Daily Papers

We present a machine-checked formalization of structurally governed AI workflow architectures and prove that effect-level governance can be imposed without reducing internal computational expressivity. Using Interaction Trees in Rocq 8.19, we define a governance operator G that mediates all effectful directives, including memory access, external calls, and oracle (LLM) queries. Our development compiles with 0 admitted lemmas and consists of 36 modules, ~12,000 lines of Rocq, and 454 theorems. We establishseven properties: (P1) governed Turing completeness, (P2) governed oracle expressivity, (P3) a decidability boundary in which governance predicates are total and closed under Boolean composition while semantic program properties remain non-trivial and undecidable by governance, (P4) goal preservation for permitted executions, (P5) expressive minimality of primitive capabilities (compute, memory, reasoning, external call, observability), (P6) subsumption asymmetry showing structural governance strictly subsumes content-level filtering, and (P7) semantic transparency: on all executions where governance permits, the governed interpretation is observationally equivalent (modulo governance-only events) to the ungoverned interpretation. Together, these results show that governance and computational expressivity are orthogonal dimensions: governance constrains the effect boundary of programs while remaining semantically transparent to internal computation.

Instruction tuning in low-resource languages remains underexplored due to limited text data, particularly in government and cultural domains. To address this, we introduce and open-source a large-scale (10,600 samples) instruction-following (IFT) dataset, covering key institutional and cultural knowledge relevant to Kazakhstan. Our dataset enhances LLMs' understanding of procedural, legal, and structural governance topics. We employ LLM-assisted data generation, comparing open-weight and closed-weight models for dataset construction, and select GPT-4o as the backbone. Each entity of our dataset undergoes full manual verification to ensure high quality. We also show that fine-tuning Qwen, Falcon, and Gemma on our dataset leads to consistent performance improvements in both multiple-choice and generative tasks, demonstrating the potential of LLM-assisted instruction tuning for low-resource languages.

As autonomous AI agents transition from code completion tools to full-fledged teammates capable of opening pull requests (PRs) at scale, software maintainers face a new challenge: not just reviewing code, but managing complex interaction loops with non-human contributors. This paradigm shift raises a critical question: can we predict which agent-generated PRs will consume excessive review effort before any human interaction begins? Analyzing 33,707 agent-authored PRs from the AIDev dataset across 2,807 repositories, we uncover a striking two-regime behavioral pattern that fundamentally distinguishes autonomous agents from human developers. The first regime, representing 28.3 percent of all PRs, consists of instant merges (less than 1 minute), reflecting success on narrow automation tasks. The second regime involves iterative review cycles where agents frequently stall or abandon refinement (ghosting). We propose a Circuit Breaker triage model that predicts high-review-effort PRs (top 20 percent) at creation time using only static structural features. A LightGBM model achieves AUC 0.957 on a temporal split, while semantic text features (TF-IDF, CodeBERT) provide negligible predictive value. At a 20 percent review budget, the model intercepts 69 percent of total review effort, enabling zero-latency governance. Our findings challenge prevailing assumptions in AI-assisted code review: review burden is dictated by what agents touch, not what they say, highlighting the need for structural governance mechanisms in human-AI collaboration.

Through a systematic review of academic literature, we propose a taxonomy of systemic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), in particular general-purpose AI. Following the EU AI Act's definition, we consider systemic risks as large-scale threats that can affect entire societies or economies. Starting with an initial pool of 1,781 documents, we analyzed 86 selected papers to identify 13 categories of systemic risks and 50 contributing sources. Our findings reveal a complex landscape of potential threats, ranging from environmental harm and structural discrimination to governance failures and loss of control. Key sources of systemic risk emerge from knowledge gaps, challenges in recognizing harm, and the unpredictable trajectory of AI development. The taxonomy provides a snapshot of current academic literature on systemic risks. This paper contributes to AI safety research by providing a structured groundwork for understanding and addressing the potential large-scale negative societal impacts of general-purpose AI. The taxonomy can inform policymakers in risk prioritization and regulatory development.

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

Risk decision systems in fraud detection and credit scoring operate under structural label absence: ground truth arrives weeks to months after decisions are made. During this blind period, model performance may degrade silently, eroding the governance evidence that justifies automated decisions. Existing drift detection methods either require labels (supervised detectors) or detect statistical change without distinguishing harmful degradation from benign distributional evolution (unsupervised detectors). No existing framework integrates drift detection with governance evidence assessment and operational response. This paper presents a label-free governance monitoring extension to the Governance Drift Toolkit that produces governance alerts rather than statistical alarms. The monitoring architecture applies composite multi-proxy monitoring across four proxy monitors (score distribution, feature drift, prediction entropy, confidence distribution), with governance-calibrated thresholds. Empirical evaluation on the Lending Club credit scoring dataset (1.37M loans, 11 years) demonstrates three findings. First, raw proxy metrics (Feature PSI delta up to 1.84, Score PSI delta up to 0.92) distinguish injected covariate degradation from natural temporal drift in an offline evaluation setting. Second, pure concept drift in P(Y|X) produces exactly zero delta across all proxy metrics in all windows, confirming the irreducible blind spot of label-free monitoring as a structural verification. Third, the composite score provides monotonic severity progression as more monitors trigger (0.583 to 0.833 to 1.000), enabling graduated governance response. Cross-domain comparison with IEEE-CIS fraud detection results shows the detectable/undetectable boundary is consistent across both domains. The toolkit and evaluation code are available as open-source artifacts.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

Existing multi-agent frameworks allow each agent to simultaneously plan, execute, and evaluate its own actions -- a structural deficiency we term the "Logic Monopoly." Empirical evidence quantifies the resulting "Reliability Gap": 84.30% average attack success rates across ten deployment scenarios, 31.4% emergent deceptive behavior without explicit reward signals, and cascading failure modes rooted in six structural bottlenecks. The remedy is not better alignment of individual models but a social contract for agents: institutional infrastructure that enforces a constitutional Separation of Power. This paper introduces the Agent Enterprise for Enterprise (AE4E) paradigm -- agents as autonomous, legally identifiable business entities within a functionalist social system -- with a contract-centric SoP model trifurcating authority into Legislation, Execution, and Adjudication branches. The paradigm is operationalized through the NetX Enterprise Framework (NEF): governance hubs, TEE-backed compute enclaves, privacy-preserving data bridges, and an Agent-Native blockchain substrate. The Agent Enterprise Economy scales across four deployment tiers from private enclaves to a global Web of Services. The Agentic Social Layer, grounded in Parsons' AGIL framework, provides institutional infrastructure via sixty-plus named Institutional AE4Es. 143 pages, 173 references, eight specialized smart contracts.

In January 2026, the open-source agent framework OpenClaw and the agent-only social network Moltbook produced a large-scale dataset of autonomous AI-to-AI interaction, attracting six academic publications within fourteen days. This study conducts a multivocal literature review of that ecosystem and presents ClawdLab, an open-source platform for autonomous scientific research, as a design science response to the architectural failure modes identified. The literature documents emergent collective phenomena, security vulnerabilities spanning 131 agent skills and over 15,200 exposed control panels, and five recurring architectural patterns. ClawdLab addresses these failure modes through hard role restrictions, structured adversarial critique, PI-led governance, multi-model orchestration, and domain-specific evidence requirements encoded as protocol constraints that ground validation in computational tool outputs rather than social consensus; the architecture provides emergent Sybil resistance as a structural consequence. A three-tier taxonomy distinguishes single-agent pipelines, predetermined multi-agent workflows, and fully decentralised systems, analysing why leading AI co-scientist platforms remain confined to the first two tiers. ClawdLab's composable third-tier architecture, in which foundation models, capabilities, governance, and evidence requirements are independently modifiable, enables compounding improvement as the broader AI ecosystem advances.

The most important architectural problem in AI is not the size of the model but the absence of a layer that carries forward what the model has come to understand. Sessions end. Context windows fill. Memory APIs return flat facts that the model has to reinterpret from scratch on every read. The result is intelligence that is powerful per session and amnesiac across time. This position paper argues that the layer which fixes this, the continuity layer, is the most consequential piece of infrastructure the field has not yet built, and that the engineering work to build it has begun in public. The formal evaluation framework for the property described here is the ATANT benchmark (arXiv:2604.06710), published separately with evaluation results on a 250-story corpus; a companion paper (arXiv:2604.10981) positions this framework against existing memory, long-context, and agentic-memory benchmarks. The paper defines continuity as a system property with seven required characteristics, distinct from memory and from retrieval; describes a storage primitive (Decomposed Trace Convergence Memory) whose write-time decomposition and read-time reconstruction produce that property; maps the engineering architecture to the theological pattern of kenosis and the symbolic pattern of Alpha and Omega, and argues this mapping is structural rather than metaphorical; proposes a four-layer development arc from external SDK to hardware node to long-horizon human infrastructure; examines why the physics limits now constraining the model layer make the continuity layer newly consequential; and argues that the governance architecture (privacy implemented as physics rather than policy, founder-controlled class shares on non-negotiable architectural commitments) is inseparable from the product itself.

Sustainability disclosure standards (e.g., GRI, SASB, TCFD, IFRS S2) are comprehensive yet lengthy, terminology-dense, and highly cross-referential, hindering structured analysis and downstream use. We present SSKG Hub (Sustainability Standards Knowledge Graph Hub), a research prototype and interactive web platform that transforms standards into auditable knowledge graphs (KGs) through an LLM-centered, expert-guided pipeline. The system integrates automatic standard identification, configurable chunking, standard-specific prompting, robust triple parsing, and provenance-aware Neo4j storage with fine-grained audit metadata. LLM extraction produces a provenance-linked Draft KG, which is reviewed, curated, and formally promoted to a Certified KG through meta-expert adjudication. A role-based governance framework covering read-only guest access, expert review and CRUD operations, meta-expert certification, and administrative oversight ensures traceability and accountability across draft and certified states. Beyond graph exploration and triple-level evidence tracing, SSKG Hub supports cross-KG fusion, KG-driven tasks, and dedicated modules for insights and curated resources. We validate the platform through a comprehensive expert-led KG review case study that demonstrates end-to-end curation and quality assurance. The web application is publicly available at www.sskg-hub.com.

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena{GitHub}.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

Privacy policies are supposed to provide notice. But what if substantive information appears only where users skip it? We identify a structural pattern we call jurisdiction-siloed disclosure: information about data practices appearing in specific, actionable form only within regional compliance sections labeled "California Residents" or "EU/UK Users," while general sections use vague or qualified language for the same practices. Our audit of 123 major companies identifies 282 potential instances across 77 companies (62.6% of this purposive sample). A conservative estimate restricted to practice categories validated against OPP-115 human annotations finds 138 instances across 54 companies (44%); post-2018 categories central to our findings await independent validation. If users skip jurisdiction-labeled sections as information foraging theory predicts, users outside regulated jurisdictions would receive less specific information about practices affecting them--a transparency failure operating through document architecture rather than omission. We propose universal substantive disclosure: practices affecting all users should appear in the main policy body, with regional sections containing only procedural rights information. This standard finds support in analogous disclosure regimes (securities, truth-in-lending, nutritional labeling) where material information must reach all affected parties. Regulators could operationalize this through the FTC's "clear and conspicuous" standard and GDPR transparency principles. This work is hypothesis-generating: we establish that the structural pattern exists and ground the transparency concern in behavioral theory, but direct measurement of jurisdiction-specific section skipping remains the critical validation priority. We release our methodology and annotated dataset to enable replication.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

This document serves as an overview of the different mechanisms and areas of governance in the BigCode project. It aims to support transparency by providing relevant information about choices that were made during the project to the broader public, and to serve as an example of intentional governance of an open research project that future endeavors can leverage to shape their own approach. The first section, Project Structure, covers the project organization, its stated goals and values, its internal decision processes, and its funding and resources. The second section, Data and Model Governance, covers decisions relating to the questions of data subject consent, privacy, and model release.

The growing need for accountability of the people behind AI systems can be addressed by leveraging processes in three fields of study: ethics, law, and computer science. While these fields are often considered in isolation, they rely on complementary notions in their interpretation and implementation. In this work, we detail this interdependence and motivate the necessary role of collaborative governance tools in shaping a positive evolution of AI. We first contrast notions of compliance in the ethical, legal, and technical fields; we outline both their differences and where they complement each other, with a particular focus on the roles of ethical charters, licenses, and technical documentation in these interactions. We then focus on the role of values in articulating the synergies between the fields and outline specific mechanisms of interaction between them in practice. We identify how these mechanisms have played out in several open governance fora: an open collaborative workshop, a responsible licensing initiative, and a proposed regulatory framework. By leveraging complementary notions of compliance in these three domains, we can create a more comprehensive framework for governing AI systems that jointly takes into account their technical capabilities, their impact on society, and how technical specifications can inform relevant regulations. Our analysis thus underlines the necessity of joint consideration of the ethical, legal, and technical in AI ethics frameworks to be used on a larger scale to govern AI systems and how the thinking in each of these areas can inform the others.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

The recent emergence and adoption of Machine Learning technology, and specifically of Large Language Models, has drawn attention to the need for systematic and transparent management of language data. This work proposes an approach to global language data governance that attempts to organize data management amongst stakeholders, values, and rights. Our proposal is informed by prior work on distributed governance that accounts for human values and grounded by an international research collaboration that brings together researchers and practitioners from 60 countries. The framework we present is a multi-party international governance structure focused on language data, and incorporating technical and organizational tools needed to support its work.

Addressing a structural-engineering request requires more than a single answer; it requires a chain of interdependent artifacts: interpreted requirements, a computable model, validation records, solver outputs, code-check records, and a final report. Evaluations centered on question answering or script generation rarely verify this complete evidence chain and may therefore reward fluent outputs even when the underlying engineering workflow is incomplete, internally inconsistent, or non-executable. To address this limitation, we present StructureClaw, an artifact-centered workbench in which LLM agents operate through governed engineering skills, typed tools, shared artifact state, and local analysis backends. We also introduce StructureClaw-Bench, an executable benchmark of 150 controlled scenarios spanning standard workflow execution, interactive robustness, and multimodal structural-model reconstruction. A scenario succeeds only when all required artifact- and execution-level assertions pass in a single run. Across ten agent-model configurations, each evaluated on the same 50 standard cases, the average Success Rate rises from 56.8% with the generic-skill baseline to 88.6% with the full automatic workflow. The interactive and multimodal evaluations identify two prominent remaining challenges: safe handling of invalid numerical inputs and fixture-consistent reconstruction of structural models. These findings show that artifact-centered evaluation can expose workflow-level failures that are difficult to identify from final responses alone, providing a more rigorous basis for evaluating and improving structural-engineering agents. The code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/structureclaw/structureclaw.

This paper argues that market governance mechanisms should be considered a key approach in the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), alongside traditional regulatory frameworks. While current governance approaches have predominantly focused on regulation, we contend that market-based mechanisms offer effective incentives for responsible AI development. We examine four emerging vectors of market governance: insurance, auditing, procurement, and due diligence, demonstrating how these mechanisms can affirm the relationship between AI risk and financial risk while addressing capital allocation inefficiencies. While we do not claim that market forces alone can adequately protect societal interests, we maintain that standardised AI disclosures and market mechanisms can create powerful incentives for safe and responsible AI development. This paper urges regulators, economists, and machine learning researchers to investigate and implement market-based approaches to AI governance.

The scholarly publishing ecosystem faces a dual crisis of unmanageable submission volumes and unregulated AI, creating an urgent need for new governance models to safeguard scientific integrity. The traditional human-only peer review regime lacks a scalable, objective benchmark, making editorial processes opaque and difficult to audit. Here we investigate a deterministic simulation framework that provides the first stable, evidence-based standard for evaluating AI-generated peer review reports. Analyzing 352 peer-review simulation reports, we identify consistent system state indicators that demonstrate its reliability. First, the system is able to simulate calibrated editorial judgment, with 'Revise' decisions consistently forming the majority outcome (>50%) across all disciplines, while 'Reject' rates dynamically adapt to field-specific norms, rising to 45% in Health Sciences. Second, it maintains unwavering procedural integrity, enforcing a stable 29% evidence-anchoring compliance rate that remains invariant across diverse review tasks and scientific domains. These findings demonstrate a system that is predictably rule-bound, mitigating the stochasticity of generative AI. For the scientific community, this provides a transparent tool to ensure fairness; for publishing strategists, it offers a scalable instrument for auditing workflows, managing integrity risks, and implementing evidence-based governance. The framework repositions AI as an essential component of institutional accountability, providing the critical infrastructure to maintain trust in scholarly communication.