sentence-transformers How to use MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v9 with sentence-transformers:
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
model = SentenceTransformer("MaxNoichl/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v9", trust_remote_code=True)
sentences = [
"question may well be considered: What is the particular characteristic of a philosophical position which, with whatever unique aspects it may include, yet unites it with others as an expression of idealism? In the reply which follows, it is my hope that many idealists will concur, but I shall assume no more than that it offers what, to one idealist, seems pertinent to the issues which Professor Pratt raises. If I analyze his article correctly, these are five in number: (1) the place of the esse est percipi principle in idealistic philosophy; (2) the idealistic conception of reality, and in particular, the status of the objective world; (3) the idealistic view of knowledge; (4) the significance of the self; (5) the relation of idealism to realism. This is an extensive program, and its treatment here must be fragmentary at many points. Furthermore, it will be limited to the point of view of objective idealism, since subjective idealism is considered elsewhere in this publication by Professor Bri(rhtman. Esse Est Percipi In sug(resting that idealism should be mentalistic, proclaiming the doctrine, esse est percipi, Professor Pratt is reiterating a belief that has been held by numerous realistic thinkers in recent years. Just thirty years ago, Professor G. E. Moore published his wellknown refutation of the Berkeleian principle. To not a few idealists these arguments appeared brilliant and on many points including the issue of the principle itself as he interpreted it, convincing. But the objective idealist must protest that the designation",
"of the argument as a \"Refutation of Idealism\" seems a most regrettable misnomer. The misunderstandina has persisted not only in Professor Pratt's thought, but so frequently in realistic statements, that some attention must be directed towards it. Professor MIoore opened his essay by pointina out that the conclusion fundamentally characteristic of modern idealism is that the universe is spiritual. From this very acceptable statement, he proceeds to make a bewildering, hasty, and unconvincing passage to the position that if idealists think the world spiritual, they must regard it as having, its being in being consciously perceived. The assumption is made despite the fact that Professor Moore in the Principiac Ethica describes spiritual values as real parts of the objective world, to be discovered like the color yellow, merely by being, IS IDEALISMf REALISM? 423 observed. However, as we proceed with the \"refutation,\" we discover that the error of idealists does not lie in their believingfl that the world is spiritual-Professor Moore \"devoutly hopes\" that it may be so. Their peculiar error lies in their reason for holding this belief, which is, we are told, the esse est percipi argument. The candid reply is that for objective idealists at least, and they constitute a generous percentage of idealists of both the present and past generations, it is not. The subjective idealist may hold, indeed, that all that is real must be a conscious mind or perceived by such a mind; that there can be \"no object without a subject\"; that \"mind creates",
"that this \"mere fact\" must not be allowed to weigh in our calculations, since it can not be investigated by the \"method of agreement and difference.\" This is a startling instance 5\"Principles of Human Knowledge,\" paragraphs 50, 58. t of readiness to sacrifice empirical fact-admittedly universal-to methodological theory. The method of agreement and difference is a way of studying the relations of such phenomena as are difficult of observation because they are not always present. And yet we are called upon to eliminate from our philosophy an ever-present fact, the ego, because just this, its ubiquity, prevents our studying it by a logical method invented as an aid in the investigation of inconstant phenomena. Thus, to sum up our reply to this criticism: idealism can not be contradictory to the fundamental laws of logic, for these are laws of mental self-consistency. And subsidiary logical \"laws\" and \"methods\" are neither sacrosanct nor axiomatic. 2. We turn now to consider the alleged inconsistency of the idealistic position. It is urged by contemporary realists, as by those of Berkeley's day, that the distinction actually made by idealists between subject and object, percept and image, is possible only on the supposition that non-mental reality exists.10 The idealist admits that he makes this distinction. He, like other men, recognizes a difference between present and external, and merely imagined, objects. But he distinguishes the two kinds of things, not as extramental and mental, but as objects respectively of his shared and of his unshared consciousness,",
"actuality' signified, in the first instance, the social world, the nexus of interpersonal relationships among men, but it also included the realm of physical nature, as well as the instinctive drives and lower passions of the human soul itself. L Frank When Frank first succeeded in clothing this Romantic vision of human life in philosophical language, in the years 1904-1906, the language he employed was that of the Kantian or 'critical' tradition. On some level, the vision was undoubtedly prior to the Kantian clothing in which we find it draped in Frank's early philosophical writings; Frank would not have been attracted to Kantianism in the first place if the latter had not helped him articulate his own feelings and experience. But while conceding this, we must, at the same time, avoid exaggerating the independence of thought from concepts. It is doubtful whether the content of his own experience became fully explicit for Frank before he found, in the writings of Kant and his successors, the conceptual vocabulary with which to render it communicable. Although the works of Windelband were among the texts Frank read when he first launched his study of modern philosophy around 1900,9 it was not until a few years later that the influence of Windel band's ideas become manifest in Frank's own writings. In the intervening period, Frank was hired to produce a Russian transla tion of the German philosopher's best-known work, the collection of addresses and articles gathered together under the title of Pr?ludien [Preludes]. In his memoirs, Frank recalled having been"
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [4, 4] 
