible controllers according to a set of optimality criteria, are formally verified against correctness criteria, and are translated into executable code and validated in a digital twin. The resulting controller can detect the occurrence of hazards, move the process into a safe state, and, in certain circumstances, return the process to an operational state from which it can resume its original task. We show the effectiveness of our software engineering approach through a case study involving the development of a safety controller for a manufacturing work cell equipped with a collaborative robot.

Modern deep learning systems are typically deployed as open-loop function approximators: they map inputs to outputs in a single pass, without regulating how much computation or explanatory effort is spent on a given case. In safety-critical settings, this is brittle: easy and ambiguous inputs receive identical processing, and uncertainty is only read off retrospectively from raw probabilities. We introduce the Surgical Cognitive Interpreter (SCI), a lightweight closed-loop metacognitive control layer that wraps an existing stochastic model and turns prediction into an iterative process. SCI monitors a scalar interpretive state SP(t), here instantiated as a normalized entropy-based confidence signal, and adaptively decides whether to stop, continue sampling, or abstain. The goal is not to improve accuracy per se, but to regulate interpretive error ΔSP and expose a safety signal that tracks when the underlying model is likely to fail. We instantiate SCI around Monte Carlo dropout classifiers in three domains: vision (MNIST digits), medical time series (MIT-BIH arrhythmia), and industrial condition monitoring (rolling-element bearings). In all cases, the controller allocates more inference steps to misclassified inputs than to correct ones (up to about 3-4x on MNIST and bearings, and 1.4x on MIT-BIH). The resulting ΔSP acts as a usable safety signal for detecting misclassifications (AUROC 0.63 on MNIST, 0.70 on MIT-BIH, 0.86 on bearings). Code and reproducibility: https://github.com/vishal-1344/sci

The success of large language models (LLMs) in scientific domains has heightened safety concerns, prompting numerous benchmarks to evaluate their scientific safety. Existing benchmarks often suffer from limited risk coverage and a reliance on subjective evaluation. To address these problems, we introduce SafeSci, a comprehensive framework for safety evaluation and enhancement in scientific contexts. SafeSci comprises SafeSciBench, a multi-disciplinary benchmark with 0.25M samples, and SafeSciTrain, a large-scale dataset containing 1.5M samples for safety enhancement. SafeSciBench distinguishes between safety knowledge and risk to cover extensive scopes and employs objective metrics such as deterministically answerable questions to mitigate evaluation bias. We evaluate 24 advanced LLMs, revealing critical vulnerabilities in current models. We also observe that LLMs exhibit varying degrees of excessive refusal behaviors on safety-related issues. For safety enhancement, we demonstrate that fine-tuning on SafeSciTrain significantly enhances the safety alignment of models. Finally, we argue that knowledge is a double-edged sword, and determining the safety of a scientific question should depend on specific context, rather than universally categorizing it as safe or unsafe. Our work provides both a diagnostic tool and a practical resource for building safer scientific AI systems.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on reasoning-intensive tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, their enhanced reasoning capabilities do not necessarily translate to improved safety performance-and in some cases, may even degrade it. This raises an important research question: how can we enhance the safety of LRMs? In this paper, we present a comprehensive empirical study on how to enhance the safety of LRMs through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Our investigation begins with an unexpected observation: directly distilling safe responses from DeepSeek-R1 fails to significantly enhance safety. We analyze this phenomenon and identify three key failure patterns that contribute to it. We then demonstrate that explicitly addressing these issues during the data distillation process can lead to substantial safety improvements. Next, we explore whether a long and complex reasoning process is necessary for achieving safety. Interestingly, we find that simply using short or template-based reasoning process can attain comparable safety performance-and are significantly easier for models to learn than more intricate reasoning chains. These findings prompt a deeper reflection on the role of reasoning in ensuring safety. Finally, we find that mixing math reasoning data during safety fine-tuning is helpful to balance safety and over-refusal. Overall, we hope our empirical study could provide a more holistic picture on enhancing the safety of LRMs. The code and data used in our experiments are released in https://github.com/thu-coai/LRM-Safety-Study.

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant safety concerns have emerged. Fundamentally, the safety of large language models is closely linked to the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and clarity of their understanding of safety knowledge, particularly in domains such as law, policy and ethics. This factuality ability is crucial in determining whether these models can be deployed and applied safely and compliantly within specific regions. To address these challenges and better evaluate the factuality ability of LLMs to answer short questions, we introduce the Chinese SafetyQA benchmark. Chinese SafetyQA has several properties (i.e., Chinese, Diverse, High-quality, Static, Easy-to-evaluate, Safety-related, Harmless). Based on Chinese SafetyQA, we perform a comprehensive evaluation on the factuality abilities of existing LLMs and analyze how these capabilities relate to LLM abilities, e.g., RAG ability and robustness against attacks.

Language models can distinguish between testing and deployment phases -- a capability known as evaluation awareness. This has significant safety and policy implications, potentially undermining the reliability of evaluations that are central to AI governance frameworks and voluntary industry commitments. In this paper, we study evaluation awareness in Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. We show that linear probes can separate real-world evaluation and deployment prompts, suggesting that current models internally represent this distinction. We also find that current safety evaluations are correctly classified by the probes, suggesting that they already appear artificial or inauthentic to models. Our findings underscore the importance of ensuring trustworthy evaluations and understanding deceptive capabilities. More broadly, our work showcases how model internals may be leveraged to support blackbox methods in safety audits, especially for future models more competent at evaluation awareness and deception.

Despite the growing use of large language models (LLMs) in clinical dialogue systems, existing evaluations focus on task completion or fluency, offering little insight into the behavioral and risk management requirements essential for safety-critical systems. This paper presents MATRIX (Multi-Agent simulaTion fRamework for safe Interactions and conteXtual clinical conversational evaluation), a structured, extensible framework for safety-oriented evaluation of clinical dialogue agents. MATRIX integrates three components: (1) a safety-aligned taxonomy of clinical scenarios, expected system behaviors and failure modes derived through structured safety engineering methods; (2) BehvJudge, an LLM-based evaluator for detecting safety-relevant dialogue failures, validated against expert clinician annotations; and (3) PatBot, a simulated patient agent capable of producing diverse, scenario-conditioned responses, evaluated for realism and behavioral fidelity with human factors expertise, and a patient-preference study. Across three experiments, we show that MATRIX enables systematic, scalable safety evaluation. BehvJudge with Gemini 2.5-Pro achieves expert-level hazard detection (F1 0.96, sensitivity 0.999), outperforming clinicians in a blinded assessment of 240 dialogues. We also conducted one of the first realism analyses of LLM-based patient simulation, showing that PatBot reliably simulates realistic patient behavior in quantitative and qualitative evaluations. Using MATRIX, we demonstrate its effectiveness in benchmarking five LLM agents across 2,100 simulated dialogues spanning 14 hazard scenarios and 10 clinical domains. MATRIX is the first framework to unify structured safety engineering with scalable, validated conversational AI evaluation, enabling regulator-aligned safety auditing. We release all evaluation tools, prompts, structured scenarios, and datasets.

For safety, medical AI systems undergo thorough evaluations before deployment, validating their predictions against a ground truth which is assumed to be fixed and certain. However, this ground truth is often curated in the form of differential diagnoses. While a single differential diagnosis reflects the uncertainty in one expert assessment, multiple experts introduce another layer of uncertainty through disagreement. Both forms of uncertainty are ignored in standard evaluation which aggregates these differential diagnoses to a single label. In this paper, we show that ignoring uncertainty leads to overly optimistic estimates of model performance, therefore underestimating risk associated with particular diagnostic decisions. To this end, we propose a statistical aggregation approach, where we infer a distribution on probabilities of underlying medical condition candidates themselves, based on observed annotations. This formulation naturally accounts for the potential disagreements between different experts, as well as uncertainty stemming from individual differential diagnoses, capturing the entire ground truth uncertainty. Our approach boils down to generating multiple samples of medical condition probabilities, then evaluating and averaging performance metrics based on these sampled probabilities. In skin condition classification, we find that a large portion of the dataset exhibits significant ground truth uncertainty and standard evaluation severely over-estimates performance without providing uncertainty estimates. In contrast, our framework provides uncertainty estimates on common metrics of interest such as top-k accuracy and average overlap, showing that performance can change multiple percentage points. We conclude that, while assuming a crisp ground truth can be acceptable for many AI applications, a more nuanced evaluation protocol should be utilized in medical diagnosis.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

When considering the accuracy of sensors in an automated vehicle (AV), it is not sufficient to evaluate the performance of any given sensor in isolation. Rather, the performance of any individual sensor must be considered in the context of the overall system design. Techniques like redundancy and different sensing modalities can reduce the chances of a sensing failure. Additionally, the use of safety models is essential to understanding whether any particular sensing failure is relevant. Only when the entire system design is taken into account can one properly understand the meaning of safety-relevant sensing failures in an AV. In this paper, we will consider what should actually constitute a sensing failure, how safety models play an important role in mitigating potential failures, how a system-level approach to safety will deliver a safe and scalable AV, and what an acceptable sensing failure rate should be considering the full picture of an AV's architecture.

The open-world deployment of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles needs to address a variety of ML vulnerabilities such as interpretability, verifiability, and performance limitations. Research explores different approaches to improve ML dependability by proposing new models and training techniques to reduce generalization error, achieve domain adaptation, and detect outlier examples and adversarial attacks. However, there is a missing connection between ongoing ML research and well-established safety principles. In this paper, we present a structured and comprehensive review of ML techniques to improve the dependability of ML algorithms in uncontrolled open-world settings. From this review, we propose the Taxonomy of ML Safety that maps state-of-the-art ML techniques to key engineering safety strategies. Our taxonomy of ML safety presents a safety-oriented categorization of ML techniques to provide guidance for improving dependability of the ML design and development. The proposed taxonomy can serve as a safety checklist to aid designers in improving coverage and diversity of safety strategies employed in any given ML system.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.

Recent work has highlighted the importance of monitoring chain-of-thought reasoning for AI safety; however, current approaches that analyze textual reasoning steps can miss subtle harmful patterns and may be circumvented by models that hide unsafe reasoning. We present a sentence-level labeled dataset that enables activation-based monitoring of safety behaviors during LLM reasoning. Our dataset contains reasoning sequences with sentence-level annotations of safety behaviors such as expression of safety concerns or speculation on user intent, which we use to extract steering vectors for detecting and influencing these behaviors within model activations. The dataset fills a key gap in safety research: while existing datasets label reasoning holistically, effective application of steering vectors for safety monitoring could be improved by identifying precisely when specific behaviors occur within reasoning chains. We demonstrate the dataset's utility by extracting representations that both detect and steer safety behaviors in model activations, showcasing the potential of activation-level techniques for improving safety oversight on reasoning. Content Warning: This paper discusses AI safety in the context of harmful prompts and may contain references to potentially harmful content.

The meaningful use of electronic health records (EHR) continues to progress in the digital era with clinical decision support systems augmented by artificial intelligence. A priority in improving provider experience is to overcome information overload and reduce the cognitive burden so fewer medical errors and cognitive biases are introduced during patient care. One major type of medical error is diagnostic error due to systematic or predictable errors in judgment that rely on heuristics. The potential for clinical natural language processing (cNLP) to model diagnostic reasoning in humans with forward reasoning from data to diagnosis and potentially reduce the cognitive burden and medical error has not been investigated. Existing tasks to advance the science in cNLP have largely focused on information extraction and named entity recognition through classification tasks. We introduce a novel suite of tasks coined as Diagnostic Reasoning Benchmarks, DR.BENCH, as a new benchmark for developing and evaluating cNLP models with clinical diagnostic reasoning ability. The suite includes six tasks from ten publicly available datasets addressing clinical text understanding, medical knowledge reasoning, and diagnosis generation. DR.BENCH is the first clinical suite of tasks designed to be a natural language generation framework to evaluate pre-trained language models. Experiments with state-of-the-art pre-trained generative language models using large general domain models and models that were continually trained on a medical corpus demonstrate opportunities for improvement when evaluated in DR. BENCH. We share DR. BENCH as a publicly available GitLab repository with a systematic approach to load and evaluate models for the cNLP community.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

As AI systems become more advanced, companies and regulators will make difficult decisions about whether it is safe to train and deploy them. To prepare for these decisions, we investigate how developers could make a 'safety case,' which is a structured rationale that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe. We propose a framework for organizing a safety case and discuss four categories of arguments to justify safety: total inability to cause a catastrophe, sufficiently strong control measures, trustworthiness despite capability to cause harm, and -- if AI systems become much more powerful -- deference to credible AI advisors. We evaluate concrete examples of arguments in each category and outline how arguments could be combined to justify that AI systems are safe to deploy.

Safety perception measurement has been a subject of interest in many cities of the world. This is due to its social relevance, and to its effect on some local economic activities. Even though people safety perception is a subjective topic, sometimes it is possible to find out common patterns given a restricted geographical and sociocultural context. This paper presents an approach that makes use of image processing and machine learning techniques to detect with high accuracy urban environment patterns that could affect citizen's safety perception.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

Large language models (LLMs) are routinely used by physicians and patients for medical advice, yet their clinical safety profiles remain poorly characterized. We present NOHARM (Numerous Options Harm Assessment for Risk in Medicine), a benchmark using 100 real primary care-to-specialist consultation cases to measure frequency and severity of harm from LLM-generated medical recommendations. NOHARM covers 10 specialties, with 12,747 expert annotations for 4,249 clinical management options. Across 31 LLMs, potential for severe harm from LLM recommendations occurs in up to 22.2% (95% CI 21.6-22.8%) of cases, with harm of omission accounting for 76.6% (95% CI 76.4-76.8%) of errors. Safety performance is only moderately correlated (r = 0.61-0.64) with existing AI and medical knowledge benchmarks. The best models outperform generalist physicians on safety (mean difference 9.7%, 95% CI 7.0-12.5%), and a diverse multi-agent approach improves safety compared to solo models (mean difference 8.0%, 95% CI 4.0-12.1%). Therefore, despite strong performance on existing evaluations, widely used AI models can produce severely harmful medical advice at nontrivial rates, underscoring clinical safety as a distinct performance dimension necessitating explicit measurement.

With the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing attention has been paid to their safety concerns. Consequently, evaluating the safety of LLMs has become an essential task for facilitating the broad applications of LLMs. Nevertheless, the absence of comprehensive safety evaluation benchmarks poses a significant impediment to effectively assess and enhance the safety of LLMs. In this work, we present SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the safety of LLMs, which comprises 11,435 diverse multiple choice questions spanning across 7 distinct categories of safety concerns. Notably, SafetyBench also incorporates both Chinese and English data, facilitating the evaluation in both languages. Our extensive tests over 25 popular Chinese and English LLMs in both zero-shot and few-shot settings reveal a substantial performance advantage for GPT-4 over its counterparts, and there is still significant room for improving the safety of current LLMs. We believe SafetyBench will enable fast and comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' safety, and foster the development of safer LLMs. Data and evaluation guidelines are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/SafetyBench. Submission entrance and leaderboard are available at https://llmbench.ai/safety.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

This paper introduces STAR-1, a high-quality, just-1k-scale safety dataset specifically designed for large reasoning models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1. Built on three core principles -- diversity, deliberative reasoning, and rigorous filtering -- STAR-1 aims to address the critical needs for safety alignment in LRMs. Specifically, we begin by integrating existing open-source safety datasets from diverse sources. Then, we curate safety policies to generate policy-grounded deliberative reasoning samples. Lastly, we apply a GPT-4o-based safety scoring system to select training examples aligned with best practices. Experimental results show that fine-tuning LRMs with STAR-1 leads to an average 40% improvement in safety performance across four benchmarks, while only incurring a marginal decrease (e.g., an average of 1.1%) in reasoning ability measured across five reasoning tasks. Extensive ablation studies further validate the importance of our design principles in constructing STAR-1 and analyze its efficacy across both LRMs and traditional LLMs. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/STAR-1.

Construction safety inspections typically involve a human inspector identifying safety concerns on-site. With the rise of powerful Vision Language Models (VLMs), researchers are exploring their use for tasks such as detecting safety rule violations from on-site images. However, there is a lack of open datasets to comprehensively evaluate and further fine-tune VLMs in construction safety inspection. Current applications of VLMs use small, supervised datasets, limiting their applicability in tasks they are not directly trained for. In this paper, we propose the ConstructionSite 10k, featuring 10,000 construction site images with annotations for three inter-connected tasks, including image captioning, safety rule violation visual question answering (VQA), and construction element visual grounding. Our subsequent evaluation of current state-of-the-art large pre-trained VLMs shows notable generalization abilities in zero-shot and few-shot settings, while additional training is needed to make them applicable to actual construction sites. This dataset allows researchers to train and evaluate their own VLMs with new architectures and techniques, providing a valuable benchmark for construction safety inspection.

As the performance of large language models (LLMs) continues to advance, their adoption is expanding across a wide range of domains, including the medical field. The integration of LLMs into medical applications raises critical safety concerns, particularly due to their use by users with diverse roles, e.g. patients and clinicians, and the potential for model's outputs to directly affect human health. Despite the domain-specific capabilities of medical LLMs, prior safety evaluations have largely focused only on general safety benchmarks. In this paper, we introduce a safety evaluation protocol tailored to the medical domain in both patient user and clinician user perspectives, alongside general safety assessments and quantitatively analyze the safety of medical LLMs. We bridge a gap in the literature by building the PatientSafetyBench containing 466 samples over 5 critical categories to measure safety from the perspective of the patient. We apply our red-teaming protocols on the MediPhi model collection as a case study. To our knowledge, this is the first work to define safety evaluation criteria for medical LLMs through targeted red-teaming taking three different points of view - patient, clinician, and general user - establishing a foundation for safer deployment in medical domains.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

The field of medical diagnosis has undergone a significant transformation with the advent of large language models (LLMs), yet the challenges of interpretability within these models remain largely unaddressed. This study introduces Chain-of-Diagnosis (CoD) to enhance the interpretability of LLM-based medical diagnostics. CoD transforms the diagnostic process into a diagnostic chain that mirrors a physician's thought process, providing a transparent reasoning pathway. Additionally, CoD outputs the disease confidence distribution to ensure transparency in decision-making. This interpretability makes model diagnostics controllable and aids in identifying critical symptoms for inquiry through the entropy reduction of confidences. With CoD, we developed DiagnosisGPT, capable of diagnosing 9604 diseases. Experimental results demonstrate that DiagnosisGPT outperforms other LLMs on diagnostic benchmarks. Moreover, DiagnosisGPT provides interpretability while ensuring controllability in diagnostic rigor.

This paper introduces fourteen novel datasets for the evaluation of Large Language Models' safety in the context of enterprise tasks. A method was devised to evaluate a model's safety, as determined by its ability to follow instructions and output factual, unbiased, grounded, and appropriate content. In this research, we used OpenAI GPT as point of comparison since it excels at all levels of safety. On the open-source side, for smaller models, Meta Llama2 performs well at factuality and toxicity but has the highest propensity for hallucination. Mistral hallucinates the least but cannot handle toxicity well. It performs well in a dataset mixing several tasks and safety vectors in a narrow vertical domain. Gemma, the newly introduced open-source model based on Google Gemini, is generally balanced but trailing behind. When engaging in back-and-forth conversation (multi-turn prompts), we find that the safety of open-source models degrades significantly. Aside from OpenAI's GPT, Mistral is the only model that still performed well in multi-turn tests.

This paper introduces a new IncidentAI dataset for safety prevention. Different from prior corpora that usually contain a single task, our dataset comprises three tasks: named entity recognition, cause-effect extraction, and information retrieval. The dataset is annotated by domain experts who have at least six years of practical experience as high-pressure gas conservation managers. We validate the contribution of the dataset in the scenario of safety prevention. Preliminary results on the three tasks show that NLP techniques are beneficial for analyzing incident reports to prevent future failures. The dataset facilitates future research in NLP and incident management communities. The access to the dataset is also provided (the IncidentAI dataset is available at: https://github.com/Cinnamon/incident-ai-dataset).

Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.

Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled impressive generalization across diverse video understanding tasks under zero-shot settings. However, their capabilities in high-stakes industrial domains-where recognizing both routine operations and safety-critical anomalies is essential-remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce iSafetyBench, a new video-language benchmark specifically designed to evaluate model performance in industrial environments across both normal and hazardous scenarios. iSafetyBench comprises 1,100 video clips sourced from real-world industrial settings, annotated with open-vocabulary, multi-label action tags spanning 98 routine and 67 hazardous action categories. Each clip is paired with multiple-choice questions for both single-label and multi-label evaluation, enabling fine-grained assessment of VLMs in both standard and safety-critical contexts. We evaluate eight state-of-the-art video-language models under zero-shot conditions. Despite their strong performance on existing video benchmarks, these models struggle with iSafetyBench-particularly in recognizing hazardous activities and in multi-label scenarios. Our results reveal significant performance gaps, underscoring the need for more robust, safety-aware multimodal models for industrial applications. iSafetyBench provides a first-of-its-kind testbed to drive progress in this direction. The dataset is available at: https://github.com/raiyaan-abdullah/iSafety-Bench.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and widely used, ensuring the safety of their outputs is increasingly critical. Existing guardrail models, though useful in static evaluation settings, face two major limitations in real-world applications: (1) they typically output only binary "safe/unsafe" labels, which can be interpreted inconsistently across diverse safety policies, rendering them incapable of accommodating varying safety tolerances across domains; and (2) they require complete model outputs before performing safety checks, making them fundamentally incompatible with streaming LLM inference, thereby preventing timely intervention during generation and increasing exposure to harmful partial outputs. To address these challenges, we present Qwen3Guard, a series of multilingual safety guardrail models with two specialized variants: Generative Qwen3Guard, which casts safety classification as an instruction-following task to enable fine-grained tri-class judgments (safe, controversial, unsafe); and Stream Qwen3Guard, which introduces a token-level classification head for real-time safety monitoring during incremental text generation. Both variants are available in three sizes (0.6B, 4B, and 8B parameters) and support up to 119 languages and dialects, providing comprehensive, scalable, and low-latency safety moderation for global LLM deployments. Evaluated across English, Chinese, and multilingual benchmarks, Qwen3Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance in both prompt and response safety classification. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE

Foundation models are routinely fine-tuned for use in particular domains, yet safety assessments are typically conducted only on base models, implicitly assuming that safety properties persist through downstream adaptation. We test this assumption by analyzing the safety behavior of 100 models, including widely deployed fine-tunes in the medical and legal domains as well as controlled adaptations of open foundation models alongside their bases. Across general-purpose and domain-specific safety benchmarks, we find that benign fine-tuning induces large, heterogeneous, and often contradictory changes in measured safety: models frequently improve on some instruments while degrading on others, with substantial disagreement across evaluations. These results show that safety behavior is not stable under ordinary downstream adaptation, raising critical questions about governance and deployment practices centered on base-model evaluations. Without explicit re-evaluation of fine-tuned models in deployment-relevant contexts, such approaches fall short of adequately managing downstream risk, overlooking practical sources of harm -- failures that are especially consequential in high-stakes settings and challenge current accountability paradigms.

Large language model-based agents are rapidly evolving from simple conversational assistants into autonomous systems capable of performing complex, professional-level tasks in various domains. While these advancements promise significant productivity gains, they also introduce critical safety risks that remain under-explored. Existing safety evaluations primarily focus on simple, daily assistance tasks, failing to capture the intricate decision-making processes and potential consequences of misaligned behaviors in professional settings. To address this gap, we introduce SafePro, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of AI agents performing professional activities. SafePro features a dataset of high-complexity tasks across diverse professional domains with safety risks, developed through a rigorous iterative creation and review process. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art AI models reveals significant safety vulnerabilities and uncovers new unsafe behaviors in professional contexts. We further show that these models exhibit both insufficient safety judgment and weak safety alignment when executing complex professional tasks. In addition, we investigate safety mitigation strategies for improving agent safety in these scenarios and observe encouraging improvements. Together, our findings highlight the urgent need for robust safety mechanisms tailored to the next generation of professional AI agents.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly used for tasks like medical report generation and visual question answering. However, fluent diagnostic text does not guarantee safe visual understanding. In clinical practice, interpretation begins with pre-diagnostic sanity checks: verifying that the input is valid to read (correct modality and anatomy, plausible viewpoint and orientation, and no obvious integrity violations). Existing benchmarks largely assume this step is solved, and therefore miss a critical failure mode: a model can produce plausible narratives even when the input is inconsistent or invalid. We introduce MedObvious, a 1,880-task benchmark that isolates input validation as a set-level consistency capability over small multi-panel image sets: the model must identify whether any panel violates expected coherence. MedObvious spans five progressive tiers, from basic orientation/modality mismatches to clinically motivated anatomy/viewpoint verification and triage-style cues, and includes five evaluation formats to test robustness across interfaces. Evaluating 17 different VLMs, we find that sanity checking remains unreliable: several models hallucinate anomalies on normal (negative-control) inputs, performance degrades when scaling to larger image sets, and measured accuracy varies substantially between multiple-choice and open-ended settings. These results show that pre-diagnostic verification remains unsolved for medical VLMs and should be treated as a distinct, safety-critical capability before deployment.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models is critical for healthcare; however, reliance on binary refusal boundaries often results in over-refusal of benign queries or unsafe compliance with harmful ones. While existing benchmarks measure these extremes, they fail to evaluate Safe Completion: the model's ability to maximise helpfulness on dual-use or borderline queries by providing safe, high-level guidance without crossing into actionable harm. We introduce Health-ORSC-Bench, the first large-scale benchmark designed to systematically measure Over-Refusal and Safe Completion quality in healthcare. Comprising 31,920 benign boundary prompts across seven health categories (e.g., self-harm, medical misinformation), our framework uses an automated pipeline with human validation to test models at varying levels of intent ambiguity. We evaluate 30 state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-5 and Claude-4, revealing a significant tension: safety-optimised models frequently refuse up to 80\% of "Hard" benign prompts, while domain-specific models often sacrifice safety for utility. Our findings demonstrate that model family and size significantly influence calibration: larger frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Llama-4) exhibit "safety-pessimism" and higher over-refusal than smaller or MoE-based counterparts (e.g., Qwen-3-Next), highlighting that current LLMs struggle to balance refusal and compliance. Health-ORSC-Bench provides a rigorous standard for calibrating the next generation of medical AI assistants toward nuanced, safe, and helpful completions. The code and data will be released upon acceptance. red{Warning: Some contents may include toxic or undesired contents.}

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Large language models are increasingly used for mental health support, yet their conversational coherence alone does not ensure clinical appropriateness. Existing general-purpose safeguards often fail to distinguish between therapeutic disclosures and genuine clinical crises, leading to safety failures. To address this gap, we introduce a clinically grounded risk taxonomy, developed in collaboration with PhD-level psychologists, that identifies actionable harm (e.g., self-harm and harm to others) while preserving space for safe, non-crisis therapeutic content. We release MindGuard-testset, a dataset of real-world multi-turn conversations annotated at the turn level by clinical experts. Using synthetic dialogues generated via a controlled two-agent setup, we train MindGuard, a family of lightweight safety classifiers (with 4B and 8B parameters). Our classifiers reduce false positives at high-recall operating points and, when paired with clinician language models, help achieve lower attack success and harmful engagement rates in adversarial multi-turn interactions compared to general-purpose safeguards. We release all models and human evaluation data.

Large language models (LLMs) show promise in medical diagnosis, but real-world deployment remains challenging due to high-stakes clinical decisions and imperfect reasoning reliability. As a result, careful inspection of model behavior is essential for assessing whether diagnostic reasoning is reliable and clinically grounded. However, debugging medical LLMs remains difficult. First, developers often lack sufficient medical domain expertise to interpret model errors in clinically meaningful terms. Second, models can fail across a large and diverse set of instances involving different input types, tasks, and reasoning steps, making it challenging for developers to prioritize which errors deserve focused inspection. Third, developers struggle to identify recurring error patterns across cases, as existing debugging practices are largely instance-centric and rely on manual inspection of isolated failures. To address these challenges, we present VeriLLMed, a visual analytics system that integrates external biomedical knowledge to audit and debug medical LLM diagnostic reasoning. VeriLLMed transforms model outputs into comparable reasoning paths, constructs knowledge graph-grounded reference paths, and identifies three recurring classes of diagnosis errors: relation errors, branch errors, and missing errors. Case studies and expert evaluation demonstrate that VeriLLMed helps developers identify clinically implausible reasoning and generate actionable insights that can inform the improvement of medical LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve answer quality through explicit chain-of-thought, yet this very capability introduces new safety risks: harmful content can be subtly injected, surface gradually, or be justified by misleading rationales within the reasoning trace. Existing safety evaluations, however, primarily focus on output-level judgments and rarely capture these dynamic risks along the reasoning process. In this paper, we present SafeRBench, the first benchmark that assesses LRM safety end-to-end -- from inputs and intermediate reasoning to final outputs. (1) Input Characterization: We pioneer the incorporation of risk categories and levels into input design, explicitly accounting for affected groups and severity, and thereby establish a balanced prompt suite reflecting diverse harm gradients. (2) Fine-Grained Output Analysis: We introduce a micro-thought chunking mechanism to segment long reasoning traces into semantically coherent units, enabling fine-grained evaluation across ten safety dimensions. (3) Human Safety Alignment: We validate LLM-based evaluations against human annotations specifically designed to capture safety judgments. Evaluations on 19 LRMs demonstrate that SafeRBench enables detailed, multidimensional safety assessment, offering insights into risks and protective mechanisms from multiple perspectives.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have expanded the capabilities of traditional language models by enabling interaction through both text and images. However, ensuring the safety of these models remains a significant challenge, particularly in accurately identifying whether multimodal content is safe or unsafe-a capability we term safety awareness. In this paper, we introduce MMSafeAware, the first comprehensive multimodal safety awareness benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs across 29 safety scenarios with 1500 carefully curated image-prompt pairs. MMSafeAware includes both unsafe and over-safety subsets to assess models abilities to correctly identify unsafe content and avoid over-sensitivity that can hinder helpfulness. Evaluating nine widely used MLLMs using MMSafeAware reveals that current models are not sufficiently safe and often overly sensitive; for example, GPT-4V misclassifies 36.1% of unsafe inputs as safe and 59.9% of benign inputs as unsafe. We further explore three methods to improve safety awareness-prompting-based approaches, visual contrastive decoding, and vision-centric reasoning fine-tuning-but find that none achieve satisfactory performance. Our findings highlight the profound challenges in developing MLLMs with robust safety awareness, underscoring the need for further research in this area. All the code and data will be publicly available to facilitate future research.

Foundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous literature, intuitions, or common sense, leading to disjointed sets of categories for risks specified in recent regulations and policies, which makes it challenging to evaluate and compare FMs across these benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-Bench 2024, the first AI safety benchmark aligned with emerging government regulations and company policies, following the regulation-based safety categories grounded in our AI risks study, AIR 2024. AIR 2024 decomposes 8 government regulations and 16 company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with 314 granular risk categories in the lowest tier. AIR-Bench 2024 contains 5,694 diverse prompts spanning these categories, with manual curation and human auditing to ensure quality. We evaluate leading language models on AIR-Bench 2024, uncovering insights into their alignment with specified safety concerns. By bridging the gap between public benchmarks and practical AI risks, AIR-Bench 2024 provides a foundation for assessing model safety across jurisdictions, fostering the development of safer and more responsible AI systems.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

The primary goal of drug safety researchers and regulators is to promptly identify adverse drug reactions. Doing so may in turn prevent or reduce the harm to patients and ultimately improve public health. Evaluating and monitoring drug safety (i.e., pharmacovigilance) involves analyzing an ever growing collection of spontaneous reports from health professionals, physicians, and pharmacists, and information voluntarily submitted by patients. In this scenario, facilitating analysis of such reports via automation has the potential to rapidly identify safety signals. Unfortunately, public resources for developing natural language models for this task are scant. We present PHEE, a novel dataset for pharmacovigilance comprising over 5000 annotated events from medical case reports and biomedical literature, making it the largest such public dataset to date. We describe the hierarchical event schema designed to provide coarse and fine-grained information about patients' demographics, treatments and (side) effects. Along with the discussion of the dataset, we present a thorough experimental evaluation of current state-of-the-art approaches for biomedical event extraction, point out their limitations, and highlight open challenges to foster future research in this area.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in critical domains like healthcare, justice, and social services has sparked numerous regulatory initiatives aimed at ensuring their safe deployment. Current regulatory frameworks, exemplified by recent US and EU efforts, primarily focus on procedural guidelines while presuming that scientific benchmarking can effectively validate AI safety, similar to how crash tests verify vehicle safety or clinical trials validate drug efficacy. However, this approach fundamentally misunderstands the unique technical challenges posed by modern AI systems. Through systematic analysis of successful technology regulation case studies, we demonstrate that effective scientific regulation requires a causal theory linking observable test outcomes to future performance - for instance, how a vehicle's crash resistance at one speed predicts its safety at lower speeds. We show that deep learning models, which learn complex statistical patterns from training data without explicit causal mechanisms, preclude such guarantees. This limitation renders traditional regulatory approaches inadequate for ensuring AI safety. Moving forward, we call for regulators to reckon with this limitation, and propose a preliminary two-tiered regulatory framework that acknowledges these constraints: mandating human oversight for high-risk applications while developing appropriate risk communication strategies for lower-risk uses. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider fundamental assumptions in AI regulation and suggest a concrete path forward for policymakers and researchers.

With the growing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has raised significant concerns. However, there is still a lack of definitive standards for evaluating their safety due to the subjective nature of current safety benchmarks. To address this gap, we conducted the first exploration of LLMs' safety evaluation from a legal perspective by proposing the SafeLawBench benchmark. SafeLawBench categorizes safety risks into three levels based on legal standards, providing a systematic and comprehensive framework for evaluation. It comprises 24,860 multi-choice questions and 1,106 open-domain question-answering (QA) tasks. Our evaluation included 2 closed-source LLMs and 18 open-source LLMs using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, highlighting the safety features of each model. We also evaluated the LLMs' safety-related reasoning stability and refusal behavior. Additionally, we found that a majority voting mechanism can enhance model performance. Notably, even leading SOTA models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o have not exceeded 80.5% accuracy in multi-choice tasks on SafeLawBench, while the average accuracy of 20 LLMs remains at 68.8\%. We urge the community to prioritize research on the safety of LLMs.

Recognizing safety violations in construction environments is critical yet remains underexplored in computer vision. Existing models predominantly rely on 2D object detection, which fails to capture the complexities of real-world violations due to: (i) an oversimplified task formulation treating violation recognition merely as object detection, (ii) inadequate validation under realistic conditions, (iii) absence of standardized baselines, and (iv) limited scalability from the unavailability of synthetic dataset generators for diverse construction scenarios. To address these challenges, we introduce Safe-Construct, the first framework that reformulates violation recognition as a 3D multi-view engagement task, leveraging scene-level worker-object context and 3D spatial understanding. We also propose the Synthetic Indoor Construction Site Generator (SICSG) to create diverse, scalable training data, overcoming data limitations. Safe-Construct achieves a 7.6% improvement over state-of-the-art methods across four violation types. We rigorously evaluate our approach in near-realistic settings, incorporating four violations, four workers, 14 objects, and challenging conditions like occlusions (worker-object, worker-worker) and variable illumination (back-lighting, overexposure, sunlight). By integrating 3D multi-view spatial understanding and synthetic data generation, Safe-Construct sets a new benchmark for scalable and robust safety monitoring in high-risk industries. Project Website: https://Safe-Construct.github.io/Safe-Construct

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into numerous applications across various domains, LLMs' safety becomes a critical concern for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between safe and unsafe, or constrained by the narrow risk taxonomies of a single benchmark. To leverage these fine-grained safety taxonomies across multiple safety benchmarks, in this paper, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe input prompts and LLMs' outputs with violated safety taxonomies through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, our GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through our careful cold-start strategy and reward design. Consequently, our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that our GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, our GSPR not only demonstrates powerful safety generalization abilities but also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

The emergence of groundbreaking large language models capable of performing complex reasoning tasks holds significant promise for addressing various scientific challenges, including those arising in complex clinical scenarios. To enable their safe and effective deployment in real-world healthcare settings, it is urgently necessary to benchmark the diagnostic capabilities of current models systematically. Given the limitations of existing medical benchmarks in evaluating advanced diagnostic reasoning, we present DiagnosisArena, a comprehensive and challenging benchmark designed to rigorously assess professional-level diagnostic competence. DiagnosisArena consists of 1,113 pairs of segmented patient cases and corresponding diagnoses, spanning 28 medical specialties, deriving from clinical case reports published in 10 top-tier medical journals. The benchmark is developed through a meticulous construction pipeline, involving multiple rounds of screening and review by both AI systems and human experts, with thorough checks conducted to prevent data leakage. Our study reveals that even the most advanced reasoning models, o3-mini, o1, and DeepSeek-R1, achieve only 45.82%, 31.09%, and 17.79% accuracy, respectively. This finding highlights a significant generalization bottleneck in current large language models when faced with clinical diagnostic reasoning challenges. Through DiagnosisArena, we aim to drive further advancements in AIs diagnostic reasoning capabilities, enabling more effective solutions for real-world clinical diagnostic challenges. We provide the benchmark and evaluation tools for further research and development https://github.com/SPIRAL-MED/DiagnosisArena.

Modern automobiles have evolved from just being mechanical machines to having full-fledged electronics systems that enhance vehicle dynamics and driver experience. However, these complex hardware and software systems, if not properly designed, can experience failures that can compromise the safety of the vehicle, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. For example, a system to activate the brakes to avoid a collision saves lives when it functions properly, but could lead to tragic outcomes if the brakes were applied in a way that's inconsistent with the design. Broadly speaking, the analysis performed to minimize such risks falls into a systems engineering domain called Functional Safety. In this paper, we present SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool to assist engineers and analysts in analyzing automotive Functional Safety datasets. SafetyLens combines techniques including network exploration and visual comparison to help analysts perform domain-specific tasks. This paper presents the design study with domain experts that resulted in the design guidelines, the tool, and user feedback.

We evaluate the propensity of frontier models to sabotage or refuse to assist with safety research when deployed as AI research agents within a frontier AI company. We apply two complementary evaluations to four Claude models (Mythos Preview, Opus 4.7 Preview, Opus 4.6, and Sonnet 4.6): an unprompted sabotage evaluation testing model behaviour with opportunities to sabotage safety research, and a sabotage continuation evaluation testing whether models continue to sabotage when placed in trajectories where prior actions have started undermining research. We find no instances of unprompted sabotage across any model, with refusal rates close to zero for Mythos Preview and Opus 4.7 Preview, though all models sometimes only partially completed tasks. In the continuation evaluation, Mythos Preview actively continues sabotage in 7% of cases (versus 3% for Opus 4.6, 4% for Sonnet 4.6, and 0% for Opus 4.7 Preview), and exhibits reasoning-output discrepancy in the majority of these cases, indicating covert sabotage reasoning. Our evaluation framework builds on Petri, an open-source LLM auditing tool, with a custom scaffold running models inside Claude Code, alongside an iterative pipeline for generating realistic sabotage trajectories. We measure both evaluation awareness and a new form of situational awareness termed "prefill awareness", the capability to recognise that prior trajectory content was not self-generated. Opus 4.7 Preview shows notably elevated unprompted evaluation awareness, while prefill awareness remains low across all models. Finally, we discuss limitations including evaluation awareness confounds, limited scenario coverage, and untested pathways to risk beyond safety research sabotage.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.

The rapid proliferation of large language models (LLMs) has intensified the requirement for reliable safety evaluation to uncover model vulnerabilities. To this end, numerous LLM safety evaluation benchmarks are proposed. However, existing benchmarks generally rely on labor-intensive manual curation, which causes excessive time and resource consumption. They also exhibit significant redundancy and limited difficulty. To alleviate these problems, we introduce SafetyFlow, the first agent-flow system designed to automate the construction of LLM safety benchmarks. SafetyFlow can automatically build a comprehensive safety benchmark in only four days without any human intervention by orchestrating seven specialized agents, significantly reducing time and resource cost. Equipped with versatile tools, the agents of SafetyFlow ensure process and cost controllability while integrating human expertise into the automatic pipeline. The final constructed dataset, SafetyFlowBench, contains 23,446 queries with low redundancy and strong discriminative power. Our contribution includes the first fully automated benchmarking pipeline and a comprehensive safety benchmark. We evaluate the safety of 49 advanced LLMs on our dataset and conduct extensive experiments to validate our efficacy and efficiency.

The safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained increasing attention in recent years, but there still lacks a comprehensive approach for detecting safety issues within LLMs' responses in an aligned, customizable and explainable manner. In this paper, we propose ShieldLM, an LLM-based safety detector, which aligns with general human safety standards, supports customizable detection rules, and provides explanations for its decisions. To train ShieldLM, we compile a large bilingual dataset comprising 14,387 query-response pairs, annotating the safety of responses based on various safety standards. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that ShieldLM surpasses strong baselines across four test sets, showcasing remarkable customizability and explainability. Besides performing well on standard detection datasets, ShieldLM has also been shown to be effective in real-world situations as a safety evaluator for advanced LLMs. We release ShieldLM at https://github.com/thu-coai/ShieldLM to support accurate and explainable safety detection under various safety standards, contributing to the ongoing efforts to enhance the safety of LLMs.

While vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown promising robotic behaviors across a diverse set of manipulation tasks, they achieve limited success rates when deployed on novel tasks out-of-the-box. To allow these policies to safely interact with their environments, we need a failure detector that gives a timely alert such that the robot can stop, backtrack, or ask for help. However, existing failure detectors are trained and tested only on one or a few specific tasks, while VLAs require the detector to generalize and detect failures also in unseen tasks and novel environments. In this paper, we introduce the multitask failure detection problem and propose SAFE, a failure detector for generalist robot policies such as VLAs. We analyze the VLA feature space and find that VLAs have sufficient high-level knowledge about task success and failure, which is generic across different tasks. Based on this insight, we design SAFE to learn from VLA internal features and predict a single scalar indicating the likelihood of task failure. SAFE is trained on both successful and failed rollouts, and is evaluated on unseen tasks. SAFE is compatible with different policy architectures. We test it on OpenVLA, pi_0, and pi_0-FAST in both simulated and real-world environments extensively. We compare SAFE with diverse baselines and show that SAFE achieves state-of-the-art failure detection performance and the best trade-off between accuracy and detection time using conformal prediction. More qualitative results can be found at https://vla-safe.github.io/.

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of 46.54% over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

Clinical diagnosis is a highly specialized discipline requiring both domain expertise and strict adherence to rigorous guidelines. While current AI-driven medical research predominantly focuses on knowledge graphs or natural text pretraining paradigms to incorporate medical knowledge, these approaches primarily rely on implicitly encoded knowledge within model parameters, neglecting task-specific knowledge required by diverse downstream tasks. To address this limitation, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Diagnosis (RAD), a novel framework that explicitly injects external knowledge into multimodal models directly on downstream tasks. Specifically, RAD operates through three key mechanisms: retrieval and refinement of disease-centered knowledge from multiple medical sources, a guideline-enhanced contrastive loss that constrains the latent distance between multi-modal features and guideline knowledge, and the dual transformer decoder that employs guidelines as queries to steer cross-modal fusion, aligning the models with clinical diagnostic workflows from guideline acquisition to feature extraction and decision-making. Moreover, recognizing the lack of quantitative evaluation of interpretability for multimodal diagnostic models, we introduce a set of criteria to assess the interpretability from both image and text perspectives. Extensive evaluations across four datasets with different anatomies demonstrate RAD's generalizability, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, RAD enables the model to concentrate more precisely on abnormal regions and critical indicators, ensuring evidence-based, trustworthy diagnosis. Our code is available at https://github.com/tdlhl/RAD.

Accurate and timely identification of construction hazards around workers is essential for preventing workplace accidents. While large vision-language models (VLMs) demonstrate strong contextual reasoning capabilities, their high computational requirements limit their applicability in near real-time construction hazard detection. In contrast, small vision-language models (sVLMs) with fewer than 4 billion parameters offer improved efficiency but often suffer from reduced accuracy and hallucination when analyzing complex construction scenes. To address this trade-off, this study proposes a detection-guided sVLM framework that integrates object detection with multimodal reasoning for contextual hazard identification. The framework first employs a YOLOv11n detector to localize workers and construction machinery within the scene. The detected entities are then embedded into structured prompts to guide the reasoning process of sVLMs, enabling spatially grounded hazard assessment. Within this framework, six sVLMs (Gemma-3 4B, Qwen-3-VL 2B/4B, InternVL-3 1B/2B, and SmolVLM-2B) were evaluated in zero-shot settings on a curated dataset of construction site images with hazard annotations and explanatory rationales. The proposed approach consistently improved hazard detection performance across all models. The best-performing model, Gemma-3 4B, achieved an F1-score of 50.6%, compared to 34.5% in the baseline configuration. Explanation quality also improved significantly, with BERTScore F1 increasing from 0.61 to 0.82. Despite incorporating object detection, the framework introduces minimal overhead, adding only 2.5 ms per image during inference. These results demonstrate that integrating lightweight object detection with small VLM reasoning provides an effective and efficient solution for context-aware construction safety hazard detection.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

Clinical diagnosis is critical in medical practice, typically requiring a continuous and evolving process that includes primary diagnosis, differential diagnosis, and final diagnosis. However, most existing clinical diagnostic tasks are single-step processes, which does not align with the complex multi-step diagnostic procedures found in real-world clinical settings. In this paper, we propose a multi-step diagnostic task and annotate a clinical diagnostic dataset (MSDiagnosis). This dataset includes primary diagnosis, differential diagnosis, and final diagnosis questions. Additionally, we propose a novel and effective framework. This framework combines forward inference, backward inference, reflection, and refinement, enabling the LLM to self-evaluate and adjust its diagnostic results. To assess the effectiveness of our proposed method, we design and conduct extensive experiments. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We also provide a comprehensive experimental analysis and suggest future research directions for this task.

Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) are increasingly deployed for vision-language tasks that produce explicit intermediate rationales. However, reasoning traces can contain unsafe content even when the final answer is non-harmful, creating deployment risks. Existing multimodal safety guards primarily evaluate only the input question and the final answer, neglecting the intermediate reasoning process. This oversight allows undetected harm, such as biased inferences or policy-violating use of visual context, to emerge during reasoning. We introduce GuardTrace-VL, a vision-aware safety auditor that monitors the full Question-Thinking-Answer (QTA) pipeline via joint image-text analysis, enabling detection of unsafe content as it emerges in the reasoning stage. To support training and evaluation, we construct the GuardTrace dataset, which is generated through diverse prompting strategies and refined via a MLRM- and human-based voting and verification pipeline. Furthermore, we propose a three-stage progressive training scheme combined with the data refinement process, enabling the model to learn nuanced and context-dependent safety preferences according to different risk levels. On our proposed test set covering both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, GuardTrace-VL model achieves an F1 score of 93.1% on unsafe reasoning detection tasks, representing a 13.5% improvement in F1 score compared to the previous strongest multimodal safety defense methods. The codes will be made publicly available.

Defending against jailbreak attacks is crucial for the safe deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent research has attempted to improve safety by training models to reason over safety rules before responding. However, a key issue lies in determining what form of safety reasoning effectively defends against jailbreak attacks, which is difficult to explicitly design or directly obtain. To address this, we propose STAR-S (Self-TAught Reasoning based on Safety rules), a framework that integrates the learning of safety rule reasoning into a self-taught loop. The core of STAR-S involves eliciting reasoning and reflection guided by safety rules, then leveraging fine-tuning to enhance safety reasoning. Repeating this process creates a synergistic cycle. Improvements in the model's reasoning and interpretation of safety rules allow it to produce better reasoning data under safety rule prompts, which is then utilized for further training. Experiments show that STAR-S effectively defends against jailbreak attacks, outperforming baselines. Code is available at: https://github.com/pikepokenew/STAR_S.git.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in understanding visual content, but their reliability in safety-critical contexts remains under-explored. We introduce VERI (Visual Emergency Recognition Dataset), a carefully designed diagnostic benchmark of 200 images (100 contrastive pairs). Each emergency scene is matched with a visually similar but safe counterpart through multi-stage human verification and iterative refinement. Using a two-stage protocol - risk identification and emergency response - we evaluate 14 VLMs (2B-124B parameters) across medical emergencies, accidents, and natural disasters. Our analysis reveals a systematic overreaction problem: models excel at identifying real emergencies (70-100 percent success rate) but suffer from an alarming rate of false alarms, misidentifying 31-96 percent of safe situations as dangerous, with 10 scenarios failed by all models regardless of scale. This "better-safe-than-sorry" bias manifests primarily through contextual overinterpretation (88-93 percent of errors), challenging VLMs' reliability for safety applications. These findings highlight persistent limitations that are not resolved by increasing model scale, motivating targeted approaches for improving contextual safety assessment in visually misleading scenarios.

With the profound development of large language models(LLMs), their safety concerns have garnered increasing attention. However, there is a scarcity of Chinese safety benchmarks for LLMs, and the existing safety taxonomies are inadequate, lacking comprehensive safety detection capabilities in authentic Chinese scenarios. In this work, we introduce CHiSafetyBench, a dedicated safety benchmark for evaluating LLMs' capabilities in identifying risky content and refusing answering risky questions in Chinese contexts. CHiSafetyBench incorporates a dataset that covers a hierarchical Chinese safety taxonomy consisting of 5 risk areas and 31 categories. This dataset comprises two types of tasks: multiple-choice questions and question-answering, evaluating LLMs from the perspectives of risk content identification and the ability to refuse answering risky questions respectively. Utilizing this benchmark, we validate the feasibility of automatic evaluation as a substitute for human evaluation and conduct comprehensive automatic safety assessments on mainstream Chinese LLMs. Our experiments reveal the varying performance of different models across various safety domains, indicating that all models possess considerable potential for improvement in Chinese safety capabilities. Our dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/UnicomAI/UnicomBenchmark/tree/main/CHiSafetyBench.

Chest X-ray plays a central role in thoracic diagnosis, and its interpretation inherently requires multi-step, evidence-grounded reasoning. However, large vision-language models (LVLMs) often generate plausible responses that are not faithfully grounded in diagnostic evidence and provide limited visual evidence for verification, while also requiring costly retraining to support new diagnostic tasks, limiting their reliability and adaptability in clinical settings. To address these limitations, we present CXReasonAgent, a diagnostic agent that integrates a large language model (LLM) with clinically grounded diagnostic tools to perform evidence-grounded diagnostic reasoning using image-derived diagnostic and visual evidence. To evaluate these capabilities, we introduce CXReasonDial, a multi-turn dialogue benchmark with 1,946 dialogues across 12 diagnostic tasks, and show that CXReasonAgent produces faithfully grounded responses, enabling more reliable and verifiable diagnostic reasoning than LVLMs. These findings highlight the importance of integrating clinically grounded diagnostic tools, particularly in safety-critical clinical settings.

Safe Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms are typically evaluated under fixed training conditions. We investigate whether training-time safety guarantees transfer to deployment under distribution shift, using diabetes management as a safety-critical testbed. We benchmark safe RL algorithms on a unified clinical simulator and reveal a safety generalization gap: policies satisfying constraints during training frequently violate safety requirements on unseen patients. We demonstrate that test-time shielding, which filters unsafe actions using learned dynamics models, effectively restores safety across algorithms and patient populations. Across eight safe RL algorithms, three diabetes types, and three age groups, shielding achieves Time-in-Range gains of 13--14\% for strong baselines such as PPO-Lag and CPO while reducing clinical risk index and glucose variability. Our simulator and benchmark provide a platform for studying safety under distribution shift in safety-critical control domains. Code is available at https://github.com/safe-autonomy-lab/GlucoSim and https://github.com/safe-autonomy-lab/GlucoAlg.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. However, their deployment in safety-critical domains poses significant challenges. Existing safety fine-tuning methods, which focus on textual or multimodal content, fall short in addressing challenging cases or disrupt the balance between helpfulness and harmlessness. Our evaluation highlights a safety reasoning gap: these methods lack safety visual reasoning ability, leading to such bottlenecks. To address this limitation and enhance both visual perception and reasoning in safety-critical contexts, we propose a novel dataset that integrates multi-image inputs with safety Chain-of-Thought (CoT) labels as fine-grained reasoning logic to improve model performance. Specifically, we introduce the Multi-Image Safety (MIS) dataset, an instruction-following dataset tailored for multi-image safety scenarios, consisting of training and test splits. Our experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning InternVL2.5-8B with MIS significantly outperforms both powerful open-source models and API-based models in challenging multi-image tasks requiring safety-related visual reasoning. This approach not only delivers exceptional safety performance but also preserves general capabilities without any trade-offs. Specifically, fine-tuning with MIS increases average accuracy by 0.83% across five general benchmarks and reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) on multiple safety benchmarks by a large margin. Data and Models are released under: https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/{https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/}

Although large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities on complex tasks, recent studies reveal that these models frequently fulfill harmful user instructions, raising significant safety concerns. In this paper, we investigate the underlying cause of LRM safety risks and find that models already possess sufficient safety knowledge but fail to activate it during reasoning. Based on this insight, we propose R1-Act, a simple and efficient post-training method that explicitly triggers safety knowledge through a structured reasoning process. R1-Act achieves strong safety improvements while preserving reasoning performance, outperforming prior alignment methods. Notably, it requires only 1,000 training examples and 90 minutes of training on a single RTX A6000 GPU. Extensive experiments across multiple LRM backbones and sizes demonstrate the robustness, scalability, and practical efficiency of our approach.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained attention due to their ability to understand and generate sophisticated human-like content. However, ensuring their safety is paramount as they might provide harmful and unsafe responses. Existing LLM testing frameworks address various safety-related concerns (e.g., drugs, terrorism, animal abuse) but often face challenges due to unbalanced and obsolete datasets. In this paper, we present ASTRAL, a tool that automates the generation and execution of test cases (i.e., prompts) for testing the safety of LLMs. First, we introduce a novel black-box coverage criterion to generate balanced and diverse unsafe test inputs across a diverse set of safety categories as well as linguistic writing characteristics (i.e., different style and persuasive writing techniques). Second, we propose an LLM-based approach that leverages Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), few-shot prompting strategies and web browsing to generate up-to-date test inputs. Lastly, similar to current LLM test automation techniques, we leverage LLMs as test oracles to distinguish between safe and unsafe test outputs, allowing a fully automated testing approach. We conduct an extensive evaluation on well-known LLMs, revealing the following key findings: i) GPT3.5 outperforms other LLMs when acting as the test oracle, accurately detecting unsafe responses, and even surpassing more recent LLMs (e.g., GPT-4), as well as LLMs that are specifically tailored to detect unsafe LLM outputs (e.g., LlamaGuard); ii) the results confirm that our approach can uncover nearly twice as many unsafe LLM behaviors with the same number of test inputs compared to currently used static datasets; and iii) our black-box coverage criterion combined with web browsing can effectively guide the LLM on generating up-to-date unsafe test inputs, significantly increasing the number of unsafe LLM behaviors.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to harmful input compared to their language-only backbones. We investigated this vulnerability by exploring LVLMs internal dynamics, framing their inherent safety understanding in terms of three key capabilities. Specifically, we define these capabilities as safety perception, semantic understanding, and alignment for linguistic expression, and experimentally pinpointed their primary locations within the model architecture. The results indicate that safety perception often emerges before comprehensive semantic understanding, leading to the reduction in safety. Motivated by these findings, we propose Self-Aware Safety Augmentation (SASA), a technique that projects informative semantic representations from intermediate layers onto earlier safety-oriented layers. This approach leverages the model's inherent semantic understanding to enhance safety recognition without fine-tuning. Then, we employ linear probing to articulate the model's internal semantic comprehension to detect the risk before the generation process. Extensive experiments on various datasets and tasks demonstrate that SASA significantly improves the safety of LVLMs, with minimal impact on the utility.

Large language models are increasingly used as planners for robotic systems, yet how safely they plan remains an open question. To evaluate safe planning systematically, we introduce DESPITE, a benchmark of 12,279 tasks spanning physical and normative dangers with fully deterministic validation. Across 23 models, even near-perfect planning ability does not ensure safety: the best-planning model fails to produce a valid plan on only 0.4% of tasks but produces dangerous plans on 28.3%. Among 18 open-source models from 3B to 671B parameters, planning ability improves substantially with scale (0.4-99.3%) while safety awareness remains relatively flat (38-57%). We identify a multiplicative relationship between these two capacities, showing that larger models complete more tasks safely primarily through improved planning, not through better danger avoidance. Three proprietary reasoning models reach notably higher safety awareness (71-81%), while non-reasoning proprietary models and open-source reasoning models remain below 57%. As planning ability approaches saturation for frontier models, improving safety awareness becomes a central challenge for deploying language-model planners in robotic systems.

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is critical for responsible deployment, yet existing evaluations often prioritize performance over identifying failure modes. We introduce Phare, a multilingual diagnostic framework to probe and evaluate LLM behavior across three critical dimensions: hallucination and reliability, social biases, and harmful content generation. Our evaluation of 17 state-of-the-art LLMs reveals patterns of systematic vulnerabilities across all safety dimensions, including sycophancy, prompt sensitivity, and stereotype reproduction. By highlighting these specific failure modes rather than simply ranking models, Phare provides researchers and practitioners with actionable insights to build more robust, aligned, and trustworthy language systems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have exhibited extraordinary prowess in tasks like mathematics and coding, leveraging their advanced reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, as these capabilities progress, significant concerns regarding their vulnerabilities and safety have arisen, which can pose challenges to their deployment and application in real-world settings. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of LRMs, meticulously exploring and summarizing the newly emerged safety risks, attacks, and defense strategies. By organizing these elements into a detailed taxonomy, this work aims to offer a clear and structured understanding of the current safety landscape of LRMs, facilitating future research and development to enhance the security and reliability of these powerful models.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Truly multilingual safety moderation efforts for Large Language Models (LLMs) have been hindered by a narrow focus on a small set of languages (e.g., English, Chinese) as well as a limited scope of safety definition, resulting in significant gaps in moderation capabilities. To bridge these gaps, we release POLYGUARD, a new state-of-the-art multilingual safety model for safeguarding LLM generations, and the corresponding training and evaluation datasets. POLYGUARD is trained on POLYGUARDMIX, the largest multilingual safety training corpus to date containing 1.91M samples across 17 languages (e.g., Chinese, Czech, English, Hindi). We also introduce POLYGUARDPROMPTS, a high quality multilingual benchmark with 29K samples for the evaluation of safety guardrails. Created by combining naturally occurring multilingual human-LLM interactions and human-verified machine translations of an English-only safety dataset (WildGuardMix; Han et al., 2024), our datasets contain prompt-output pairs with labels of prompt harmfulness, response harmfulness, and response refusal. Through extensive evaluations across multiple safety and toxicity benchmarks, we demonstrate that POLYGUARD outperforms existing state-of-the-art open-weight and commercial safety classifiers by 5.5%. Our contributions advance efforts toward safer multilingual LLMs for all global users.

Anomaly detection plays a crucial role in the field of predictive maintenance for wind turbines, yet the comparison of different algorithms poses a difficult task because domain specific public datasets are scarce. Many comparisons of different approaches either use benchmarks composed of data from many different domains, inaccessible data or one of the few publicly available datasets which lack detailed information about the faults. Moreover, many publications highlight a couple of case studies where fault detection was successful. With this paper we publish a high quality dataset that contains data from 36 wind turbines across 3 different wind farms as well as the most detailed fault information of any public wind turbine dataset as far as we know. The new dataset contains 89 years worth of real-world operating data of wind turbines, distributed across 44 labeled time frames for anomalies that led up to faults, as well as 51 time series representing normal behavior. Additionally, the quality of training data is ensured by turbine-status-based labels for each data point. Furthermore, we propose a new scoring method, called CARE (Coverage, Accuracy, Reliability and Earliness), which takes advantage of the information depth that is present in the dataset to identify a good all-around anomaly detection model. This score considers the anomaly detection performance, the ability to recognize normal behavior properly and the capability to raise as few false alarms as possible while simultaneously detecting anomalies early.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) show promising potential in assistive tasks across various domains, including mobile device control. As these agents interact directly with personal information and device settings, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior is crucial to prevent undesirable outcomes. However, no benchmark exists for standardized evaluation of the safety of mobile device-control agents. In this work, we introduce MobileSafetyBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of device-control agents within a realistic mobile environment based on Android emulators. We develop a diverse set of tasks involving interactions with various mobile applications, including messaging and banking applications. To clearly evaluate safety apart from general capabilities, we design separate tasks measuring safety and tasks evaluating helpfulness. The safety tasks challenge agents with managing potential risks prevalent in daily life and include tests to evaluate robustness against indirect prompt injections. Our experiments demonstrate that while baseline agents, based on state-of-the-art LLMs, perform well in executing helpful tasks, they show poor performance in safety tasks. To mitigate these safety concerns, we propose a prompting method that encourages agents to prioritize safety considerations. While this method shows promise in promoting safer behaviors, there is still considerable room for improvement to fully earn user trust. This highlights the urgent need for continued research to develop more robust safety mechanisms in mobile environments. We open-source our benchmark at: https://mobilesafetybench.github.io/.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, the risk of generating harmful or toxic content remains a central challenge. Post-hoc alignment methods are brittle: once unsafe patterns are learned during pretraining, they are hard to remove. We present a data-centric pretraining framework that builds safety into the model from the start. Our contributions include: (i) a safety classifier trained on 10,000 GPT-4 labeled examples, used to filter 600B tokens; (ii) the largest synthetic safety dataset to date (100B tokens) generated via recontextualization of harmful web data; (iii) RefuseWeb and Moral Education datasets that convert harmful prompts into refusal dialogues and web-style educational material; (iv) Harmfulness-Tag annotations injected during pretraining to flag unsafe content and steer away inference from harmful generations; and (v) safety evaluations measuring base model behavior before instruction tuning. Our safety-pretrained models reduce attack success rates from 38.8% to 8.4% with no performance degradation on standard LLM safety benchmarks.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into operational workflows (LLM-Ops), there is a pressing need for effective guardrails to ensure safe and aligned interactions, including the ability to detect potentially unsafe or inappropriate content across languages. However, existing safe-for-work classifiers are primarily focused on English text. To address this gap for the Malaysian language, we present a novel safe-for-work text classifier tailored specifically for Malaysian language content. By curating and annotating a first-of-its-kind dataset of Malaysian text spanning multiple content categories, we trained a classification model capable of identifying potentially unsafe material using state-of-the-art natural language processing techniques. This work represents an important step in enabling safer interactions and content filtering to mitigate potential risks and ensure responsible deployment of LLMs. To maximize accessibility and promote further research towards enhancing alignment in LLM-Ops for the Malaysian context, the model is publicly released at https://huggingface.co/malaysia-ai/malaysian-sfw-classifier.

Instruction tuned reasoning models are increasingly deployed with safety classifiers trained on frozen embeddings, assuming representation stability across model updates. We systematically investigate this assumption and find it fails: normalized perturbations of magnitude σ=0.02 (corresponding to approx 1^circ angular drift on the embedding sphere) reduce classifier performance from 85% to 50% ROC-AUC. Critically, mean confidence only drops 14%, producing dangerous silent failures where 72% of misclassifications occur with high confidence, defeating standard monitoring. We further show that instruction-tuned models exhibit 20% worse class separability than base models, making aligned systems paradoxically harder to safeguard. Our findings expose a fundamental fragility in production AI safety architectures and challenge the assumption that safety mechanisms transfer across model versions.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.