Daily Papers

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable progress in scaling to access massive contexts. However, the access is via the latent and uninterpretable attention mechanisms, and LLMs fail to effective process long context, exhibiting significant performance degradation as context length increases. In this work, we study whether long-context processing can be externalized from latent attention into explicit, executable interactions, by allowing coding agents to organize text in file systems and manipulate it using its native tools. We evaluate off-the-shelf frontier coding agents as the general interface for tasks that require processing long contexts, including long-context reasoning, retrieval-augmented generation, and open-domain question answering with large-scale corpus contains up to three trillion tokens. Across multiple benchmarks, these agents outperform published state-of-the-art by 17.3% on average. We attribute this efficacy to two key factors: native tool proficiency, which enables agents to leverage executable code and terminal commands rather than passive semantic queries, and file system familiarity, which allows them to navigate massive text corpora as directory structures. These findings suggest that delegating long-context processing to coding agents offers an effective alternative to semantic search or context window scaling, opening new directions for long-context processing in LLMs.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

The NLC2CMD Competition hosted at NeurIPS 2020 aimed to bring the power of natural language processing to the command line. Participants were tasked with building models that can transform descriptions of command line tasks in English to their Bash syntax. This is a report on the competition with details of the task, metrics, data, attempted solutions, and lessons learned.

We present new data and semantic parsing methods for the problem of mapping English sentences to Bash commands (NL2Bash). Our long-term goal is to enable any user to perform operations such as file manipulation, search, and application-specific scripting by simply stating their goals in English. We take a first step in this domain, by providing a new dataset of challenging but commonly used Bash commands and expert-written English descriptions, along with baseline methods to establish performance levels on this task.

The Unix terminal, or just simply, the terminal, can be found being applied in almost every facet of computing. It is available across all major platforms and often integrated into other applications. Due to its ubiquity, even marginal improvements to the terminal have the potential to make massive improvements to productivity on a global scale. We believe that evolutionary improvements to the terminal, in its current incarnation as windowed terminal emulator, are possible and that developing a thorough understanding of issues that current terminal users face is fundamental to knowing how the terminal should evolve. In order to develop that understanding we have mined Unix and Linux Stack Exchange using a fully-reproducible method which was able to extract and categorize 91.0% of 1,489 terminal-related questions (from the full set of nearly 240,000 questions) without manual intervention. We present an analysis, to our knowledge the first of its kind, of windowed terminal-related questions posted over a 15-year period and viewed, in aggregate, approximately 40 million times. As expected, given its longevity, we find the terminal's many features being applied across a wide variety of use cases. We find evidence that the terminal, as windowed terminal emulator, has neither fully adapted to its now current graphical environment nor completely untangled itself from features more suited to incarnations in previous environments. We also find evidence of areas where we believe the terminal could be extended along with other areas where it could be simplified. Surprisingly, while many current efforts to improve the terminal include improving the terminal's social and collaborative aspects, we find little evidence of this as a prominent pain point.

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) provide structured textual environments for system administration. Explorations have been performed using pre-trained language models (PLMs) to simulate these environments for safe interaction in high-risk environments. However, their use has been constrained to frozen, large parameter models like GPT. For smaller architectures to reach a similar level of believability, a rich dataset of CLI interactions is required. Existing public datasets focus on mapping natural-language tasks to commands, omitting crucial execution data such as exit codes, outputs, and environmental side effects, limiting their usability for behavioral modeling. We introduce a Shell Input -Output Environment (ShIOEnv), which casts command construction as a Markov Decision Process whose state is the partially built sequence and whose actions append arguments. After each action, ShIOEnv executes the candidate and returns its exit status, output, and progress toward a minimal-length behavioral objective. Due to the intractable nature of the combinatorial argument state-action space, we derive a context-free grammar from man pages to mask invalid arguments from being emitted. We explore random and proximal-policy optimization (PPO)-optimized sampling of unrestricted and grammar-masked action spaces to produce four exploration strategies. We observed that grammar masking and PPO significantly improve sample efficiency to produce a higher quality dataset (maximizing the number of arguments while minimizing redundancies). Policy-generated datasets of shell input-output behavior pairs are used to fine-tune CodeT5, where we observe 85% improvements in BLEU-4 when constraining the action space to grammar productions with an additional 26% improvement when applying PPO. The ShIOEnv environment and curated command behavior datasets are released for use in future research.

We release Terminal Wrench, a subset of 331 terminal-agent benchmark environments, copied from the popular open benchmarks that are demonstrably reward-hackable. The data set includes 3,632 hack trajectories and 2,352 legitimate baseline trajectories across three frontier models (Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4). Each entry preserves the original task definition alongside full attack trajectories that show how the verifier was bypassed. It also includes cases where the task was not solved as intended. The tasks span system administration, machine learning, software engineering, and security challenges; the exploits range from simple output spoofing to stack-frame introspection, standard-library patching, and rootkit-style binary hijacking. Crucially, these exploits are specific to each task, rather than the evaluation harness, making them harder to patch. We also present a monitorability study in which hack trajectories are sanitized or stripped of reasoning traces and then scored by an LLM judge, showing that detection degrades meaningfully when chain-of-thought is removed (AUC drops from 0.97 to 0.92). The data set is publicly available at https://github.com/few-sh/terminal-wrench.

Training agentic models for terminal-based tasks critically depends on high-quality terminal trajectories that capture realistic long-horizon interactions across diverse domains. However, constructing such data at scale remains challenging due to two key requirements: \emph{Executability}, since each instance requires a suitable and often distinct Docker environment; and \emph{Verifiability}, because heterogeneous task outputs preclude unified, standardized verification. To address these challenges, we propose TerminalTraj, a scalable pipeline that (i) filters high-quality repositories to construct Dockerized execution environments, (ii) generates Docker-aligned task instances, and (iii) synthesizes agent trajectories with executable validation code. Using TerminalTraj, we curate 32K Docker images and generate 50,733 verified terminal trajectories across eight domains. Models trained on this data with the Qwen2.5-Coder backbone achieve consistent performance improvements on TerminalBench (TB), with gains of up to 20\% on TB~1.0 and 10\% on TB~2.0 over their respective backbones. Notably, TerminalTraj-32B achieves strong performance among models with fewer than 100B parameters, reaching 35.30\% on TB~1.0 and 22.00\% on TB~2.0, and demonstrates improved test-time scaling behavior. All code and data are available at https://github.com/Wusiwei0410/TerminalTraj.

The Bourne-Again Shell (Bash) command-line interface for Linux systems has complex syntax and requires extensive specialized knowledge. Using the natural language to Bash command (NL2SH) translation capabilities of large language models (LLMs) for command composition circumvents these issues. However, the NL2SH performance of LLMs is difficult to assess due to inaccurate test data and unreliable heuristics for determining the functional equivalence of Bash commands. We present a manually verified test dataset of 600 instruction-command pairs and a training dataset of 40,939 pairs, increasing the size of previous datasets by 441% and 135%, respectively. Further, we present a novel functional equivalence heuristic that combines command execution with LLM evaluation of command outputs. Our heuristic can determine the functional equivalence of two Bash commands with 95% confidence, a 16% increase over previous heuristics. Evaluation of popular LLMs using our test dataset and heuristic demonstrates that parsing, in-context learning, in-weight learning, and constrained decoding can improve NL2SH accuracy by up to 32%. Our findings emphasize the importance of dataset quality, execution-based evaluation and translation method for advancing NL2SH translation. Our code is available at https://github.com/westenfelder/NL2SH

Despite rapid recent progress in the terminal capabilities of large language models, the training data strategies behind state-of-the-art terminal agents remain largely undisclosed. We address this gap through a systematic study of data engineering practices for terminal agents, making two key contributions: (1) Terminal-Task-Gen, a lightweight synthetic task generation pipeline that supports seed-based and skill-based task construction, and (2) a comprehensive analysis of data and training strategies, including filtering, curriculum learning, long context training, and scaling behavior. Our pipeline yields Terminal-Corpus, a large-scale open-source dataset for terminal tasks. Using this dataset, we train Nemotron-Terminal, a family of models initialized from Qwen3(8B, 14B, 32B) that achieve substantial gains on Terminal-Bench 2.0: Nemotron-Terminal-8B improves from 2.5% to 13.0% Nemotron-Terminal-14B improves from 4.0% to 20.2%, and Nemotron-Terminal-32B improves from 3.4% to 27.4%, matching the performance of significantly larger models. To accelerate research in this domain, we open-source our model checkpoints and most of our synthetic datasets at https://huggingface.co/collections/nvidia/nemotron-terminal.

Malicious shell commands are linchpins to many cyber-attacks, but may not be easy to understand by security analysts due to complicated and often disguised code structures. Advances in large language models (LLMs) have unlocked the possibility of generating understandable explanations for shell commands. However, existing general-purpose LLMs suffer from a lack of expert knowledge and a tendency to hallucinate in the task of shell command explanation. In this paper, we present Raconteur, a knowledgeable, expressive and portable shell command explainer powered by LLM. Raconteur is infused with professional knowledge to provide comprehensive explanations on shell commands, including not only what the command does (i.e., behavior) but also why the command does it (i.e., purpose). To shed light on the high-level intent of the command, we also translate the natural-language-based explanation into standard technique & tactic defined by MITRE ATT&CK, the worldwide knowledge base of cybersecurity. To enable Raconteur to explain unseen private commands, we further develop a documentation retriever to obtain relevant information from complementary documentations to assist the explanation process. We have created a large-scale dataset for training and conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the capability of Raconteur in shell command explanation. The experiments verify that Raconteur is able to provide high-quality explanations and in-depth insight of the intent of the command.